The French Plan
BY VISCOUNT CECIL OF CIIELWOOD.
THE new French disarmament plan has, so far, only been partially and fragmentarily disclosed. Any comments- on it, therefore, must . be tentative and pro- visional. It is quite clear, however, that the plan is to be regarded as a genuine contribution to the solution of the disarmament problem. It is a perfectly honest and straightforward proposal, and parts of it—at any rate those parts whose purport is already clear—must be regarded as very encouraging. The French, after all, are an extremely -intelligent people. They have a habit of seeing things as they are when they want to see them so, and in this case they realize the folly of meeting the German case merely by maintaining French armaments or building them up to still higher levels. They see that the German claim to equality of status is irresistible, and their plan is quite manifestly an admission of that claim, in principle at all events. That is, at least, a satisfactory beginning. -It is also satisfactory that it does not propose rearmament for Germany—a most pernicious suggestion.
As regards details, the proposal to reduce the period of training in conscipt armies—according to some reports to a period as short as six months—is definitely to be welcomed. It is common ground that in six months you cannot make a soldier fit for aggressive warfare, such as an attack on trenches, though he may be quite adequate for frontier defence. A reduction of training to six months would involve virtually the creation of a militia system. That would certainly be an immense step forward. What, under this plan, is to happen to the existing French professional army, which now numbers 100,000, is not entirely clear. It would appear, however, that it is to go the way of the German Reichswehr, for what is proposed is the abolition of all long-term service except in the case of Great Britain.
One question which needs to be answered, and will no doubt be answered in due course, is what steps are pro- posed regarding what is commonly known as qualitative disarmament, that is, the complete abolition of weapons Of a predominantly aggressive character, such as tanks, heavy artillery and bombing aeroplanes. Merely to reduce man-power, while retaining all the existing mechanism of war, would do very little to create security in Europe. There is a recognized category of weapons which definitely confer the power of attack, and it .is important to know what. steps the French con template in regard to these.
Another practical point which presents itself is in regard to that part of the French proposal which aims at increasing collective security and making it more possible for the nations as a whole to bring help to any one of their number made a victim of attack. There is apparently to be an international auxiliary force, made up of special con- tingents from each nation, and the implication is that these national contingents shall still be equipped with weapons generally regarded as aggressive. What is not yet clear is whether all aggressive weapons will be abolished except such as are required for the equipment of these special contingents, and, if so, how this pro- vision would work out. There might well be difficulties III training only a small section of the army in the use of such weapons and securing, at the same time, that the bulk of the national militia should be deprived of them. Though, as I have said, there is little or nothing in the French plan about the actual abolition of aggressive weapons, my hope is that France does propose to abolish them and that proposals to this effect will even now be advanced.
- As to the national contingents ear-marked for the purpose of international defence, that provision found a place in the Treaty of Mutual Assistance Which I took part in drafting at Geneva in 1923, and I still feel that there is a great deal that is valuable in it. One feature of the French plan that will go far to commend it to this country is the realization underlying it of the fact that our posi- tion as an island is different from that of an ordinary continental country. It is more difficult, in some ways, for us to lend military assistance, and it is less likely that we Shall need collective assistance for our own defence.
tinder the French project Great Britain is not to be bound to take part in the raising of the -international force. It need not, that is to say, keep a national contingent armed and equipped as a contribution to such a force in case of need. If we did decline this contribution we could not, of course, claim the assistance of the international force for our own defence. In those circumstances, no kind of Pressure being exerted on us, I do not myself believe we should decline to take part. I hope we should not. Com- paratively secure though we may be, these islands are not invulnerable, particularly against air attack, though I should hope the prohibition of military aviation may be achieved. I remember moments of great anxiety during the War—the facts were undisclosed at the time though they are generally known now—moments when a little more success in the warfare on our shipping might have placed us in grave peril. Only collective action against a possible aggressor could give adequate defence against such attacks, and it would appear to me to be to our interest, to avail ourselves of it.
Everything, no doubt, will depend on the attitude of Germany to the French plan, and hardly less on the attitude we may adopt in this country. It is difficult to imagine that the Germans could reject a plan which makes, As this appears to do, a genuine attempt to meet their claim to equality of status. At a comparatively early date in the Disarmament Conference the German Delegation accepted the Italian plan for the abolition of aggressive armaments as virtually a satisfaction of their claim, and there is every reason to hope that the French will go a long way towards such abolition. The Germans are not fools, and it must have been burned into their minds by this time that no nation can go deliberately into isolation and run counter to the general purpose of the world. If, therefore, the French plan does, on examination, and after a much fuller disclosure of its details, commend itself to the other Great Powers, particularly to ourselves and to the United States, I do not for a moment believe that it will fail through the opposition of Germany. For that reason, so far as I understand the plan—and I repeat that no considered judgement can be passed till the project is available in all its details—I regard it as a definite step forward and as constituting a contribution we may welcome and take as a basis of discussions into which we can enter with confident hope.
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