4 JUNE 1932, Page 5

Disarmament in the Balance

Ithe last six weeks the Disarmament Conference has 1 sunk into disregard and disrepute. No one quite knows what it has been doing and so far as they do know they are not impressed. No greater contrast to the spirit that marked the opening discussions in February and the tabling of concrete proposals by various delegations at the beginning of April could be imagined. If the Conference is not to end in a failure that would leave the situation worse than if no conference had been held at all someone must pull it resolutely out of the ditch and set its feet on the solid high road again. And that must be done quickly before it sinks in deeper still and expires finally of suffocation.

That means pretty much wiping the work of the last six weeks out. It has been work entrusted to the experts, naval, military and air, who have sat on at Geneva through part of April and all May while the politicians, most of them, returned to their several capitals. So far as concerns the particular task that was set them the experts have achieved nothing, for every committee has wound up, or is winding up, by recording its complete inability to agree. But that does not mean that the sittings have been valueless. On the contrary, they have led to one conclusion of considerable importance—that the only possible hope of progress lies in the resolve of the politicians to give their experts the go by and get something definite done themselves. To say that is not as derogatory to the experts as it sounds, for they were set by the politicians to argue on questions as fertile in discord as any that ever agitated a conclave of bickering schoolmen. The Conference (sitting as a General Commission) suspended its effective work on April 22nd. On that day two resolutions were unanimously adopted, both of them in their original form emanating from Sir John Simon. By the first the Conference

" declares its approval of the principle of qualitative disarmament-- i.e., the selection of certain classes or descriptions of weapons the possession or use of which should be absolutely prohibited to all States or internationalized by a general convention."

The last few words are, of course, a concession to M. Tardieu's ideas. Between abolition and internationaliza- tion a division will have to be taken sooner or liter. but for the moment the point was the selection of the weapons that were to be marked out for the one treatment or the other. What were the weapons to be thus con- demned ? To get that decided the Conference resolved

"that the range of land, sea and air armaments should be examined by the competent special commissions, with a view to selecting those weapons whose character is the most specifically offensive, or the most efficacious against national defence or those most threatening to civilians."

What experts could resist such terms of reference ? And to what conclusions could such terms of reference lead ? Practically any weapon can be either offensive or defensive according to circumstances. That is un- deniable; and the experts pointed it out. The gun that fires farthest and fires the heaviest projectile is likely to be the most efficacious against defence. The experts pointed that out too. But as to what calibre should mark a weapon as primarily offensive there was no agreement at all—or only so vague an agreement as to he useless. There was no agreement as to whether capital ships were offensive or defensive. Or submarines. Or aircraft-carriers. Or as to what tanks were. Or as to the distinction between offensive and defensive aircraft. The Conference, in short, when it meets again will find itself not an inch further on than it was on the day, six weeks ago, when Sir John Simon's two resolutions were adopted and the experts were started on their work.

The reason is obvious. The Conference was trying an impossible short-cut. Having decided in favour of the principle of qualitative disarmament, meaning the abolition (or internationalization) of certain aggressive weapons, it called in the experts to save it the respon- sibility of deciding what those weapons should be. That responsibility cannot be so shelved. The Conference must take the decision for itself and it is perfectly competent to do that. The Allied statesmen at Versailles found no difficulty in deciding what weapons should be forbidden to Germany in order to resider her incapable of aggression—ships over 10,000 tons, submarines, heavy guns and tanks and all military aircraft. Signor Grandi on behalf of the Italian Government has formally proposed to the Conference the total abolition of all those weapons. Several other Governments have sup- ported him. Others again, like our own and the United States, have proposed the abolition of some of the weapons in question but not (as yet at any rate) of others. Along that line progress is possible and the line must be taken up once more and vigorously pursued. To seek, through reference to the experts, the automatic application of a principle accepted simply as a theoretic principle, was to invite precisely the failure that has now to be recorded. The experts were hopeless coun- sellors for two reasons. In the first place they were asked to argue about a purely academic question, with no moral force to impel them. The politicians arc constrained to say, at least in theory, " We are pledged to disarmament. Therefore we will abolish certain weapons." But to the experts the injunction was, in effect, "Tell us in the abstract what weapons are offensive and what defensive, disregarding the general merits of disarmament, which is outside your province." In the second place an expert as a national official is compelled to take an even mom national view than the Minister he serves, and the curse of the world to-day consists in the universal discussion of international problems in a purely national spirit.

As a matter of fact the discussions of the last six weeks have done no great harm. They have discredited the experts themselves, not individually but as a class. But they have not really held up the Conference, for it could have made no progress in essentials till the new French Government was in being. That difficulty is now virtu- ally over. Next week at any rate the Disarmament Conference should be in a position to resume its full activity and it is of capital importance that bold decisions should be courageously sought. The only solution that will bring appeasement to Europe is one that accords to Germany equality of status (not equality in the number of men or weapons) in the matter of armaments. That is what Italy has proposed and other nations have advocated. If Mr. MacDonald can visit Geneva for a few days before Lausanne, and is ready to press that solution upon the Conference, hopes that have been rapidly wilting can revive again. But if the Cabinet is resolved to maintain ships of 35,000 tons while Germany is limited to 10,000 that is the end of the equality of status demand. France, no doubt, would raise some difficulties in any ease. So, in respect to certain types, would the United States. But we in this country are concerned with our own Government first. Sir John Simon in proposing qualitative disarmament has un- questionably started down the right road. How far is the Government ready to follow it ?