TOPICS OF THE DAY.
THE REVOLUTION IN CONSTANTINOPLE.
1 T is exactly ten weeks since we published, on March 25th, before the first demonstration of the Softas, the follow- ing calculation :—" It is clear that much of all this [the fail- " ing position of Islam] is thoroughly known to the governing "class in Constantinople, and clear also that their blame for it "all is gradually concentrating itself upon the head of the "Sultan himself. They admit that he is ruining the country. "The mysterious reverence always paid to the Khalif has never "prevented exasperated Mohammedans from dethroning him, "and though the Sultan is strong in the absence of any Janissary "army, in the extinction of all self-dependent authorities, and "in the presence of his ironclad fleet in the Bosphorus, the "power to assail his throne can hardly be totally wanting. If "the half-coupons are ultimately not paid, the whole wealth of the Mosques, for which the Sheikh-ul-Islam is responsible, "will be swept away, and the Ulema will be irritated to mad- " ness. The Mohammedan mob, always liable to fits of fury, "has lately been burning palaces very close to the Seraglio. The "troops in Constantinople may be relied on against insurgents, "without being trustworthy against a new Sultan. The ele- " ments of conflagration lie heaped about in the capital, and it "is difficult to believe that the Pashas, at last affected in their "personal interests, and long aware of the ruin of their country "and their faith, will not find means of firing them. If they "are convinced, as they are said to be convinced, that the Sultan "is responsible, the natural thought must be to dethrone him ; "and that, as it happens, has been the regular course of the his- " tory of Turkey. On the whole, the balance of probability is that "a movement may occur, an active demonstration from some "class of the community, and that, disliked by Christians as an "oppressor, distrusted by Mohammedans as a Giaour, and de- " spised by the officials as unable to govern, the Sultan, like "Louis Philippe, may find no one to defend him. In that "event, the Revolution would succeed, the present ruler would "be sent away, and a new Sultan would try the doubtful ex- " periment of reinvigorating an empire which we believe to be "past all hope, except from the aid of a man of genius sprung "from the House of Othman." That prophecy has been fulfilled, as it were, line by line: The discontent of the Mohammedans, of their priesthood, and of the officials, grew and increased for another six weeks, until at last an active demonstration from a single class, the Softas or theological students and de- pendants of the Mosques, revealed the utter isolation and powerlessness of the Sultan. There can be little doubt that if Abdul Aziz, worn out-hypochondriac as he is, could have relied upon the army or the mob, or even the endless armed servants of his palaces, he would have met the demands of the Softas by a massacre of their followers, have taxed the Mosque estates—as he intended—to fill his Treasury, and have reigned thenceforward more absolute and more sacrosanct than ever. His concessions showed that he was power- less, his blind fury threatened the dynasty—for he would not long have been content to immure his legal heir, Murad Effendi, and his dangerous brother, Ahmed, a man, it is said, who may yet revive the House of Othraan, in a cellar— and the great Pashas became convinced that the hour of Revo- lution, which has so often struck in Turkey, had arrived again. When a Czar is a maniac, "the sword hath an edge and the scarf bath a fold," as Pushkine sings ; when a Khalif becomes an imbecile, a unanimous and irresistible though silent vote of all powers left in Turkey expels him from the scene. With Hier- oollah Effendi as Sheikh-ul-Islam, the Viziers in Constantinople controlled the Softas and the organised "roughs," the great working guilds of the capital, the firemen, porters, water-carriers, and gardeners and thus could rely on a mob of some fifty thou- sand men, physically powerful, and accustomed—the firemen more especially—to deeds of violence. Through the Minister at War, Hussein Avni Pasha, they held the small army present in Constantinople and the greater army in the field ; through the Grand Vizier, Mohammed Ruchdi, they governed the police ; and through agencies, which we can guess at, but do not care to point out, they were sure of the neutrality of the fleet and of the Sultan's enormous household. Reassuring the Christ- ians, whose fears might have brought down upon them the Embassies, and carefully forbidding disorder, which might have called out Ignatieff's body-guard and the Christ- ian mob, they surrounded the Sultan's residence with armed men, demanded a solemn audience of Abdul Ariz, and informed him that he must at once resign the Khalifate, and surrender himself a prisoner into their hands. Indulgence, drugs, and hypochondria have worn out in Abdul Aziz the pride and the courage alike of Ottoman and Sultan, and after a wild scene—in which, as we read the reports, he offered all his hoarded treasure for his Throne, and was refused, by men who knew that within twelve hours their lives might be the forfeit of indecision—he was carried to his caique, and followed by fifty-three boat-loads of women, eunuchs, and slaves, to the old palace on the Bosphorus there, in all human probability, to expire of heart-break and drugged coffee.
Meanwhile, the legal heir, the eldest male of the House of Ottoman, Murad, or 46 Amurath," as Englishmen used to write the name, was liberated from his cellar, led on horseback to a Mosque, and there proclaimed Commander of the Faithful and Sovereign of Turkey. There was no one to resist, for Abdul Aziz had worn out all Mohammedans' patience, and no Christian could interfere without the certainty of a massacre ; there was no feeling offended, for loyalty in Turkey is felt not to any individual, but to the lithalifate and the race of Othman, and Murad possessed the one by the sentence of the Sheikh-ul- Islam, and was legal representative of the other. In a few hours the absolute ruler of Turkey, the semi-sacred potentate, was a prisoner paralysed with despair, rage, and expectation of death ; and the captive of the cellar was Khalif, absolute lord of all Mohammedans, and of what all true Mussulmans deem the first of thrones,—master of the potentialities of bound- less activity and enjoyment. There has been no resistance and no displeasure in the provinces, in the armies, or among the people, for whom is there to resist, or what to displease ? Nothing has been changed for which any man cares. Moham- medans will fight for the Faith, but the guardianship of the faith has only passed into more zealous hands ; and Turks will die for the race of Othman, but its legal heir, persecuted and menaced for his birth, is seated upon the throne. Of personal loyalty, the European feeling of devotion to an individual apart from office, history, or character, the East knows no more than it knows of Legitimacy in the European sense,—and Abdul Aziz had committed the one crime which Orientals never forgive,— being the ruler appointed by God, he had ceased to rule. Asiatics will bear anything except a Merovingian, and the Sultan who could not defeat insurgents, who could neither pay his debts nor silence his creditors, who could not prevent oppression, and could not massacre the clamorous, was a Sovereign for whom no finger would be raised. Abdul Aziz, even if permitted to live, which is improbable, is already as forgotten by his sub- jects as a divorced wife.
The European correspondents who report this event talk of great changes to be accomplished in the method of government, but being forced to employ words which have to Europeans a customary meaning, they create in the West an erroneous im- pression. There is neither "Constitution," nor Parliament, nor Civil List coming in Turkey. Neither the power, nor the independence, nor the methods of the Khalifate can be altered in the least degree or affected even in theory, by anything which Europeans would understand by a "Constitution,"—that is, a law to which the Khalif must submit. But one law binds or can bind him and that is the law which binds the meanest of his Mohammeda:n subjects, the divine, eternal, and unalterable Code given by the Almighty to his Prophet. That Murad V.
has promised to rule by that Code, to serve the State and not himself, to spend as little as possible on his own dignity or pleasures, to listen patiently to the Great Divan, to govern well and justly, as Mohammedans understand justice, we do not doubt, for every successive Khalif has promised the same things. But he is Khalif all the same ; absolute lord over the Divan which remonstrates, as over the soldier who obeys ; able to dismiss a Vizier or execute a General ; the supreme arbiter of policy, of expenditure, even of what is just between man and man. The very men who have raised him expect him to rule, and the very mutineers who dethroned his predecessor will despise him, if he rules by any strength save his own inherent power and the command of the sacred law. He is to govern ; if he is capable, all will go well ; if he is incapable, all will be anarchy; but in either case, he is all in all. The only influence above him is opinion, which, if again exasper- ated, may dethrone him in favour of his brother ; and this opinion requires that he shall once more energise the Mohammedan system, governing as the Law intends, with, it may be, just consideration for Christians—who, while sub- missive, ought, under Mohammedan law, to be as well treated as all other creatures of Allah—but through a persistent, un- mistakable, and if necessary, cruel assertion of Mussulman right to ascendency within the Empire. It is the Mussulman, not the Christian system, he is to maintain,—that is, he is to hearken to advice, but to decide for himself ; to see justice done, but to keep Mohammedans supreme ; to observe the faith of treaties, but to reject absolutely all European or Infidel counsel and interference.
It is quite possible that Murad may fulfil some of the ex- pectations, raised rather by the greatness of the change effected, than by anything known, either here or in Constantinople, of his personal character. He has for fifteen years learned in poverty and seclusion the lesson of caution and of patience, and the circumstances of his accession will always remind him that his divine right is not supported by supernatural power. He may be content with little money for himself; may pay his army, and so restore its discipline ; may choose energetic Viziers and Generals, and may reinvigorate the whole fabric of ad- ministration ; but that he should do this, and also do what seems to be expected in the West, is utterly impossible. He cannot pay his army and feed the war and gather a strong garrison in Constantinople—a necessity, if he is not to fallow hia uncle—and pay the Bondholders too. He cannot hold high the standard of the Faith, and yield to every ambassador who finds an audience of him or presents him with a conjoint Note. He cannot reassert Mnssulman ascend- ency and conciliate the Christians, who feel that ascendency to be the very secret, the causa causans, of their sufferings. If he rules weakly, he fails. If he rules strongly—and he will strive to do this—he must reinvigorate the very yoke which his provinces have determined finally to throw off. He cannot be what Mussulmans are seeking, a great Khalif, and submit to see insurgent subjects aided by Servians, Montenegrins, and Dalmatians, whom yet he is not at liberty to chastise. So far from the Christians of the North being soothed by his ac- cession, they will regard it as a warning that only the sword can protect them ; and so far from Europe being deprived of its excuse for interference, he must energise the system which in their eyes makes interference a necessity. That his accession is good for Turkey, we do not doubt, for any rule is better than anarchy, any sensible man easier to deal with than a fool ; but that it increases the chance of peace, of agreement between Constantinople and the West, of submission in the disturbed provinces, we are wholly unable to perceive. On the contrary, it increases the difficulty of the only solution which, as we are still convinced, may prevent the struggle, namely, the concession of autonomy to the provinces North of the Balkan. A new Sultan, called to the throne to defend Islam, cannot begin by surrendering Mohammedan provinces to Christian rule.
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