THE R17SSO-TURKISH BLUE BOOKS.*
THE whole of the papers on the contest with Russia respecting Turkey have been presented to Parliament, and are now accessible to the public. The series is extensive, and appears to be complete. It commences as far back as 1850, with the original dispute between the Greek and Latin dignitaries in Syria, and traces the growth of the dispute throughout every stage—from that in which the question lay between Franee.and Russia, to the next form of Russian complaint against Turkey' respectingthe custody of the Holy Places and the treatment of Greek Christians, down to the Menschikoff mission and all that has ensued. To digest these two bulky volumes at the end of the week, is clearly impossible; and we can only glance at the chief points of interest. Those points, of course, lie in the papers which bear upon the actual state of the re/ationa of our Government, not only with that of Turkey and Russia, but with the other Powers of Europe, and upon the principles laid down to guide the course henceforward. As we have already remarked respecting the statement of Lord Clarendon, this series of papers does not materially alter the aspect of affairs as it has been already presented by the public journals, in its most important events. The documents likewise support every position in the Ministerial explanations ; indeed, the text justifies stronger expressions than our Ministers have in some cases used for their own vindication. 'Upon the whole, it may be said that the official papers present all parties concerned in a more advantageous light than they ap- peared under less complete information ; with the one exception of Russia, whose falsehood, treachery, and bad feeling, come out more strongly in proportion to the fulness of the account.
Lord Clarendon has excused our Government of trusting to Russian pro-
mises and assurances, by the remark that "a policy of suspicion is neither wise nor generous" ; and there are evidences in these volumes that he WO not alone in the disposition to place trust in the word of the Czar. We find Lord Stratford de Redcliffe, whose sagacity and energy are unquestioned, observing, that "the personal character of the Emperor Nicholas, his obliga- tions in common with the other Great Powers of Christendom, and his fre- quent declarations of respect for the independence of the Turkish empire, exclude the suspicion of any attempt to carry his point by mere arbitrary force. He lies under the restraint of moral as well as political considera- tions." With more to the same effect.
Ministers have defended themselves from the charge of being timid as well as credulous ; of shrinking from the responsibility of acts that might force them into war. The despatches prove that they never missed an occasion of recording their desire to restore peace if Russia would only act upon her own professions. The affair of Sinope, however, had as great an effect upon Min- isters as upon the public. They used language as strong as any that has been used by irresponsible writers. "Even if the Governments of England and France," Lord Clarendon declares, "were not in honour bound to pro- tect the Sultan, they could not, in the interests of humanity, tolerate that such scenes of horrible carnage as that of which Sinope has been the theatre should be renewed." Hence the instructions to take the command of the Black Sea, for the purpose of defending the Turkish flag and the Turkish territory, and requiring Russian vessels other than merchantmen to return to Sebastopol. "Her Majesty's Government have not hesitated to adopt the course which the honour and dignity of this country prescribe ; but, at the same time, they do not disguise from themselves that it may at no distant period involve England and France in war with Russia." After languar such as this, and action such as this, the Cabinet of St. Petersburg could scarcely mistake forbearance for indifference, or calculate upon any want of firmness in carrying out the declared policy of the Governments of France and England. If the Russian Government had made the mistake, Lord Cla- rendon says to Sir Hamilton Seymour, it had erred.
• "Correspondence respecting the Rights and Privileges of the Latin and Greek Churches in Turkey. Presented to both Houses of Parliament by command ether Majesty."
Although our Ministers entered into the dispute with perfect good faith, trusting the word of Russia, it is (mite evident that now at least they no longer do so. In a conversation with Baron Brunow, related in a letter to Sir Hamilton Seymour on the 28th of December last, Lord Clarendon tells how he informed the Baron that the French and English Governments had intended to take a more active part than hitherto in the Eastern question. In the same conversation, Lord Clarendon expresses his belief, "founded upon information from various quarters, that the Emperor would make no concessions, and was determined upon war if he could not make peace upon his own terms." The last identical note adopted by the representatives of the Four Powers at Constantinople, and subsequently adopted by the Porte, originated with Lord Stratrord de Radcliffe ; who has all along laboured, and successfully, in keeping Turkey to her moderation and self-possession. Not that he trusted Russia. lie confesses, (Dec. 170 with that distinctness which distinguishes all the English statesmen who take part in these negotiations, " that the late destruction of so many Turkish vessels at Sinope would probably never have occurred if the ships of England and France had been sent thither at an earlier period." For that disaster, the Russian officers, fully aware of the miserable land-defences at Sinope, were answerable. Lord Stratford points out the general interest which the Russians have in weakening their adver- sary. " Since they frown upon his progress in peace, and thwart it as oc- casions offer, are they likely to neglect the opportunity which war presents of crippling his means and curtailing his power ?" . . . . " So much for the facts as eases in point, and as warnings for the future."
The English Minister at St. Petersburg, acting under the instructions of Lord Clarendon, carried the general frankness on our side to the Russian capital. "Your Lordship's wishes," he says, "as to frankness to be observed towards the Russian Government at a juncture of this importance, are so well known to me," that he did not hesitate to represent the feelings excited in England by the destruction at Sinope. Sir Hamilton relates a conversa- tion in which he declared to Count Nesselrode, in so many words, that the great forbearance hitherto shOwn as to the entrance of the ships into the Black Sea "was no longer possible." The last conversation with Count Nesselrode is reported in a letter written on the 13th of January. The Count was then ill ; but diplomatic considerations perhaps induced him at this conversation as well as others previously, not to say much—not to answer, except upon abstract points. For example, he questioned the right of England and France to feel aggrieved by the affair of Sinope, which he represented as a mere accident of the local war, and not at all intended as a demonstratian against the Western Powers.
In this last conversation, Sir Hamilton told Count Nesselrode that every Russian ship would be required to register a Russian port. "Is is painful to me," be continued, "M. le Comte, to make such un allusion ; but if the summons is not attended to, it will be enforced" (on aura recours d la force). In the course of the conversation, "Count Nesselrode said that he felt obliged to observe, that it was most unfortunate that her Majesty's Government should have determined upon taking measures of as decided a character, at the precise moment when strenuous efforts were being made at Vienna for coming to a peaceable arrangement." [The Russian was ever willing to. continue negotiations for peace !] The most curious incident in the Russian proceedings, however, is the point of honour upon which the Czar appears to stand. In the conversa- tion with Sir Hamilton Seymour on the 24th December, Count Nesselrode said, "the conduct pursued towards the Russian Cabinet was unheard-of—the Sultan was consulted as to the conditions upon which he was disposed to make peace !" "Then again, the idea of asking Russia to send a plenipotentiary to meet a Turkish plenipotentiary under the auspices of the Allied Minister& was perfectly novel—was an indignity which would be offered only to one of the smallest of the European States—was a course which, during the last hun- dred years, Russia had never submitted to in her intercourse with Turkey, and to which she could not now be expected to lend herself." Sir Hamilton could not understand how Russia should feel humiliated, or how she should feel hurt, because in a question of avowed European interest Europe chose to attend to that interest. "This comes," replied Count Nesselrode, "from your not choosing to put yourselves in our situation." How would England feel, he asked, if some great power had offered to interfere to settle her dif- ferences with China ? No European interests, replied Sir Hamilton, were engaged there; but if assistance in settling differences bad been offered, it would have been gladly received by her Majesty's Government. At a sub- sequent conversation, the Chancellor again adverted to "the extreme repug- nance of his Majesty" to admit a Turkish negotiator.
Nothing is more distinctly established by the papers than the complete accord between the French and English Governments. This appears even by the very freedom with which differences of counsel are suggested. Alluding to a communication from the Austrian Ambassador at Paris, Lord Cowley recites the reply which M. Drouyn de Lhuys proposed to make. "I observed," said Lord Cowley, "that he might add," and so forth. The relation between the two Governments is throughout that of genuine consultation and joint action.
The position of Prussia comes out principally in her acquiescence with the proceedings of the Four Powers, and what appears to be a general ap- proval. Baron Maiateuffel, for example freely expresses his opinion that the Turkish reply to the (second) note of the four representatives at Constantinople "was moderate and well drawn up."
The position of Austria in the negotiations is such as to give some ground for Lord John Russell's hope that the Government at Vienna may not break with the Western Powers. Count Buol, no doubt, took some exception to "the decided and menacing position" of the French and English Governments after the Sinope affair; but, through M. de Hour- queney, he assured M. Drouyn de Lhuys, that the Austrian Govern- ment, "although not prepared for the lengths to which the two Govern- ments had gone, would not separate from them in consequence." Count Buol expressed a wish to Lord Westmoreland that -Austria should be the Channel to urge pacific proposals upon Russia. In accordance with this view, he drew up a despatch to the Austrian Minister at St. Petersburg, which be showed to Lord Westmoreland. This despatch "was highly approved" by the representatives of the Four Powers ; statesmen, let us Observe, remarkable for the pertinacity with which, while acknowledging that the Porte acted in accordance with their wishes, they continued to declare their "confidence" that Russia would resume negotiations to conclude peace. Count Buors despatch is described by Lord Westmore- land— ." The tone of this despatch is full of friendly interest for the Emperor Nicholas; but it does not fail to point out to him the anxious expectation of the Austrian Government, that in pursuance of that respect for the mainte- nance of the tranquillity and independence of the states of Europe by which his policy has been distinguished, he will seize this opportunity of putting an end to a state of things which, by being prolonged, might compromise all those interests which he has hitherto go eminently coOperated in main-
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