Military Aspects of Indo-China

By JULES MENKEN . THE more the problem of Indo-China is examined, the more complex are its realities seen to be, the more difficult, appear the choices before Western policy, the more far-reaching the implications of whatever is done. This article will not attempt to discuss the problem as a whole, much less to urge any policy, but will confine itself to two or three largely military issues of major importance in the situation. First, the Red River Delta. The delta is a rough triangle of flat, low-lying ground, with northern and southern sides each about a hundred miles long and rimmed by low hills, and with a somewhat shorter base on the sea. Waterways and rice-fields dominate the landscape. The waterways comprise the Red River and its outlets, which cut the delta into small bas:ns, and are prevented by embankments, both natural and artificial, from overflowing the land when the rivers are in summer flood. Communications are bad. Roads fan out from Hanoi, most of them raised and running along the dykes and embankments which control the flood-waters; the only remain- ing railway connects Hanoi with Haiphong, the one port of entry for the American supplies vital to the defence; between many places movement is by water.

Within the delta, one of the most densely populated regions of the earth, about eight million people live in an area of less than 6,000 square miles. In English terms, it is as though the three Ridings of Yorkshire (whose combined area is also about 6,000 square miles) supported almost four times their actual population—and supported them not largely by industry, but almost solely out of the produce of the soil. The average :density of the rural population throughout the delta exceeds 1,300 per square mile; because of the great expanse of waters, most of the people live in numerous small, scattered villages; in the most thickly settled areas many villages have a density of more than 5.000 per square mile. The dense population exacerbates the guerrilla problem; in any case, fighting in areas settled so thickly is impossible without damage to pro- perty or injury to persons, which the people resent, and which the Viet-minh exploit against the French.

Out of upwards of 6,500 villages in the delta, the Corn- munists already control perhaps 3.500, French Union and Vietnamese forces control about 1,200, and about 2,000 are in dispute. The Viet-minh Command are believed to have a military force in the delta totalling about 100,000, of whom some 30.000 are regulars and the remainder regional troops

- , and guerrillas. Along the northern perimeter are the equivalent of two Viet-minh divisions. The Communist troops which took Dien Bien Phu (three infantry divisions and an artillery division) are being hurried toward the western apex of the

; delta and should be available within a month. French Union forces in the Red River delta number something like 601000 men. A very large proportion are static troops, the garrisons (each between ten and forty or more strong) of the 2,000 dispersed strong-points and blockhouses which form the French defences along the perimeter or within the delta itself. Mobile troops available for the relief of threatened positions are few. Some strong-points are now being evacuated in order to concentrate the limited French Union forces and

increase the hard to defend—is the vital 65-mile long ncrease the strength of mobile formations. Of outstanding

importance—and

This serious at the south- eastern disparity of forces makes clear the reasons

and continuing guerrilla attacks), it will not bring a respite against smaller Communist operations. All these facts explain why the recent Ely-Salan mission to Indo-China is reported to have urged the dispatch of substantial reinforcements, and to have insisted that any delay must expose the French Uniod forces in the delta to the risk of grave defeats.

As to the rest of Indo-China, in terms of strategic geogi'aph); the vital fact is that no natural defence line exists south of the Red River delta. In this respect Indo-China is quite unlike Korea. Both countries, it is true, have a narrow waist) but in Korea a line across the peninsula rests at both ends on the sea, over which United Nations naval and air forces can exercise complete command. By contrast, in Indo-China the western flank of any defence line across the waist could be turned: and though this might involve operations oil Siamese territory to which there would be political objectioni even from the Communist standpoint, militarily no natural obstacles would prevent such operations. Moreover, if terrain was disregarded and an attempt made to hold such a line, French Union communications would be bad and logistic dal culties great; while the experience of Dien Bien Phu show9 that air supply .with the limited forces available in Indo-China is inadequate to maintain any substantial body of troops, Farther south geography is even less favourable and offers nc) natural defences whatever; though in the Saigon area in the extreme south a bridgehead—which would take large forceS to hold—could be based on the sea.

Partly because of the attention concentrated on the Red River delta, the numbers and disposition of forces elsewhere in Indo-China are obscure. At the beginning of this year the French Expeditionary Corps in Indo-China is reported to have totalled some 142,000 (French, 71,000; Foreign Legion, 19,000) North Africans, 32,000; other Africans, 20.000), to which French-officered Vietnamese troops with the French Exped14, tionary Corps added about 110,000, making together a total of 252,000. The Vietnam National Army is variouslY estimated, with perhaps 175,000 as about its true strength' Laos and Cambodia have armies of about 15,000 each.. After deducting losses of, say, 15,000 at Dien Bien Phu and allowinf for, say, 60,000 (mainly French Expeditionary Corps) in the delta, there would remain elsewhere in Indo-China perhaps 75,000 French Union troops other than Vietnamese, and perhaps 100,000 French-officered Vietnamese. To these most, or all of the Vietnam National Army must be added, as well as the small armies .of Laos and Cambodia.

For the Communists a calculation is obviously more difficult, The total of Communist regular and regional troops ig variously estimated at upwards of 300,000. With about 150,000 of them threatening the Red River delta front, there must be something like 150,000 elsewhere in Indo' China. Thus both in the Red River delta and elsewhere the Communists would appear to have a superiority over French Union forces excluding Vietnamese of 2 or 2 to 1. while including French-officered Vietnamese there would appear to be a rough numerical equality outside the Red River delta.

Numbers alone are very far from the whole story. French superiority in the air is at present complete, though the number of planes in use is small. French weapons (mainly American' supplied) are ample, though comparable types can have little if any qualitative advantage over the heavy weapons with which Soviet and Chinese aid has equipped the Viet-minh. American-supplied transport is better and much more ample, though handicapped in many areas by bad roads. Elsewhere in Indo-China the French Union forces are also widely dispersed and tied down in many small strong-points; unless French' officered, the.fighting quality of Vietnamese troops is uncertain, their morale is often bad, and in the south Communist propaganda or terrorist pressure has caused the Vieinameso garrisons of a good many strong-points to go over to the enemy.

On balance, therefore, the effective fighting strength of the Communists elsewhere in Indo-China is thus abou' equal to French Union strength, and in addition the Corr rusts have the advantage of the initiative. All these facts underline once more the urgent need for French reinforcements. The French decision to call up at once conscripts who would not normally join the colours until October indicates that the French Government has at last faced these realities. The new call-up, however, cannot help the immediate situation; and large French reinforcements for Indo-China will be hard to find unless French formations in the West are weakened.

Britain and the United States are not better placed. Exclud- ing boys and women's services, the British Army had an active strength of 427,000 at the beginning of this year; four-fifths Of its fighting units are overseas (they include three armoured divisions and an infantry division in Germany, and two divisions and a brigade in the Canal Zone); and there is no strategic reserve. If present plans are carried out, the United States Army will be reduced from 1,407,000 this June to 1,164,000 a year hence, with a parallel reduction in its divisional strength from 20 divisions a year ago to 19 today and 17 in June, 1955. Of the present 19 divisions, eight (which are not all at full strength) are in the United States, and 11 are over- seas (five—plus three armoured regimental units practically equivalent to a division—in Europe, and six in Korea and Japan). There are also three Marine divisions.

In one way or another these forces could perhaps provide two or three divisions between them for Indo-China—though only with difficulty, and at the cost of creating wakness else- Where. They could clearly not provide the troopsere quired for a major ground campaign, particularly if the Chinese intervened in strength. It follows either that even a reinforced Western effort in Indo-China will still be insufficient to !estore the situation, or else that the West must face, however reluctantly, an expansion of its armed forces.