THE FRANCO-RUSSIAN ALLIANCE. T HERE is a weak place in the
Franco-Russian Alliance which the publicists who discuss it often forget, but which has in the last ten days given rise to an important incident. The two parties to the agreement do not stand in equal need of it. The French have their lost provinces to recover, they crave with all the strength of their jealous temperaments for a grand position, and they are full of the tradition of 1870, with its stories of invasion and defeat, and its menaces of final dismemberment. The Triple Alliance, they think, may some day invade their country, and even, if fate is hostile or Generals imbecile, may subjugate France, which grows every year in wealth, but not in population. Russia, on the other hand, though glad of a powerful ally, does not actually need one. Secure in her vast and increasing population, her millions of drilled men, her endless spaces, and her inexorable climate, she has only to remain quiet to be as free from the danger of invasion or of loss of territory as if she were a separate planet. Nothing except fear would tempt either Germans or Austrians to waste their children's lives on an invasion of Russia. No doubt France might be useful as a counter- poise to Great Britain, should that Power ever decide to arrest the march of Russia to the Pacific, to the Persian Gulf, or to the Mediterranean, but for defence she is not likely to be required. Naturally, therefore, Russia con- siders that she is " the predominant partner" in the alliance, that she gives more than she receives, and that she ought to be allowed the initiative in all serious under- takings. This feeling is deepened by another one arising from the different constitution of the two States The Russian statesmen are at once Conservatives and Monarchists of the strongest type, they are full of the traditions of an older Europe, and they regard the present rulers of France much as country gentlemen regard upstarts who have accidentally possessed them- selves of estates carrying great political influence. They are most courteous and friendly in demeanour, and will give M. Faure any number of stars and ribbons ; but they hardly regard their new acquaintances as gentlemen, they have no confidence in their diplomatic skill, and they fret under French diplomatic blunders as great men fret when their associates fall into social solecisms or quarrel with the wrong persons. To Prince Lobanoff M. Bourgeois, or M. Ribot, or M. Berthelot, is what a wealthy and vulgar parvenu seems to an accomplished noble. y He will not allow his rich acquaintance to presume too far, or, above all, to take the initiative in little plans for extending their common social influence. The conduct of the French Foreign Office, therefore, as regards the Soudan has seemed to St. Petersburg almost offensive. Doubtless France must be supported as against England, but M. Berthelot had received no hint from St. Petersburg to begin a quarrel ; he ought to have remembered that the Czar desires the world to be lapped in peace during the august ceremonial of next June ; and, above all, he ought not to have seemed to drag Russia after him. A Duke may follow a Mr. Barnet°, but he does not like to be visibly dragged along by him. A whisper, therefore, reached Paris that the Czar was not well- pleased with the management of the Soudan negotiations, especially by that threat as to the " consequences " which might follow a march to Dongola ; that he could not quite appreciate M. Berthelot's method of diplomacy, and that it would be expedient that some change should be made in the French Foreign Office. M. Berthelot resisted, but he could not appeal to the Chamber or the public without endangering the Alliance, and therefore he had, after a brief struggle, to depart, muttering discontent, but, in the interest of France, submissive and silent. M. Bourgeois takes the foreign portfolio to avoid any further mistakes and to strengthen his Government against Russian pressure, and makes a profusion of speeches, which, however, he reads openly from a manu- script, and which, of course, are intended to assign any cause for recent complications except the true one. Even Socialists in France avoid questions about Russia, and the explanations offered pass muster, all sides under- standing perfectly that they are the best which the Government think it expedient or even patriotic to make ; while M. Bourgeois himself is a little stronger than before because it would be so difficult, in view of " a rather strained situation," to replace him.
That is, we are well convinced, a fairly accurate account of the recent incident, the resignation of M. Berthelot ; but we do not think the little rift within the lute will go much further at present. The causes which induce French politicians to adhere to Russia in spite of any grievances are permanent and are almost irresistibly strong, while Russia, up to a certain point, derives great benefit from the French alliance. She has active support in Constantinople, Teheran, and Tokio, and she wants it in all three places ; she is able to bully England comfortably,. which soothes her Jingo party, always strong in Russia because domestic politics are so tedious and dangerous ; and, above all, she can put her finances right, her currency included, with the money eagerly offered by the French peasantry at 4 per cent. She will therefore, we doubt not, pay her diplomatic debt quite honestly, will support all French demands in China, especially those demands for appointments which M. Bourgeois has promised the Senate to urge steadily, will help to worry Great Britain about the Soudan, and will favour any French plans in the East of Europe which do not conflict with her own. And she will keep her Army so cantoned that the Triple Alliance will hesitate to threaten France with actual invasion, lest the Russian multitudes of armed men should fall upon its rear. So far all will be smooth sailing ; but the question of questions for England is how much further ? Russia thinks first of herself and her own interests, and one hardly perceives how a French success in a. maritime war with England would benefit them. France in Egypt would not bring Russia nearer to Constantinople, or to Bushire, or to Port Arthur ; indeed, it might push her farther from them, for with England and France exhausted the Triple Alliance would be in command of the situation, and might, in the interest of Austria and Italy, prevent the Czar from obtaining Constantinople. It is useless, of course, and therefore foolish, to speculate upon contingencies so distant, and so liable to be affected by the deaths of individuals ; but, we repeat, when serious movements are at hand, the interest of the two allies in standing by each other is by no means equal. Russia can protect France from destruction, while France can only make Russia's policy a little easier of execution. The total result is, therefore, that Russia will not give up her control of the initiative, that for the present she leads France, and intends to lead her, and that when menaces are flying about the first question to be con- sidered is not what France is seeking, but what is Russia to get if she assists her to obtain it. France, it is admitted, cares about Egypt. Russia does not care in the least about Egypt, and once offered it to England in full sovereignty. Where, then, if Russia is to be cordial on the subject of Egypt, is the reconciling point of those differences of feeling ? When that has been clearly discovered there will be great danger ahead, but not, we think, till then. To assume that Russia will go to war merely because France sees a prize before her is, we cannot but conceive, to over- estimate Russian disinterestedness, or indeed, to be fair„ the disinterestedness of any State.
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