THE MILITARY SITUATION IN S01.1111. AFRICA. T HE military situation in
South Africa has very greatly improved during the past week. General Prinsloo's large commando in the north-east of the Orange Colony has surrendered, already some two thousand five hnndred men, with horses and guns, are prisoners in our hands, and at any moment we may hear of the surrender of De Wet. This does not, of course, actually end hostilities, but it is certain to take the heart out of the resistance of those Boer forces which still keep the field. We do not suppose that Botha will at once surrender because De Wet has shown him the Way, but he and his men will doubtless be much depressed by the event, and will be less and less inclined to desperate measures of resistance. But in truth none of the Boers are inclined for such measures. They fight bravely and cleverly enough, but, as one of their generals remarked, they are willing to surrender whenever they are placed in a position from which they cannot escape. They are not the kind of troops who fight hardest when they get their backs to the wall. On the contrary, they will only go on fighting when they have open country behind them. The moment they find they have no retreat they surrender. Those who are inclined to be pessimistic about the terrible things which the Boers are going to do in the Lydenburg district, and who dread the Boers obliging us to shoot them down while they stand and "roll the psalm to wintry skies," may make themselves quite happy. There will be no last stand of that kind, and no butchery. What will happen in the case of the Transvaalers in the Lydenburg district is just what has happened in the Bethlehem district in the case of the Orange Free Staters. They will manceuvre and raid, and dodge and twist and turn, like the splendid moss-troopers they are, but the moment they are fairly cornered it will be a case of "Don't shoot, Colonel; I'll come down."
But though we think that we shall be forced to play the same game in the Lydenburg district that we have been playing in the north-east of the Orange Colony, we by no means anticipate that the struggle will be so long drawn out. In the first place, the Boers will not be very numerous ; they are dwindling every day. Next, they will be depressed by thinking of the results of Prinsloo's attempts to hold out. Then, too, the force we shall have at our disposal in order to do the work of "cornering" will be very much larger. We shall practically be able to employ double the numbers we have used in the Orange Colony. Again, we shall have a better base. There was no line of railway avail- able near Bethlehem. The Lydenburg district borders on the Delagoa Bay Railway, which will soon be in our hands. Lastly, the Lydenburg district is full of natives, and though the Boers will no doubt make them very fine promises, and we shall of course do all we can to restrain the natives, the Boers directly they begin to get the worst of things will not feel easy. Remember, too, that the Lydenburg district is geographically by no means favourably placed. We already hold the west, and very soon shall hold the south, while the east is Portuguese territory. Now in theory no doubt the Boers could easily raid across the border and start a new Republic in Portu- guese territory, but this they will not attempt, as such an armed incursion would force the Portuguese to go to war with the Boers, and so not only cut off the supplies they still get from Delagoa Bay, but enable us to use that port as a plan e from which to despatch troops. In fact, nothing would suit us better than for the Boers to invade Portu- guese territory and so enable us to act from the east. There remains the north into which the Boers could re- treat. Fortunately, however, this is also closed to them. The large force of mounted men which was sent viti the Beira Railway into Rhodesia should by now be in a position entirely to close the north against a final trek. The military problem, then, will be simply to prevent the Boers from wandering up and down the Lydenburg district raiding and seeking what they may devour in the way of convoys and detached posts, and gradually to " round them up" into a place from which there is no escape, after the method pursued by Hunter and Rundle. How long this process will take it is, of course, impossible to say. It may be finished in two months, or it may take four or six, but that it will be finished by the end of October is our firm belief. We have always believed that the Boers would accomplish their doom within a year from the time when, drunk with power and insolence, like so many oligarchies before-them, they hurled their defiance against the British Empire and the principles of free government. We see nothing in recent events to make us alter our opinion. But though we are so strongly optimistic about the final result of the operations in the Lydenburg country, we must warn our readers to prepare themselves for minor defeats. In order to accomplish his end Lord Roberts will no doubt have to divide his force into flying columns, and to send those columns to penetrate the passes of the mountainous district which the Boers have chosen for their last campaign. To do this is the only way of ending the war. But in order to do this a certain number of risks will have to be ran, and with a foe so capable in the matter of mountain warfare, and so nimble in action, it is impossible not to expect that bodies of troops will occa- sionally be isolated and cut up. It is quite conceivable that there will be another " regrettable incident" on a big scale. It is almost certain that there will be one or two minor surprises and ambuscades. We would ask the public to remember this, and not to take such matters too mach to heart, or to imagine that they portend an endless war. They will not in reality affect the final result in the very least. We do not, of course, want the nation to be indif- ferent to disasters. That would be to go much too far in the opposite direction, and would encourage indifference and carelessness in our officers. We want to see men responsible for bad blunders punished with the utmost severity, but we do not want to see our follies used to exaggerate the strength of the Boers.
It is probable that in the coarse of the next month We shall take a great many prisoners,. and among them many prominent Boers. Very likely the public will begin to wonder whether it is worth while to trans- port these men to St. Helena or Ceylon, and it will be suggested that it would be better to keep them in Natal or at the Cape. Now, we have no desire to be vindictive, but in the case of all the leaders, at any rate, we hope that the policy of sending them out of South Africa will be pursued. Our reason is this. The Boer artillery is being hidden, and bidden very ingeniously. But the country will not be really pacified or safe until every gun, whether a hundred-pounder or a "porn-porn," has been given up. We should therefore let it be known that unless and until the buried cannon are accounted for the Boer leaders must remain beyond sea. This will be a perfectly fair arrange- ment, for the Boer leaders know where the cannon of their own commandos have been hidden, or else can find out. We shall not be asking them to betray any one, but merely to say in what places the guns are concealed. When the tale of grins is complete it will be possible to settle the conditions under which the Boer prisoners will be able to return to their homes. That the Boers will return from oversee better men than they went we cannot doubt. They will have learnt something of the world, and they will also have learnt that the "rooinek " is not so black as he has been habitually painted by Mr. Steyn and Mr. Kruger. Finally, we wish it might prove possible to imitate Chatham's great piece of policy in regard to the pacification of the Highlands, and raise a couple of regiments or so of Boer mounted sharpshooters for frontier service in various parts of the Empire. Such a body of men might prove of immense use in China, or Nigeria, or the West Coast. We are afraid, however, that the Boer is not adventurous enough for such service, and would not like to quit South Africa even for a five years' enlistment. We are not able, in his case, to please him by the offer of being allowed to wear his national dress, for a national dress he does not possess. We fear, then, that the notion of using Boer marksmanship in the service of the Empire must be abandoned. Later on, however, when the Boer settles down, we shall not be surprised to find him enlisting freely in the local frontier forces.
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