BONN ESCAPES PARIS TO BERLIN
Douglas Johnson on why France mourns the political passing of Helmut Kohl Paris THE STATEMENT was made some years ago, but it is being recalled today: 'When Helmut Kohl ceases to be the German Chancellor, this will be a tragedy for France.' It was Edouard Balladur who said this, when he was prime minister, some seven years ago. Now the French believe that they have to look more closely at the nature of this 'tragedy'.
For several weeks before 27 September, the French shut their eyes to the possibility of a Kohl defeat. It was true that opinion polls were suggesting a victory for Gerhard SchrOder, but the politically wise had their answers, and they were readily listened to by the public. SchrOder, they said, had peaked too soon. Now he could only decline. And sure enough, the gap began to close.
Kohl himself produced a slogan. He was, he said, someone who might lose in the polls, but he was someone who would win in the election. After all, he was the great- est German statesman of the century. He was greater even than Bismarck (the recent centenary of whose death had been celebrated in the most discreet manner possible). And who was Schroder? What did he stand for? He seemed to be the most unreliable of men, constantly chang- ing his mind about vital questions such as the euro.
And even if, contrary to historical prece- dent, the Chancellor did suffer an electoral defeat, then there were many French observers who claimed that all was not lost. The complexity of the German elec- toral system was such that, even supposing SchrOder and the Social Democrats were the winners, they would not be able to form a government on their own. A coali- tion would be necessary, and what could be more natural than a coalition between the two biggest parties, the Social Democrats and the Christian Democrats? This had happened in the past, and it could happen in the future. Kohl would therefore not disappear. The tragedy would not occur.
But all these predictions came to noth- ing. Kohl has gone, presumably for good. So French opinion swung violently from determined optimism to resolute pes- simism. This was the end of the Franco- German working alliance, the so-called motor that had made the European Union function, the special relationship that had been a dominant force. To illustrate the ending of this feature, one had only to consider how Schroder, in his highly organised electoral campaign, had used the name of Tony Blair and had imitated his methods. One could go further. A pho- tograph of the young Schroder in his peri- od of wild dissidence could be compared to the youthful Tony Blair wearing his anti-nuclear badge. Would not the Franco- German alliance be replaced by an Anglo- German understanding and co-operation?
The French are fond of geopolitics. Hence it was easy to point out that Kohl was a southerner and a Catholic. It was nat- ural, therefore, that he should be pro- French. But more than this, his entourage was French-oriented. His chief private adviser, what the French call his chef de cabinet, was married to a French woman and had a residence in France. It was per- fectly natural that a diplomat from the Palatinate should also have a Franco-Ger- man family. But none of this applied to SchrOder, who is from the north and whose natural affinity is with England and with that phenomenon that still appears attrac- tive to the Germans, namely New Labour.
But this was not the only spectre that has been conjured up since last Sunday. One thing appears certain. The new Ger- man administration is not willing to sub- sidise Europe to the extent that it has been doing. Therefore the spectre is Mrs Thatcher from 1979, at meeting after meeting of the European Community, say- ing, 'I want my money back.' No wonder it The aforesaid cremation would be after your death I take it?' was Giscard d'Estaing who was one of the first to express publicly his reservations concerning Schnider's devotion to Europe, since it was he who was most irritated by Mrs Thatcher's resolve that Britain should not pay more to the Community than was just. And, say the French, have not the British always been more pro-German than pro-French? On this anniversary of the Munich agreement of 1938, it is remem- bered that Chamberlain exulted in having come to an agreement with Germany, and had no thought for France.
But SchrOder was alarmed by the French reaction. His immediate response was to state that he cherished the Franco-German special relationship and was ready to demonstrate this. Therefore, before he had even finished forming his government, he accepted that he would go to Paris, have lunch with President Chirac and dinner with Prime Minister Jospin on 1 October. Immediately the French attitude changed. Several politicians, while publicly express- ing their delight, have privately said that it would have been more dignified to have waited a little.
There is the feeling that SchrOder is not a very reliable politician, and there is also some bewilderment over the future of Joschka Fischer, the environmentalist, whose ambition it is to be the new German foreign minister. He is certainly someone who knows French and who knows Paris well. But this friend of the 1968 revolution- ary, Daniel Cohn-Bendit will be a new ele- ment in the diplomatic world. Can you imagine Dominique Voynet in charge of the Quai d'Orsay? is the question posed by certain newspapers.
What has happened, and what the French must accept (as must the British), is that there is a new phase in German histo- ry. First, there was reconciliation. Second, there was West Germany's role in the Cold War. Third, there was reunification. We now know from German historians that President Mitterrand, who would have pre- ferred to postpone reunification, struck a bargain with Kohl whereby the Germans accepted the euro and the policy of being extremely European.
The new phase concerns German power, and it will be symbolised by the move from Bonn to Berlin. Europe is no longer a moral necessity, something that takes precedence over national interests. Presi- dent Mitterrand's invitation to German troops to parade down the Champs Elysees on 14 July was a gesture that Kohl appreci- ated. It was intensely European. What will happen is that Germany will wish to adopt the policies that are necessary for Ger- many. The problem remains whether the government in the process of being formed is the correct government for such a policy. The problem for the French is where they should go. The French Right is unable to find someone to lead them in next year's European elections. Thus the difficulties that lie ahead for France.
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