A case of human sacrifice
PERSONAL COLUMN PETER J. SMITH
Dr Smith is a young English scientist now work- ing in the United States.
To those or us who suspect that technology has outstripped man's moral and intellectual capa- city to control it, the supersonic transport (ssr) is fast becoming a cause célèbre. The growing opposition to the construction of Concorde and the Boeing 2707 representatives of our newest and most demanding god, may not fully succeed, but will not have been in vain if it only focuses the attention of a wider audience on the regrettable tendency of gods to demand sacrifices. As an example of the folly of uncriti- cal allegiance to a basically worthy ideal, SST- worship could could hardly be bettered.
• A short time ago, I would have raised my hands in horror at the thought of double- crossing Europe yet again by withdrawing from the Concorde project. But there comes a time when one has to admit that the wider interests of humanity must take precedence over the feelings of -a French general, or the meagre benefit to be derived from a particularly dubious exercise in national prestige. I am not concerned here with the argument that, in our current eco- nomic plight, the financial burden of Concorde in itself constitutes grounds for withdrawal. To cancel Concorde for financial reasons may be tempting, but would merely be dishonestly opportunistic. The argument that all expensive technology is unjustified on the grounds that urgent social problems are more worthy con- tenders for available resources has never been valid; though one has to admit that the triplica- tion of SST development in Europe, America and Russia represents national pride and self- interest gone mad.
What, then. are the real objections to the ssr? First, there is the much-publicised sonic boom—a form of atmospheric pollution of which we have so far had but little experience. It is generally accepted that each supersonic flight will produce a thunderous boom which will be heard on the ground some twenty-five to thirty miles each side of the flight path. In human terms, this would mean that a single flight across the United States, for example, would boom some 20 million people. Air trans- port authorities are conspicuously reticent on the possibility of banning overland flights; but even if only trans-oceanic flights were to be allowed, the human audience would not com- pletely disappear. During a typical trans- atlantic run, the boom would be heard by several thousand less speed-conscious indi- viduals on fishing boats, passenger liners, freighters and the like.
The psychological effects of the boom on man and livestock are likely to be costly, though difficult to evaluate and thus hitherto con- veniently ignored. The physical damage to pro- perty is likewise difficult to estimate if only because the precise intensity of the boom will not be known until the first SST. becomes air- borne. We do know, however, that during the ten-year period to 1967 some 34,000 claims, for damages done by sonic booms, totalling about $19 million, were received by the us Air Force. And this total conceals a marked increase in claims with the rapid build-up of the US military supersonic fleet. Further, the SST is likely to produce a much more intense boom than its military predecessors.
But while it is a fact that precise knowledge of the consequences of the sonic boom is lack- ing, it is equally true that reasonable estimates tend to be minimised by the vested interests involved. The participating aircraft companies and their innumerable sub-contractors, as well as being financially committed, are already feeling the benefit of technological fallout from the ssr programme. As time goes by, the com- mitment increases and the willingness to with- draw, whatever the moral issues involved, becomes correspondingly smaller. Human nature being what it is, this is at least under- standable as far as the aircraft constructors are concerned—and may or may not be repre- hensible, depending upon one's point of view.
A much more serious question—and one which has not received its proper emphasis—is raised by the extent of government participa- tion. Even in America, the costs involved in the development of the SST are far too high to be borne by the aircraft manufacturers themselves, despite substantial advance deposits from the airlines. It has thus become necessary to finance both the Boeing 2707 and Concorde extensively from public funds. The governments concerned now possess significant vested interests in Ate success of the enterprises and a consequent tendency to underplay any deleterious effects. The institution with the 'greatest duty to society has thus effectively abrogated its responsibility. We, the people, are rendered defenceless against possibly well-meant, but mistaken, policies propagated in our name. With the ever-increas- ing scale of technology this type of conflict of interests warrants immediate and serious atten- tion. If there is one argument above all others for increasing the scientific and technological expertise of Parliament and Congress, this is surely it. The second serious objection to the ssr re- flects a lack of scientific integrity, of which the issue of the sonic boom is merely a particular manifestation. This is that the decision to build was taken well before the relevant basic scien- tific knowledge was available for an adequate understanding of the SST's effect on nature, and vice versa. The point at issue here is not whether or not the consequences subsequently turn out to be deleterious, but whether man, in his arro- gance, has the right to assume them unworthy of consideration before proceeding with his pet schemes. While not every consequence can be foreseen, it is often possible to obtain data enabling one to judge the result of action more precisely than is possible in the complete absence of information.
For example, the ssr will fly at heights of between sixteen and twenty-one kilometres where the extremely rarefied atmosphere will afford reduced protection from radiation, espe- cially that from the sun. Yet whereas the Concorde 001 is nearing completion, only recently have calculations been made indicating that during a single three-hour flight at twenty- one kilometres, a burst of radiation from the sun such as that actually observed on 12 November 1960 would give a passenger a dosage equal to twice that recommended for a whole year. At twenty-one kilometres, more- over, concentrations of the poisonous gas, ozone, reach a hundred times the danger level.
Again, not only will it be necessary to con- tend with the sonic boom, but also with the more devastating `superboom,' produced by the simultaneous arrival at ground level of two 'ordinary' booms. Superbooms could arise not only from voluntary changes in flight direction or acceleration at supersonic speeds, which may in principle be avoidable, but also from in- voluntary changes in speed and altitude result- ing from turbulence. Very little is known of turbulence at low altitudes—still less at twenty-- one kilometres. Knowledge of its cumulative effects on passengers and the fatigue life of aircraft is negligible. Then again, at high speeds, small changes in temperature produce large changes in accelerating capability. We know almost nothing of temperature fluctuations at twenty-one kilometres.
The various decisions to build ssrs were based exclusively on political desirability and the feasibility of constructing the actual machines. No consideration was given to the interaction between the machine and its environment before the decisions were taken. Such procedures can no longer be regarded as tolerable. It is a measure of Britain's culpability in this that the long-mooted American ssr project was finally given the go-ahead reluc- tantly, and only under the economic threat of Concorde.
My prediction is that after much delay and additional expense, Concorde and the Boeing 2707 will work. I believe that man is clever enough to overcome all the technical obstacles, including nature's resistance. But I also believe that once again man will prove blind to his own true interest. The sonic boom will invade us; and we will surrender with little more than a whimper just as we have surrendered to other forms of pollution. The 1960s will not go down in history as the decade in which we came to terms with our environment; but, hopefully, they will be remembered as the time when we realised, at long last, that to come to terms quickly was of vital importance. The lesson of the SST must be learned.
Previous page
