THE FIRST FIVE MILLIONS.
rrHE title we have chosen for this article may seem a vainglorious boast, but we do not think that it really suggests more than the British people of these islands and over the seas are prepared to do in supplying men to win the war. What has been accomplished in the past is a measure —a short measure, we believe—of what we can do if we are still harder pressed in the future. The determination of the people is tremendous. There has never been anything like it. If the war must go on for years, so be it. If a second five millions of men must be found as time passes, so be it. If even a third must be found, so be it also. A people who are reputed by foreigners to be stiff and phlegmatic, with cold Northern blood iu their veins, are not generally supposed to be self-conscious. Yet we British are none the less a self- conscious people. We are terrified at being laughed at. In order to avoid that discomfiture, we take the precaution of saving our composure by laughing at ourselves. That is why we'eternally make light of our own efforts, speaking of them as though they were nothing, or even as something rather clumsy and absurd. But there is in sober fact nothing clumsy or absurd about these first five million men. They arc a monument to the spirit and the powers of improvisation of the British on which readers of history in the future will gaze amazed. The King, with his usual perception for a great . thing well done, marked the close of the voluntary epoch and the opening of the universal compulsory epoch by the message of May 25th, which admirably expressed what we are all entitled to feel about the feat of providing five million men for naval and military purposes under a voluntary system. He spoke of it as " an effort far surpassing that of any other nation in similar circumstances."
We have often examined the experiences and difficulties of other countries—notably of the United States—in raising large armies by voluntary recruitment. We cannot go into the details again, but those who remember their nature will know that the King's praise of our own effort as " far surpass- ing " that of any other nation is literally true. The effort has been immense and unique. The nation's will-power has been gradually applied with steadily increasing force, so that we are surely justified in saying that our effort is still on an ascending scale. In proportion to our existing strength and wealth we shall do even more if necessary in the future. If the Germans have an inkling of our resolution, they certainly have formed no adequate estimate of it. We call to mind the story of an Eastern potentate who gazed spellbound upon a British ship of war in one of the harbours of his country and then, turning to a cosmopolitan group of dignitaries who surrounded him, exclaimed : y a douze de ces machines-lit 1 " He little knew how many dozens of dozens. And Germany, we suspect, is in the same stage of partial comprehension. It is well that this should be said, for self-disparage- ment, though a likeable trait in itself, may be very harmful in war, when onlookers are apt to take nations at their own valuation. Warring nations, we fancy, are not altogether unlike prize-fighters, who create round themselves an atmo- sphere of victory by their complacent confidence. There is something in the habit of the champions of the ring, for they spread misgivings in their opponents and their opponents' supporters, and that is a step towards success. Far be it from us to boast—we do not need to be reminded I hat the country which underrates its enemy deserves to be beaten, and is actually by its folly taking a heavy risk of being -beaten—but there is a just mean in all things ; and we are certain that it is time to correct the belief which we English- men have tacitly allowed to grow up that our own contribu- tion to the war has been something less than huge and impressive. It may be said that five million men have not really been raised voluntarily, since under the groujesystem voluntaryism had become a disguised compulsion. We appreciate all that can be said on that' point. Doubtless voluntaryism was continually being subjected to pressure of various kinds that progressively reduced the element of voluntaryism. There was social pressure—the great forces of ridicule—and then the pressere of the group system which acted in the manner of Lincoln's Draft, saying in effect : " If you don't cone now spontaneously you will soon be taken by force." We analysed minutely those disguised compulsive forces at the time, and commended the employment of them as absolutely necessary, failing the real .and open compulsion which we hoped to see ultimately . enacted. But when all has been said, the fact remains that the great effort was in all essentials and charac- teristics a voluntary effort. Certain forms of pressure are inherent in all voluntary military systems, and when we use the word" voluntaryism " we necessarily imply them. No one can honestly detract from our national achievement so as to deprive it of the credit of having been a gigantic proof of public patriotism. Disguised compulsion always does and always must act unfairly. For that reason, as democrats, we detest it. It falls on the willing with special harshness, exacting from them immense sacrifices in order that craven men who could much more easily have offered themselves may be spared. No form of disguised compulsion will bring the unalloyed and constitutional slacker out of his hiding-place. Do what you may by intensive persuasion, he will always say that he means to remain under cover till he is fetched. He is as good as his word. And yet when we review the past, how miserably insignificant, even judged by numbers, were the despicable creatures who were free to go but went note beside the imposing and gallant army of brothers who went freely to face all the dangers of this unprecedented war.
One point in conclusion. It is being said by Mr. Winston Churchill and others that now that we have got the first five millions they arc not being used to their full advantage. Half the ration strength of the Army, as he put it in the House of Commons on Wednesday, is at home and half is abroad. Half of the half abroad does not fight. For every six men taken as solders only one effective rifle appears over the parapet in the trenches. Over two million men out of the five millions have " never heard the whistle of a bullet." Such is the statement. Mr. Tennant was able to tell .Mr. Churchill that not two hundred thousand, but only one hundred and twenty thousand, acted as officers' servants abroad, and that of these all the servants near the firing line had to take their regular turn in the trenches. If they did not do so, it was the fault of the Commanding Officer, and not through any custom or regulation. We imagine, however, that by reducing the number of servants at the bases abroad something approaching a division could be collected. There seems to be an opportunity here for some combing out, even though Mr. Churchill greatly exaggerated. As for the men at home, Mr. McKenna said that he had obtained from the Adjutant-General a report on the way in which every man was employed. When allowance had been made for men on the sick-list, for men in training for the reserves, waiting to go out, for the divisions ready to leave, and for the recognized number of men necessary for home defence, the whole number had been covered. We have no doubt that this is a perfectly satisfactory explanation in the circumstances. At the same time, there is no denying that there is some wastage. How it can be avoided is another matter, and a very difficult one. Under our existing system great drafts have to be kept ready at home for their particular battalions at the front in case those battalions should suddenly suffer heavy losses. Obviously there is a waste of man- power, as a battalion at the front may not need drafts for months together if its losses are slight. It is as though in- numerable reserve watering-pots full of water were kept in readiness by a gardener on a system under which each watering- pot in use when empty could be filled only from its correspond- ing watering-pot in reserve. There would be both waste of time and waste of water there. Yet we do not see an easy way out of the difficulty. A general reservoir of drafts occurs at once to the mind as a solution, but then officers belcne to particular regiments (not to a general corps of officers as in Germany), and so do the men too, wearing the uniform of those regiments. A radical change of system, with a standardized uniform that could be very quickly adapted for the use of any require] regiment, might be possible. But we do not mike any sug- gestion with confidence. Only a very rash man would light- heartedly interfere with b0 marvellous a, weapon, of war as the British regimental system.
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