THE OPPOSING STRATEGIES
By STRATEGICUS
GENERAL DIETMAR has delivered a discourse upon strategy which must be taken into account. He says, in effect, that the Axis Powers need not attack but the Allies must ; and, if we are wise, we shall accept Shat as beyond dispute. Hitler has from the first been resuming the historic challenge of the Continental strategy to the Oceanic. The pertinent fact in the present situation is that at length the Allies have come to the point when they have the means to put the case for the Oceanic strategy, since hitherto Hitler has been free to develop the Continental to a great extent as he wished. The contribution which he has made to the challenge in which Napoleon failed is to have armed more thoroughly, and by means of his early successes and greater preponderance of force to have conquered a greater part of Europe. That single-track mind sees issues of this magnitude simply in terms of multiplication. Enlarge the territorial unit sufficiently and you can make it self- supporting ; thus the world can be defied and conquered.
What Dietmar now says is that the territorial unit necessary has been conquered and is at the disposal of the conqueror. Neither of these premises is correct. Hitler seized one of the main oil-pro- ducing territories, but it was wrenched out of his hands before he could secure a gallon of oil from it. There cannot be any doubt, moreover, that almost the whole of Europe is so badly fed that even the Germans themselves are on short rations. This would not disturb Hitler's theory if he could provide the requisite food neces- sary for those whom he has enslaved to produce the war material his armies need. It is, however, known that much of/ this elave labour is being treated as no prudent mister would be stupid enough to treat his slaves.- The territories which have been taken do not " serve " him and never promise to be able to do so within the critical time. It is, therefore, absurd to suggest that the increase of European production can be set against the armament of the Allies. With no more reason can the U-boat war be set-off against the air-attack.
Nevertheless, it is wise to note the strength of the enemy position. As long ago as last autumn I pointed out that it was no longer the German offensive which constituted the problem for the Allies so much as the defensive ; and „that purely empirical conclusion seems to me more reliable than Dietmar's citation of Clausewitz in favour of the defensive as the -stronger form of war. Even the German general himself seems to think that thesis requires the buttress of illustration, since he adduces the difference between the position of 1918 and today. The Axis interior lines today, he says, do not expose them to the same concentric pressure as in 1918, because the distances between the Allies are so much greater. He quite forgets that the enemy was defeated in the west in 1918, after the east had been put out of action: It is an unpalatable fact ; but it is true. There was no concentric pressure then ; there is today.
Furthermore, he overlooks the fact that German reinforcement of the west or the east is made the more difficult, not the easier, by the greater distance between the Allies. In fact, if the Allies were separated by an even greater distance the German position would be to that extent worse. The advantage of interior lines depends in these days upon communications, as it always turned upon mobility ; and if the Germans had an army ten times the size, with the bulk of it held down in the heart of Siberia, the Allies would have repro- duced the war on two fronts in its most unpleasant form. The German position is much weaker than its apologist suggests.
So obvious is this, indeed, that there is ground for the suspicion that General Dietmar is for some reason producing a travesty of the real situation in order to deceive the Allies. The greater prob- lbility, however, is that the impressionistic picture is merely pro- duced to meet the home demand for reassurance, and it is hoped that the speaker's occasional candour will carry conviction now. During the attack upon Stalingrad, when the losses could be no longer concealed, it was stated that in future infantry would be no longer flung into the insensate struggle, and that artillery would do the rest. But in point of fact, although artillery was used more.
whole divisions continued to be used on many occasions as before. General Dietmar has produced a sedative; but there is a small core of truth in his statement. If the Germans could hold out against Russia during the whole period of the campaigning season, and maintain a strong strategic reserve at some place from which it could readily be diverted to France or the Mediterranean, their position would undoubtedly be strong.
It is almost the sole, as it is certainly the main, element of their strength that they are in the position of the defenders against an invasion from the sea This is among the most difficult operations of war ; and when an enemy has been given time to create sufficiently strong shore defences the hazards become increasingly great. But it is unthinkable that all the immensely long vulnerable coastline exposed to attack has been fortified. In that sense " fortress " Europe exists only in the imagination. Although the Germans have a capacity for slave-like labour, even, they could not in the given time have fortified the whole of the North Sea coast and Mediter- ranean as well What they may think they have done is to have built a series of protective works over the coast which could be most easily given Fighter cover. Even that is a considerable undertaking, and it is very far from certain that the provision will meet the need.
But what is this fortification of the coast intended to do? It cannot prevent a landing by resolute men. However much a failure the Dieppe raid was, at least it should be clear from a study of the attack how little prevented it from being successful. All that fortifications are designed to achieve is economy of the defence, and delay. Indeed, the German plan does not depend upon the inability to land. It turns upon the difficulty of landing a sufficient force sufficiently armed to meet counter-attack by some suitably con- centrated unit, before if can establish itself. If one may take
Dietmar's statement at its face value it means that this is no longer taken for granted, and the Germans intend, as far as they can, to
see what strength an' invading force can attain before committing themselves to the illusory advantages of interior lines of such extent as they now possess.
That would depend upon how far they will be allowed to. rest upon their eastern laurels, how far the defensive in Russia can be trusted to hold. In spite of the experience of two years of war on the eastern front it would be rash to hazard a clear answer to that question,- The " bolt position " at Stalingrad did not prevent the Germans from suffering the greatest military disaster their army has experienced in modern times. We may say that it was a present from Hitler ; and it is undeniable that he was the main architect of the ruin. But what were the professional soldiers doing? The most striking feature of the Russian development is the fact that it was directed from the same places which had seen the launching of minor
counter-attacks for several weeks. It would seem incredible, if It were not the fact, that the Wehrmacht should be crushed by the mere strengthening of blows which had been pressed on and off for so long. There are evidently weaknesses in it that will manifest themselves even more disastrously before the end.
In spite of that there are at this moment a number of positions on the Russian front which seem to defy all assault. Whether they
will be able to hold if Germany decides to remain on the defensive for any length of time is quite another matter. Is it conceivable that Russia will stand still while the enemy is attempting to cope with invasion when she attacked so strongly without the help of that diversion? Is it conceivable that the Wehrmacht can withstand the full force of the Russian onslaught? Those are questions which only the future can decide ; but, since Germany has lost the flower of her troops, it would seem that the hour of destiny will strike when the Allies develop their full effort against her. Dietmar's main importance for us is the tacit admission of German nerve's. Germany has no defence against the growing air-offensive, and her admissions confirm, what indeed we already know, that the Allies have now trained divisions equal in number to her own.
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