Commonwealth anti Foreign
110D2A v. HE NLEIN
From A CZECH CORRESPONDENT Prague, May 29th.
To understand recent events in Czechoslovakia, it is necessary to realise one fact clearly ; after the Anschluss had been achieved, the German Government decided to proceed immediately to a settlement of the Czechoslovakian problem. The Anschluss had created the proper psychological conditions for action by Germany in the Sudetenland, and it was hoped that it would not be difficult to create a state of " lawlessness." Incidents multiplied, and there is no doubt that they were artificially created, for when the Czechoslovak Government took pre- cautions to protect public security in the frontier areas, com- plete calm and order was established. But first an incident took place whose consequences for the world might have been as grave as those of the assassination of Franz Ferdinand at Sarajevo. The shooting of the two Sudeten Germans by a guard near Eger (Cheb) on the German frontier could have led either to a German ultimatum or to an attack by Germany without any ultimatum.
The Czech Government, like the British, had received information of troop movements in Germany's frontier dis- tricts. The train from Brussels to Prague was held up at Aachen and all English travellers were detained. Some informed the British Ambassador in Berlin and thus confirmed the information of troop movements he already possessed. As a result he made immediate representations at Berlin. The Czech Government thereupon took the precaution of summon- ing two annual classes of reserves to the colours. Its action was perfectly legal. This must be emphasised, becauze the Sudeten German Volkspartei has tried to present it abroad as unconstitutional. The Government has by law power to summon reserves for manoeuvres when it thinks necessary, and the law lays down a period of four weeks as the maximum duration of the manoeuvres.
What measures did Germany take ? It is well known that after the Anschluss Germany had four army corps under General von Reichenau, to which General Liszt's troops in Austria were attached, and four motorised divisions, on the Czech frontier. These forces were insufficient to occupy the western portions of Bohemia. (It was assumed that Germany wished to occupy Western Bohemia, including Pilsen, where the Skoda works are situated.) The troop movements were designed to transfer these forces to their summer quarters (as was explained to the British Ambassador in Berlin) near the Czech frontier, and also to allow more troops to be brought in to the frontier districts. These additional troops were drawn from General Kluge's 6th Army Corps, General Dolmann's 9th Army Corps, General Knochenhauer's toth Army Corps, General Ulexa's nth Army Corps, and the newly organised 14th Army Corps under General Wittersheim. They were to be followed by troops of the 1st Army Corps (General Kiiller), the 2nd Army Corps (General Biaskowitz) and the 3rd Army Corps (General Witzleben). It is significant that the 1st and and Army Corps are stationed on the Polish frontier, so that for some reason the German General Staff thought it possible to weaken their forces on that frontier.
The forces mobilised by the Czech Government formed only a small part of what they could dispose of on the actual outbreak of war. Czechoslovakia's total first line reserve is sixteen times as large as the one annual class of the regular army and the special reserve which was mobilised. In addi- tion there is the second line of reserves, and further the reserve of men unsuitable for service in peace-time—about 70,000 men. The Czech Army's equipment is first class, and in some respects the best in the world ; the condition of the army can be briefly described as outstandingly good. The occupation of the frontier areas was carried out in accordance with a new plan only worked out after the Anschluss ; nevertheless, the last troops were at their posts two hours before the time laid down by the plan as possible under the most favourable conditions. Another feature of the mobilisation is significant. During the march of the German troops into Austria, 16 per cent. of their tanks and armoured cars broke down. It is impossible to reveal the exact figures for Czechoslovakia's lightning mobilisation ; but they were very much smaller, indeed so small as to constitute a record. The Czechoslovak army is a machine that functions so precisely that in the event of war it would arouse astonishment ; but it exists only to defend peace.
The chief result of these measures was to create complete calm in the frontier areas. The first day the Czechoslovak army appeared in the Sudetenland, all provocation ceased. Only too often has it been whispered in these districts that " der Tag " was coming, and that on " the day " the German Army would appear. It was the Czechoslovak Army that came. Many Sudeten Germans were called up, and without exception they joined their regiments. Absolute calm reigned throughout Czechoslovakia, in Prague life went on as usual and the preparations for the great celebration of the birthday of the Republic continued quietly. Visitors to Czechoslovakia in- quired with surprise where were the barricades seen in Prague by Polish journalists and the armed Communists continually described by the German Press ?
At the present moment the Government continues to negotiate with the Sudeten German Volkspartei. Last week a conversation took place between Dr. Hod2a, the Prime Minister, and Konrad Henlein, the German leader, and the negotiations have been carried on later by Herren Kundt, Franck and other Parliamentary deputies of the Party. It can be stated that the Nationality Statute has not yet been discussed, and the negotiations have centred on the so-called " guarantees." The Sudeten Germans demand that, before entering on discussions of the complicated minority problem, the Government must withdraw, or relax, the precautionary measures it has taken. Last week the Social-Democratic Minister Bechynie stated in the Provo Lidu that the measures would not be withdrawn. The opposite appears to be true. On the same day on which Dr. Hodia spoke to Henlein, he met the Commander-in-Chief of the Czechoslovak Army, the head of the General Staff, General Kregi, with whom, I believe, he discussed which of the emergency measures could be relaxed.
Henlein's demands for political autonomy are well known. Less well known abroad are the contents of the Nationality Statute which, in broad outline, is already complete, and on June z sth will be brought before Parliament. Its details will be further discussed with the Sudeten German Volkspartei, unless Henlein decides to reject it completely ; even then it will be carried out by the Government. Dr. Hodin is con- vinced that to introduce it requires no amendment to the Constitution ; the two main principles are those of granting the Sudeten Germans self-government within the framework of the Republic and an influence on administration and policy proportional to their numbers. Self-government will give the Sudeten Germans wide opportunities for managing their own affairs, restricted however in two respects. Control of the State police and the army must remain in the hands of the Government ; and the Sudeten Germans must assent to the Government's foreign policy. This does not mean that Czechoslovakia is immutably committed to one line of policy, nor that the Sudeten Germans, if as a loyal party they enter the Government, cannot influence policy, together with the other Government parties. It means that foreign policy cannot be dictated by a minority. Czechoslovakia does not wish to raise barriers against Germany, whose legitimate interests in Central Europe she recognises and even supports.
It would be an error to suppose that Czechoslovaks hate the German nation. But Czechoslovakia will never give in to dictation. Thus in two respects the Government's attitude can be described as extremely far-reaching ; it intends to defend Czechoslovakia's independence, if necessary by force, and if possible to satisfy the legitimate demands of the German people and the German Reich. The second principle of the Statute means that in the administration the Sudeten Germans will be represented in that proportion of 22 per cent. which corresponds to their numbers in the Republic ; and they will have their own Budget, whose size will be calculated according to the same proportion.
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