TWO STUDIES OF GREAT CAMPAIGNS.*
THE Special Campaign Series" is intended by the pub- lishers to provide a concise text-book on each of the campaigns selected from time to time for special study by candidates for the Army. That the series serves its purpose is evident from the fact that we have now reached the seventh and eighth volumes and that a ninth is in the press. Generally speaking, however,. the volumes, being outline and technical histories only, appeal more to the military student than to the ordinary reader. Captain Vaughan-Sawyer's volume, for instance, gives the Wilderness Campaign in accurate detail as regards and situations, movements, and strengths, and With the excellent maps and plans with which it is provided will be a useful
• The Leipzig Campaign, 1813. By Colonel F. N. Maude. C.13., p.s.c.— . Grant's Campaign in Virginia, 1884. By Captain Vaughan•Sawyer, Indian Army. With Maps and Mans. "The Special Campaign Ser.es„" Vols. VII.-
VIII. London : BMW Sounenschein and Co. [5a net each.]
guide to an officer desiring to "get up" the campaign for examination purposes. At the same time, it does not profess to be more than a concentrated essence, and we sincerely trust that no officer will be content to regard Lis knowledge of the campaign as sufficient after having read this book, without at least some reference to more standard works. If he is, he will probably suffer from severe cerebral indigestion and be " ploughed " in his examination.
Colonel Maude, on the other hand, in his study of the Leipzig Campaign, though he has no doubt exceeded his reference, has, as one might expect from so original and so learned an authority, produced an exceedingly suggestive and delightful volume, undoubtedly one of the best in the series. Particularly interesting is the introductory chapter in which Colonel Maude discusses the psychology of the attack, and the possibility of teaching even the rawest of troops actually tc cherish a desire to get killed. We are glad to find emphasis laid on this point. In the small British Army we have learned to think too much of casualties, and too little of the victory which can only be attained by heavy sacrifice of life. Chaps. 1 and 2, giving a preliminary sketch of the Prussian and French Armies respectively, are also very well worth reading, and few military writers have dealt more convincingly with the causes of the success of the Frederician system and of its subsequent collapse,—due, as Colonel Maude holds, not to faulty tactical training, but to a parsimonious starving of the Army after the Seven Years' War.
As regards the eventual triumph of the Prussian arms, our author, while sharing the common view that it was the break- down of the French cavalry which allowed their opponents to snatch victory from defeat, reminds us, in addition, that while the Frederician Army would have stood up to severer punishment than the new National Army, even in its best days, once beaten it would have dissolved. The new Prussian Army, on the other hand, though badly beaten, as at Liitzen, refused to dissolve. This was the striking change, the true sign of a National Army, which distinguished Liitzen from all Napoleon's previous victories, and thus foretold the beginning of the end by making it almost impossible for him permanently to retain the initiative.
Altogether, Colonel Maude's little book goes far beyond its professed scope, and, short as it is, may worthily be classed as a real contribution to Napoleonic literature. The book is well printed and well got up, but is disfigured by many lamentable misprints (" Du Boigne " for De Boigne, " Davant " for Davoust, "Magdala" for Magdeburg, "Oslerman" for Oster- mann, &c.) Unfortunately, too, there is no index, and the maps in the pockets at the end are not numbered and lettered on the back, and so give no facility for rapid reference.
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