Commonwealth and Foreign — I.
THE PSYCHOLOGY OF JAPAN
By GUENTHER STEIN
PUBLIC opinion in Japan, at bottom always_ rather fatalistic towards the vicissitudes of what it tends to. regard as political destiny, is subject to rapid changes as far as its surface appearance goes. A few months ago, when the then Foreign Minister, Mr. Naotake Sato, announced a new deal in Japan's fdreign policy, the atmosphere in the country almost had a pacifist complexion. At the same time, there was much grumbling at the insistent demands of the military for a general policy of national mobilisation, which were so obviOusly in contrast to the promises of a conciliatory &reign* policy. And the authoritarian leanings of the Government, together with the hardships resulting from its armament efforts, completed what looked like a genuine opposition. The" North China Incident," officially christened by that ominously high-sounding name immediately after the minor SinO-Japanese *clash near Peiping, on July '7th, suddenly changed the surfaCe atmosphere entirely. All the political". parties, including the quickly rising Labour* group—the Social Mass Party—unconditionally pledged their fullest support to the Government. The entire Press adopted an attitude of preparedness for national war against China ; so much so that the moderate leaders of the Army and Navy must have been almost as embarrassed by this new attitude of utter intransigence as they were by the semi-pacifist inclinations of the Press a short time before. The radicals in the Army, however, had reason enough to be satisfied with the general adoption of their political views. Business circles, usually attracted by the profits of reasonably large armaments, but at the same time anxiously opposed to war, changed just as quickly. They, too, began to demand the chastisement of China, and a forceful and fundamental solution of the Sino-Japanese problem.
The change in public sentiment was just as sudden. Organisations of all kinds, not only those which are patriotic or official by character, but also the numerous professional and social associations, which to such a large extent maintain the hard-dying traditions of feudalism in Japan, got busy overnight. Crowds of men, women and children were taken to Shintoist shrines in order to pray for success in war. Money collections for national defence funds and for " comforting the soldiers at the front " were started by house- to-house canvassing in the cities, in the offices of business and industrial centres, and even in the impoverished rural districts. The old war-time custom of producing bullet-proof charms for the soldiers at the front, by having thousands of young girls and women sew stitches in red thread to white cloth—a very picturesque show in front of the big department stores and cinemas and restaurants of modern Tokyo—was revived. The cinemas, theatres and revues changed their programmes from favourite sentimental themes to martial subjects. The record shops all over the country felt a sudden drop in the usually big demand for love songs, Japanese and foreign, for jazz and classical Western music, and are unable to satisfy the sudden craving for soldiers' songs and marches.
China, these days, certainly gets a raw deal from Japanese public opinion. The official indictment of the venerable neighbouring nation for its insincerity, its double-dealing, and its aggressiveness is generally being accepted ; partly with utter contempt and scorn for China's treacherous attitude toward her only real friend, Japan ; partly with mere indiffer-. ence ; and by some even with pity at China's stupid " mis- understanding of Japan's real intentions." The attitude of tolerance and sympathy toward China, which had been caused by Mr. Sato's declarations regarding a new policy some months ago, seems to be forgotten. Not a single one of all the Japanese newspapers dares as much as to examine the present Sino-Japanese case against its tragic historical back- ground. And their readers, who are such ardent believers in the noble spirit of nationalism that they use to grade their esteem for Western peoples according , to their degree of patriotism, and whose main reason for despising China always was her alleged-lack of patriotic feelings, have no respect for the birth of a new spirit of nationalism in that old country. They forget entirely that, whatever the rights and wrongs of the present conflict, it is taking place on Chinese soil and genuinely exciting a people that feels deeply humiliated by the Japanese.
It is interesting- to remember that six years ago, on the- occasion of the Manchurian Incident, Japan justified its military action by alleging that China had no real national government, and was not a truly unified nation ; so that her- well-meaning neighbour, Japan, had to assist at least part of China's suffering population toward progress and modernisa- tion. The present justifications, however, are in exactly the opposite direction. The steady growth of Chinese national unification threatened, so the argument runs, to " invade " North China, endangering the special rights of Japan, which had been built up during the six years since the Manchurian Incident. And Chinese patriotism finally became a danger to Japan herself.
Yet it would be wrong to say that japan, at present, is swayed by any real and fundamental hatred against China ; just as there seems never to be any popular hatred even against, Soviet Russia. This refers to the great mass, of the Japanese people, not only the man in the street, but_also to theimajority of the educated and the well-to-do. But, apart from, this, predominating, middle stratum, there are always the two extreme wings who have firmer political convictions, and are not easily swayed, though easily confirmed in their respective views, by passing events. There is, first of all, the. strong element of the ultra-patriots. They live •-nn-hatred and, they- crave to practise it. They are represented not only among.
the younger elements of the fighting forces and bureaucracy, among many religious sects and romantic bands of, almost professional patriots, but also in a small. section Of the general.
public. These are the people who are. not content with send- ing comfort kits and anti-bullet charms- to the, army, but,whol tap their own blood in order to paint-flags and write letters,- and who send excited telegrams to army headquarters and- to the Cabinet, demanding outright war ; one day against the Soviet Union, the other against China And these are the, people who sent their representatives to the British Enthassy in Tokyo recently, in order to warn Britain against any itind of mediation in the Sino-Japanese conflict. The left, or pacifist, group of Japanese publiC opinion, on the other hand, is quieter now than ever. The out-and-out radicals in this heterogeneous camp were driven underground since the Manchurian Incident and seem to keep their mouths shut. The mere liberals shrug their shoulders, and, feeling very uncomfortable, quickly withdraw into that well-accus- tomed silence out of which some seemingly promising remarks of the last Foreign Minister, Mr. Sato, had awakened them.- Moreover, they have lost the support if not. of all, certainly' of a great part of the country's big business' men,- who used to be opposed to military action, and even said So Occasionally, but who now seem to feel that their investments, their trade, and their great future chances in China may finally be lost unless Japan takes a very strong stand in securing by force what she proved unable—to their personal regret—to secure by peaceful Sino-Japanese co-operation. The Government watches both critical wings ; less, however, the bigger, more active, more courageous, and therefore more dangerous, right wing, than'the remnants of leftism and liberalism which have survived six years of "semi-war,"
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