3 JUNE 1978, Page 19

Books

Conservative alternatives

George Gale

The Binding of Leviathan William Waldegrave (Hamish Hamilton £4.95)

This book, though short, is ambitious and is a good deal more intelligent than might be expected from the second sentence of a first chapter of a work which is claimed to have been read and improved in various drafts by Sam Brittan, Sir Keith Joseph, Jim Urmson, Sir Arnold Weinstock, Gillon Aitken, Robin Butler, Lord Rothschild, Victoria Rothschild, Roger Scruton and Sir Dick White: 'It is the politician's job to try to act the role of mast-head look-out on the democratic ship of state.' How that Yoho-ho-and-a-bottle-of-rum stuff could have got past such a bunch of scrutineers I cannot Imagine; and indeed the following sentence suggests that Ted Heath and Jim Callaghan were Waldegrave's mentors and guides rather than those named to whom he pays thanks: 'He may find that a vote by those in the taffrail bar declines to allow the possibility of the existence of the rocks he sees ahead, or, in other moods, of the navigable Channel he sees through them; nonetheless he must shout, in the hope that someone Will listen.' There is more of these nautical metaphors in the dead middle of the mainstream of the Heath-Callaghan tradition of Political cliché; and when Waldegrave at Once moves on to consider a future world of Shortages and the unfair distribution of land, my feeling was that this book, whose subtitle is 'Conservatism and the Future', was unlikely to have much interesting to say about either Conservatism or the future. This feeling changed as the book's language Changed from coarse political metaphor into an academic style which clearly suits the author and his intentions better.

He is convinced that the period of economic growth is at, or coming to, an end. He give i no sound reason for this belief, but It is the presumption from which his thesis proceeds: 'In the next decade we will see the crumbling of the political philosophies based on growth theory . . . Thus we are likely to see the death of social democracy, as it is understood in Britain, on the one hand and Conservative growthmanship on the other . . The rise of Sir Keith 'Joseph and Mr Anthony Wedgwood Benn is not the result of their superior capacities, but of the fact that they represent theories other than those of growthmanship.' Mr Waldegrave expects that 'the movement to Corporatism . . . will massively advance as Other groups attempt to protect themselves against the power of the older manual Workers' unions.' He foresees an expanding bureaucracy becoming increasingly unpopular. He foresees declining cities, deteriorating housing, increased crime and unemployment, and with the stresses thus created, 'Parliament as at present constituted will be in danger of eclipse as a focus for national discussion and the resolution of conflict in an increasingly corporate state. Government will continue to grow — and continue to become more unpopular . . . and the national mood in the face of a world not changing our way [will become] grim and perhaps politically dangerous.'

This is a gloomy prospect. Conservatism, if it is anything, is pessimistic; but its pessimism usually flows from the view Conservatives take of human nature and not, as in this case, from peering into the future. Without economic growth to sustain social democrats to "moderation" (that is, warfare same time, to give workers the increasing standard of living they have grown accustomed to, the Labour Party of government 'is likely . . . to go into rapid decline from which the allegiance of the remaining social democrats to 'moderation' (that is, warfare against the activists) and growth (impossible to deliver) will not rescue it.' There is no actual evidence produced to support this political assertion, and although the Labour party has perceptibly shifted leftwards, the Labour party in government has, evidently, shifted in the opposite direction. Nonetheless Waldegrave asserts that Only Marxist-Leninism . . . will promote on the left a philosophy with the confidence to govern and a strategy for the attainment of power.'

What he calls, to begin with, 'NeoLiberalism' then later, simply Liberalism, puts forward an alternative which 'will have a great deal more to offer than disintegrating socialism'. It is his appreciation of this which gives his thesis its shape, for he perceives the attractions of Liberalism to conservatives, and he accepts that 'The description of how most people behave in the market place which Liberal economics offers is right and useful, insofar as it is based on sensible observation of what peo ple prefer . . . But the market-place is not where most people live' (whoever said it was?) and, 'The political advice, derived from Liberal economic theory . . . leaves governors naked and its own adherents always frustrated at the distance between their model of the world and reality. A political philosphy, to be of use, must offer explicitly the theory of government, con sent and community that the eighteeneth and nineteenth century Liberals were able to assume since they inherited, and relied on, the continuance from the past of a substructure older than and independent of their theory.' Waldegrave allows that 'one item, fundamental to Liberal thinking, needs to be injected into any Conservative society, because it is the serum which wards off our particular pathology. The serum is direct access by the citizen to, and control over, the machinery of the State.' Our pathology, against which this serum gives protection, is the corporate state.' It is against the notion that there is no alternative to the Liberal, Marxist and corporate states that Waldegrave argues the practical course of Conservatism.

His argument is in .part negative, in that his Conservative values, things which he says find no part in Liberal theory, 'continuity of institutions and the physical environment; tradition; the sense of history and belonging — all of which, necessarily restricting the individual in the interest of the community, are objects of the Liberal's hostility.' I do not think it follows that a Liberal is hostile to these things, even if his assertion of the pre-eminence of the individual prevents him from seeking legally to shore them up. No one asserts the absolute interest of the individual except the anarchist and terrorist. But no matter. What Waldegrave endeavours is to assert the interest of the community. He thinks that Liberalism is very nearly right, but that it neglects 'the coMmunity' which he distinguishes from 'nation', 'state' and 'society': his communities are 'the natural building blocks of society'. A man may be a member of several communities: his village, his workplace are two such. The purest community is a close-knit family. Waldegrave's hostility towards the Liberalism he almost embraces is because he thinks the Liberal individualist necessarily rejects the Conservative community.

His other chief assertion is that the Conservative 'will not commit himself to any over-arching theory' whereas 'Liberalism is an over-arching theory', albeit a unique one. Nonetheless, this does not prevent Waldegrave from declaring that 'party must have a philosphy of government' and does not flinch from describing the Conservative 'vision [of a] . society based around such multifarious natural groups — villages, small towns, properly organised places of work.' I am not sure that this nostalgic vision is not itself a commitment to an all-embracing theory; and in its way it is an over-arching theory to say that no commitment to an over-arching theory should be made. If, however, economic growth is no longer to be expected, then it is certainly possible that a degree of stability could be found in an authoritative state governed by popular representatives presiding over a society of communities.

The vision is by no means unattractive; but visionary it remains. The fear of change, of flux, is at the core of Conservatism. I do not share Mr Waldegrave's optimistic view that history is on the Conservative side at the moment; and I think this is a very dangerous view for a Conservative to have, for'it inclines him to stand idly by. It may be that 'when the Russian Empire follows the Roman, the Spanish and the British into the sunset, Conservatism — the philosophy of man in his community — will still be vigorous', but Mr Waldegrave does not convince us that it is likely; nor does he actually give 'us his 'philosophy of man in his community', but contents himself with the assertion that this is what Conservatism is. His book is thus, in the last analysis, unsatisfactory; but it is filled with intelligent insights.

One last dissent. We may not have seen the end of economic growth. It seems to me far more likely that the present world depression is but a hiccup, and that the astonishing growth in wealth of the industrialised nations will continue to accelerate once the hindrances of excessive government are removed. If those hindrances are not removed, then those who have imposed them will remain in power, and countries less imposed upon will become wealthier than those more imposed upon. Conservatives would be better advised to concentrate upon the reduction of government and the release of impositions in order to allow further wealth to be created than to seek to preside over a stagnant state and endeavour to nurture its communities. Without growth, I think the country is likely to become sour and increasingly socialised. I do not see a country, or a world, without growth becoming stable and conservative. As a vision it is pleasing, but as a forecast it is implausible and as a Conservative utterance it lacks vigour. Mr Waldegrave's Conservatism is too languid, I fear.