TOPICS OF THE DAY.
THE DISASTER AT NICHOLSON'S NEK. THE disaster at Nicholson's Nek, where six companies of the Royal Irish Fusiliers, four and a half com- panies of the Gloucesters, and the 10th Mountain Battery, the whole under the command of Colonel Carleton, were surrounded by the enemy and forced, owing to the loss of their reserve ammunition and artillery, to surrender, after some nine hours' fighting, is a serious matter, but it would be foolish to exaggerate its importance. Mortifying as it is to the British people and the British Army, it is not a military disaster of anything approaching the first magni- tude. We have repeatedly undergone as bad or worse reverses at the hands of an enemy far inferior to the Boers —for example, the destruction of a whole army in the old Afghan War, and later our defeat at Maiwand—and it is necessary that the public should realise that if we are to engage in serious war we must be prepared for events of a similar kind. The nation must learn that for the last ten or fifteen years we have been exceptionally fortunate, and that we cannot always expect success in every encounter. War cannot always be an affair of marching out, meeting the enemy, destroying him, and sending back telegrams in the evening about victory crowning our forces. We say this in no spirit of hostile criticism, for taken as a whole the behaviour of the nation in face of the reverse has been be- yond praise. Those who are opposed to the war, and regard it as unjust and unnecessary, have vied with those who be- lieve it to be just and necessary in maintaining the spirit in which the British people should meet a British reverse. For example, the anti-Imperialist Press—the leader in the Star on Tuesday was specially worthy of praise—though making the criticisms they have every right to make, have shown no sign of wavering or weakness. We are bound to say that we never expected them to behave in any other way, for a man does not cease to be an Englishman because he holds anti-Imperialist views, but, nevertheless, it is pleasant to record the fact. Our only complaint is that the tendency has been to exaggerate the importance of the event, and to speak as if it were unprecedented. It is not that, and, unless we misjudge the character of modern war, the enforced and inevitable surrender of isolated bodies of men will be commoner than previously. The use of modern arms makes it more than ever impossible for men who have exhausted their ammunition to carry on the fight. In former days men whose cartridges were gone might possibly still do something. Now they are virtually hors de combat as soon as their power of firing their guns is over.
This is not the moment to criticise in detail the conduct of Sir George White in allowing an isolated force to get entangled in the hills. That gallant officer, with the magnanimity and fine sense of honour that have always marked him, has made no attempt to defend himself, but has gone the length of stating the facts that tell against him, without any effort to give excuses for, or explanations of, the plans which ended so disastrously. All, then, that we can do, or that we ought to do before we get much fuller reports of what occurred, is to set forth some of the questions upon which one would like to have more precise information. Let us say, however, before we state them that it is perfectly possible that there are good and suffi- cient answers to every one of our questions. Remember that till you know the answer every question of the kind we are going to put looks quite unanswerable. To begin with, one would like to know why Sir George White abandoned the plan of standing on the defensive with a concentrated force. We are, of course, quite aware that in many cases short, sharp attacks are the very best form of defensive tactics, but there is a great difference between these and sending out an isolated force to turn the enemy's flank, which we gather from Sir George White's own words was his main object. A night attack on a neighbouring position where the attack- ing force can be easily and quickly supported, and which, therefore, cannot be isolated, might have been compatible with a defensive policy, but it is difficult to see how a force, numerically inferior to the enemy before it, could be justified in an attempt to outflank. At the same time, it is unite possible that S;r George White had, or believed he had, imperative grounds for attempting the manceuvre he did attempt. But putting aside the question of the rashness or wisdom of the movement in itself, one must next ask, Was the operation, admitting it to have been a reason- able and proper one per se, conducted on proper lines and with reasonable precautions ? One must presume that before the column plunged on Sunday night into the darkness and the hills the ground in front of it had been most carefully reconnoitred by mounted men. It is absolutely impossible to doubt that by some means or other our commanders had satisfied themselves that when our troops marched up Bell's Spruit—a narrow valley apparently—they were not running into a trap, but were taking the enemy by surprise. During the night march itself it was probably impossible to do much scout- ing, but beforehand the sides of Bell's Spruit must have been pronounced clear of the enemy. But even if the preliminary reconnoitring was thoroughly carried out, as we are bound to believe it was, it is, of course, possible that the Boers directly darkness came on took up posi- tions in places which in daylight had seemed quite clear of them. But granted that this was so and that all the proper precautions were taken, though they were unhappily insufficient, a question suggests itself which, in our present state of knowledge or ignorance, is of a most perplexing kind. Why did not Sir George White arrange to keep in constant touch with the column he had despatched on such a difficult and dangerous errand ? Of course it is absurd to say that he forgot the column on his left flank. His attack, devised to draw the enemy's attention away from the march of the column, shows that he had it in his mind ; but considering that he appears to have not heard any news of it from the time it started till its surrender, one understands how the idea that he forgot it has arisen. It seems, indeed, almost necessary to assume that he arranged that Colonel Carleton should take with him a number of mounted men, and that messages should be sent back, say, every hour, or, at any rate, directly con- tact occurred with the enemy, in order to maintain touch between the column and the main force. Doubtless some such arrangements were made, but could not be carried out because the Boers had quietly surrounded the column, and the moment our soldiers were attacked they found themselves cut off from all possibility of sending mes- sages back. But if that was so it seems strange that Sir George White did not quite early in the day realise that the want of news was a most serious and alarming symp- tom, and that he must at once try to support his wan- dering column. There is evidently some unexplained fact here, for it is impossible to believe that Sir George White intended to leave his column in the air to fend for itself, whatever the obstacles it might encounter.
We have put forward these questions because in various shapes and forms they are in all men's minds, and till they are explained the reverse at Nicholson's Nek will remain something of a mystery. As we have said already and will say again, to state them is not in the least to condemn Sir George White, for he may have explanations which will satisfy the most rigid scrutiny. For example, he may have foreseen and arranged to meet all the points which we have raised, and it may be that ill-luck of the kind which it is impossible to guard against, or blunders by subordinates for which no commander can be held responsible, may have brought all his schemes to naught. Meantime, we can only say once more that it is most foolish to exaggerate the importance of the reverse from a military, a political, or a moral point of view. The affair was not even a Bull Run, but even if had been there would not be any cause for despair. It is of course quite conceivable that we have still a really big reverse before us,—a reverse which will be a Bull Run in earnest. Well if that is to be, so be it. We have weathered worse storms before and shall weather this if it comes, for the heart of the nation is sound, and it is prepared to run all risks and endure all dangers rather than flinch or draw back from the task it has undertaken.
We do not ourselves dread a disaster before our army at Ladysmith can be reinforced, or relieved by an invasion in force through the Free State, but if one were to come we are certain that the British people would bear it with all their old courage and good sense.
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