Two Can Play
THE true story of events in the past few days in the Congo has not yet emerged. Amid the jumble of accusations and counter-accusations, and the possible UN censorship of reporting, there may be some doubt as to whether it ever will. (The charges made by Dr. Conor Cruise O'Brien about the managing of the previous Congo venture have, after all, never been cleared up.) What is particularly uncertain this time is how far the military advance was planned ahead, and how far it was a result of commanders on the spot who found they could suddenly progress without resistance. The fortunate thing is that so far the action seems to have been relatively bloodless, but the rub is the great uncertainty as to what it has actually achieved. So often before the last act in the Congo reunification has been about to begin only to be thwarted by Mr. Tshombe's eventual prevarication. This is only a little less likely now. And the present quiet in Katanga could itself be a dangerous sign. The whereabouts of Mr. Munongo, a much more violent figure than Mr. Tshombe, are unknown. He at least cannot be assumed to be taking Katanga's submission easily. It seems that U Thant's words about considering further meas- ures at the end of two weeks may well have to be taken seriously. But what, short of deposing Tshombe, are these measures to be? Mr. Tshombe perhaps is not the only one who can play at bluff. The situation is now chiefly interesting for the difference it shows between British and American policy, and hence, since Britain and America are two of the few large powers whose payments are up to date, partly for the future of the UN. American fear of a return of Com- munist infiltration has been cleverly exploited by President Adoula, a much abler man than is generally believed, in whose interest it is to claim that his Government is perpetually in dan- ger of falling. Again, American support of the use of force is clearly influenced by the know- ledge that funds will soon run out, and that the important Indian forces must at any moment be withdrawn. To act quickly then, even at the risk of appearing to be taking the venture into their ow n hands, was for the Americans essential. Britain's more thoughtful policy has had to be overridden, and in any case has gained little credit because of the way it has appeared to be tarnished with the self-interest of the Katanga lobby and now the unnecessary motion tabled by Sir Tufton Beamish and his supporters There should be no doubt that it is President Kennedy himself who is responsible for the American push. It is but another aspect of his declared determination to direct Western policy on his own.
These differences in policy have luckily been made less important by the nature of the military. action. The UN have made all the gains of force without a corresponding loss in terms of blood- shed and havoc left behind them. Perhaps the most encouraging sign of all is U Thant's quick- ness in organising large-scale technical aid to move in as the military move out. The Congo operation is costing 10,000,000 dollars a month, more than half of which is going on the military build-up. If more of this had been given as aid to the Central Government in the first place, the regaining of Katanga would not now be so important. This time, it is vital that the pro- gramme of technical aid goes ahead even if Mr. Tshombe again proves intractable.
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