Der Tag
The Smoke Screen of Jutland. By John Irving. (William Kimber, 50s.) THE fascination of Jutland continues to call forth an extraordinary number of books. Not long ago Geoffrey Bennett produced another worthy narrative of the event, and Commander Irving, a gunnery expert who was present at the battle, follows suit in somewhat greater detail, achiev- ing both clarity and tension in the process. Neither he nor Professor Marder ever loses sight of the conditions under which Jellicoe had to make his decisions: a battle line which (if the 5th Battle Squadron be included) stretched nearly seven miles, with dozens of lesser craft milling about; a relative speed of approach to the main enemy units of about twenty-eight knots; and visibility often less than six miles, with too much smoke and too little information. Indeed, on the morning after the battle Jellicoe feared that the 'Iron Duke' might have been firing, not at the German High Seas Fleet, but at the 'Inflexible,' and it was not until that day that he learned of the loss of the 'Queen Mary' and 'indefatigable.'
From the drama and despair of the battle itself one can also wander down lengthy corri- dors of speculation as to what a complete British victory might have brought. Would supplies have poured into Russia through the Baltic? Would the U-boat campaign have been stifled? Or was the Admiralty correct in judging that 'the Ger- man fleet is of secondary importance; its loss would not vitally affect the cause of the Central Powers'?
More profitable, however, is an analysis of what lay behind the apparently indecisive en- gagement. There were German mistakes at Jutland, and there was not a German victory. But individual disasters and an overall sense of frustration awaited the Grand Fleet, giving rise to lengthy and unpleasant recrimination after- wards between those who championed Jellicoe and those who, like Churchill, bemoaned the fact that the less cautious Beatty had not been in a controlling position at the time. It was a dispute which tended to obscure more funda- mental issues, issues which have been brilliantly explored in Professor Marder's two previous volumes. Behind the lost ships and lost oppor- tunities, the failure of some senior officers on the spot and of the Operations Division in Whitehall, lay weaknesses of thinking and materiel which even the Fisher revolution had not overcome. Commander Irving's judgments on the events of May 31-June 1, 1916, are shrewd enough, and few now would question his sup- port for Jellicoe's major decisions, or his implied comparison between Beatty and Hipper to the latter's advantage. But it is to Professor Marder that one must turn for a broader perspective. Jutland and After inevitably contains less novel material than its two predecessors, but it exhibits the same massive research, the same thorough consideration of political, strategic and tactical issues, and the same fairness which rises above the wranglings of the past. (It is to the memory of both Jellicoe and Beatty, 'two distinguished admirals, upholders of a proud tradition,' that this volume is dedicated.) While the Grand Fleet Battle Orders have never been better probed. the accompanying charts combine all the detail one could require with admirable clarity, and the extension of the narrative beyond the shadow fleet encounter of August 1916 helps place Jut- land itself in sharper focus. So numerous, in addition, have been the author's consultations with those possessing first-hand knowledge of the event, that the book's preface conjures up, as has Edmund Blunden, . . . a springtide of admirals, Almost Neptune in person . . .
When the battle was over the need for re- thinking was obvious, and in Professor Marder's opinion 'Jellicoe's true greatness as a fleet com- mander lay in his capitalising on the lessons of Jutland.' Caution was also unavoidable when it came to taking the heavy ships far to the south, and Beatty, despite his popular image, was to preach it as firmly as his predecessor. The sub- marine and torpedo, whose menace had perhaps been exaggerated at Jutland, were about to demonstrate their potentially decisive effect on trade—another reason why the Navy, for its part, had to extend and deepen the Fisher revolution. Matapan, North Cape and the Atlantic were to witness some of the consequences.
CHRISTOPHER THORNE
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