THE SURPRISE FROM CHINA. T HE intelligence of the week from
China is a great relief to Europe, and also.a cause of great bewilder- nient. Communications from the British, German, and Japanese Legations in Pekin, besides one from the Times correspondent, have at last been permitted to pass, and prove beyond question, unless we assume i an incredible adroitness n forgery on the part of the Chinese, that the European, American, and Japanese Ministers were, with the exception of Baron von ICetteler, alive up to July 22nd. The Legations were attacked on June 20th, and the firing was kept up con- tinuously to July 16th, the Europeans fighting desperately, and, whether assisted or not by any Chinese guards, in- flicting great loss upon their enemies. On that date, for unknown reasons, an armistice was agreed to and the attack suspended, though the Legations were watched on each side by a cordon of Chinese "troops "—not" Boxers" —apparently under regular authority. At all events, they stopped firing when they were bidden. At the same time communications from the Ministers were allowed to be forwarded to Tientsin, apparently under some agreement or coercion as to their nature, for they are of the baldest kind, contain no details of the attack beyond a statement as to officers killed or wounded, and supply no hints as to the essential fact of the situation,—namely, the existence or otherwise in Pekin of a regular Government. Sir Claude Macdonald does not even state whether he wishes a relief force to advance or no. The letters, which are as brief as if they had been smuggled through, leave it doubtful whether the attack is expected to continue, and ai-e in truth little more than evidences that the Ministers are alive. No explanation is suggested of the reasons which induced the Chinese first to circulate reports of amassacre, reports full of apparently unconscious proofs of the tragedy, then to prevent all communication between Pekin and the outer world, and then to allow numerous though carefully guarded messages to get through. The only coherent explanation we can suggest, therefore, is that the Empress-Regent is still in possession of power sufficient to regulate general policy, that she called China to arms against the foreigner—this, we think, is demonstrated by the despatches to St. Peters- burg from Manchuria—but that, while giving way to anti-foreign pressure, or to her own malice, she retained cunning enough to keep open loopholes for her own personal escape. These loopholes were to be the seizure of the Ministers as hostages, and the transfer of the capital to Segan. The slackness of the attack, which many of the writers in the regular European fashion attribute to cowardice, was due to stringent orders from the Palace, which even Prince Tuan did not venture wholly to disobey, though on the 7th inst. he made the bombardment so furious that Chinese who were not soldiers imagined it irresistible, and described its success as a fact instead of an anticipation. The Empress, who can storm the Legations still left standing at will, adheres to this idea, and her mouthpiece, Li Hung Chang, continually repeats at Shanghai that the advance of an army to Pekin will be the signal for the Ambassa- dors' death, and that they are kept as hostages for the safety of the Empress, who, again, realising the possi- bility that her iniquitous threat may be disregarded, has prepared for a retreat along the western road. This theory is at least consistent with the admitted facts, the more so as after Tientsin had fallen and an advance on Pekin seemed imminent, it became necessary to prove that the Ministers were alive. Nobody, the Viceroys reported to Pekin, believed unsupported Chinese state- ments, and you cannot threaten profitably to kill dead men, nor are corpses of great value as materials for a,. bargain. Europe, it was understood in the _Palace, demanded letters, Europe has received them, and now, in the judgment of all Chinese officials, negotiation car comfortably commence.
The Powers have been placed by this new situation in a painful predicament. The theory is that if they advance on Pekin the Empress will order a general massacre, in which the Ambassadors will be included, and which may extend even to the Southern cities. We do not believe that she will order it, as the Chinese mind loves loop- holes, and the Empress has not the disregard of personal danger which those who are born to thrones seldom fail to display. We rather imagine that she will carry her prisoners with her to Segan, hoping to make some bargain there, and postponing to the last minute the costly luxury of putting them to death. The other, however, is the theory accepted in all capitals, and it throws upon the Courts the responsibility of choosing between the lives of their most important servants and the interests of tlieir States. It seems hard to condemn innocent civilians of eminence to what may possibly prove a painful death in order to safeguard a political principle ; but, on the other hand, that principle is not of temporary or even local import- ance. The inviolability of Ambassadors is worth many lives. If any concession whatever is made to the Empress- Regent in order to save the Ministers' lives, and especially if the concession is an exemption of the guilty from per- sonal penalties, Europeans may as well abandon all hope of maintaining relations or pursuing a safe commerce with Asia. Not only the Emperor of China, but any Asiatic Sovereign will be able to commit any atrocity he pleases, and then, seizing the Ministers, to bargain for impunity and his own terms. He will not be able, it is true, to massacre the Embassies accredited to him as a first step, but he will be able to make them prisoners, to defy attempts to rescue them, and to conduct negotiations with an invaluable quid pro quo safely deposited in his hands. There is-, indeed, no reason why he should not ask from Europe compensation for his trouble in seizing its representatives. It will not be for the safety any more than the dignity of Europe to establish such a precedent. and the Powers must march to Pekin as resolutely as if the Chinese had already completed their crime against civilisation and humanity. The reason for the march is technically as good as ever, the shelling of the Legations being as much an outrage on the law of nations as the murder of the Ambassadors would have been, while the late hesitation of the Imperial Court, which will be patent to every Chinese Viceroy, will probably make the task to be per- formed a little easier. They will cease to feel that com- promise is impossible, and probably cease in some degree to dread the terrible woman who, even while fighting, has laid astute plans for a safe retreat. At present they are nearly all obeying the order to forward their armies to Pekin. Fortunately, the responsibility for the Ministers' lives is not as pressing as it looks. The German Emperor has no Minister to save, and is certain to march on Pekin, whatever the consequences to his neighbours ; • the Russians will accompany him to give themselves a position of vantage in the struggle for Manchuria and the railway, which so far have been lost to civilisation ; and the French are impelled in the same direction by their position as protectors of Roman Catholicism in the Est. The suspense as to the Ambassadors has concentrated attention upon them, but the fate of the Christian converts throughout the Empire has been even more deplorable. They have been murdered in thousands, often with horrible tortures, merely because they have been disciples of the foreigner, and France. which conquered Tonquin to avenge the Annamese Christians, can hardly allow Christianity to be extirpated in China without exacting a reparation. Three Powers, therefore, must march on Pekin ; the British, according to Mr. Brodrick, will march with them, and the Americans, though they only claim reparation for the arrest of their own Minister, will not be behind. The Army of Retribution will commence its march in the first week of August—indeed, has already commenced it, the British, Americans, and Japanese leaving the others behind —and when it reaches Pekin the political prospect will be a little clearer. We shall then know whether China has an organised Government or not, whether the Chinese troops will or will not resist European soldiers, whether any of the Powers have separate ideas, and whether it is possible to construct a Government which will secure safety for Europeans in the future. For the moment there is nothing to be done except to march from Tientsin to the capital—seventy miles—as rapidly as possible, with as few jealousies as may be, and without more slaughter of the enemy than is necessary to drive him out of the path. We should have heartily welcomed the report that the General-in-Chief is to be a German—Lieutenant- General von Lesselen—but for the Emperor's speech ; but if no quarter is to be granted, we shall only reach Pekin after weeks of fighting, to find that the most dangerous mob in Asia expects a massacre, and will fight as its countrymen fought at Tientsin.
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