4 OCTOBER 1935, Page 21

Mr. Duff Cooper's Haig

By PROFESSOR .HAROLD TEMPERLEY

TEE silent ,orie has spoken at last. As all know, Haig had '1 ant to remain dumb for a longer time. But, as always today, one revelation provokes another and premature utterances abound.

Mr. Duff Cooper's Talleyrand was a model of elegant biography, though it did not go very deep. As a practical soldier as well as politician, as a man who has not been afraid to study the politics of the Labour Party and of Germany at first hand, he is clearly not a partisan in the narrow sense. It is perhaps difficult for a biographer not to be one in the broad sense, but that is generally to thegood and especially so in this case. The innuendoes of Mr. Lloyd George could net go unanswered and, on the whole, the defence is a temperate one. On the other hand it is not a complete diary and no selections, however admirable, are quite the same thing.

There are slips and signs of haste in the preparation. Thus a not, very profound observation by Haig on Napoleon's desire to reduce the number of troops engaged on secondary objects is quoted twice over (pp. 102, 220) and the first quotation is not recorded in the Index. Moltke was not " German Corn- mander-inIchief " (p. 164) and it is now known (but not to Mr. Duff Cooper). that Schlieffen himself recommended modifications of his own plan before his death much on the same lines that Moltke carried out,. Again the saying of Wellington that a battle could no more be described than a ballroom (p. 848) ought to be followed by the other one that only the fighting commander could give a correct account of it. When the Duke tried, as first in a despatch on Waterloo, and then in a later comment, he produced versions more inaccurate than all those which . he condemned. Yet a few slips or omissions of this kind do, not materially shake our confidence in our military biographer.

• One difficulty should be recognised. Few soldiers are like Caesar and able to write their own commentaries. Haig's' diaries are remarkable for the absence of telling phrases, and for omissions ,more singular still. Our author argues in one place from these gaps that Haig can have had no love affairs, and was thus " in truth wedded to his profession." (p. 85). But Haig 'actually recorded Kitchener's death in his diary, without, Comment, though he was "not only a friend but an ally " (p. 810). This is worse even than Louis XVI's entry in his diary " Nothing. Dismissal of M. Necker."

Haig began life, at Oxford by drinking " plenty of port " in accordance with a don's advice ; by playing polo, the only );nine' in which he ever excelled ; and by interrupting mild ragging to go off to his books. By the time he got to Sandhurst as a University candidate lie was soberer even than this, amazed everyone by his industry and won the sword'Of honour. In after years his brother cavalry officers Were surprised to find him cut short a day's hunting and go off to enjoy " his military tonics." He had all a true Scotsman's seriousness. When he got to the Sudan he refused to take on the volatile Winston as an officer in his squadron (p. 62) and indulged, as he did later in South Africa, in private and free criticisms on Kitchener for his tactics. He defended this practice when warned by the future Edward VII, on the ground that he was always respectful in public l Ring Edward had a discerning eye, for lie told the future Lady Haig that Marriage must not interfere with " my best and most capable general " (p. 104). Haig had made a frontal attack on Miss Vivian after two days' acquaintance, and informed a friend, Who had. remonstrated, with him for being " hasty," that " he had often. made up his mind about_ far more important matters in half the time " (p. 104). Surely there is, humour Haig Volume I.. By Duff Cooper. (Faber and Faber. 25s.)• here. Is there on another occasion ? He asked a medium at a spiritualistic seance whether the territorial army -ought to be expanded on a battalion or on a company basis. The spooks declared for a company basis and asserted that Napoleon was always near him. " He gravely set down in his diary what occurred without comment (p. 113).

If there was humour it was buried deep, but something else was buried deeper and only the War evoked. it. He told Gough at Loos that victory was won " by my spirit saith the Lord of Hosts " (p. 282). Then at last, just before the Somme, in response to her inquiry he lifted the veil to his wife. " I feel that. every step in ,my plan has been taken with the Divine help, and I ask daily for aid, not merely in making the plan but in carrying it out, and this I hope I shall continue to do until the end of all things which concern me on earth." Then abruptly " You know I don't talk much on religious ,subjects " (pp. 327-8).

There is here an unusual man, a man with an iron tenacity of character, a man with a great sense of duty even in peace time. Witness his advice to a nephew to go off to march, to light and to starve in South Africa. It was a privilege to do that, and then " possibly in the evening of your life, you may be . . . fit to settle down M Fife " (p. 92). A man whose deep religious . faith gave him serenity of mind in danger. A man of candour and even of harshness in speech, " almost tongue-tied in debate " (p. 109), and yet ready to take responsibility. He was never without a view, never ready, and seldom able, to explain it. Military affairs were so important that he had no time for anything else. By " nature orthodoX," he seldom improved or enlarged his mind. outside the military sphere. • He took no pains to disguise MS' hatred of.Colonel Repington, The Times correspondent (p.380)' or his contempt for the Press to Briand (p. 326). Yet he came to appreciate Northcliffe (p. 341-3) and to entertain newspaper correspondents wholesale at headquarters (p. 854). He would have learned much by seeing a little more of the world before the War. In the same way it was only at the fron,t that he made the acquaintance .of Ben. Tillett and the crowd of politicians he had previously hated and despised: Yet he had the' candour to see his errors and not only to welcome, but to promote, intercourse between British and French generals and ,even to reconcile Foch with Joffre. All this was admirable—but he was a late learner.

His military exploits cover three periods in this volume. The first deals with his work under Haldane, his organisation of the Territorial army and drawing up of the Field Service Regulations, Vol. II, work for which he has received little credit. He also suggested the plan of a naval war staff. The advice was disregarded and the staff had actually to be organised in the War. His period of service in India was notable for his drawing up a plan for the use of the Indian Army in defence of the Empire dutside India. Lord Morley, on learning of this, not only ordered the abandonment of the scheme but the destruction of the plan. The orders were given verbally, but his subordinate noted " a look in Haig's eye which made me realise that he would not regard any deviation from rigid adherence to orders with undue severity " (p. 119). So he deviated, and "in 1914 troops were conveyed from India to Europe according to the very scheme that Haig had been reprimanded for preparing," and which he had preserved by a glance, or perhaps by a wink.

As soon as war broke out lie received command of the First Army Corps. . It is a singular fact that French, the leader of the Expeditionary Force, was removed from command ; Grierson, commanding.the. Second Corps, died in the train on the way to the front ; Smith-Dorrien was removed from com- wand of the same corps ; and General Murray soon ceased to be the chief of Staff. Owing to this elimination of the less fit, Haig ultimately commanded the British Army in France.

It is painful to have to record that Haig considered French " quite unfit for this great command " (p. 133), and that in previous manoeuvres at Aldershot he had given orders " of such an unpractical nature " that Grierson demurred to carry- ing them out (p. 136). Haig had been French's chief of staff in South Africa where, as he says, his military ideas often shocked me " but " fortunately " were confined to cavalry. They were derived from his too original interpretations of Hamley. Haig comes forward as the last witness against French, and he leaves him little reputation. In October, 1914, French (p. 189) thought " we would soon be in a position to round them (the Germans) up." In January, 1915, he thought " the War would be over before June " (p. 221). And in June, as it happened, the Cabinet asked French and Robertson " to indicate what they considered the best line of retreat " (p. 251). " Poltroons," commented Robertson ; we have not heard that Mr. Lloyd George has commented.

Haig considered French unbalanced and received some marks of his " jealousy " (pp. 238-9). The judgement of our Allies was even more severe and eventually Haig was left in December, 1915, as the only possible commander-in-chief in France. But he was not given a free hand, and had, like Wellington, to complain of interference from London. The War Office forced Kiggell on him as chief in preference to his own choice, Butler (p. 205), and Kitchener interfered to get Monro in front of Rawlinson (p. 296); When it came to tactics on the Somme he was overruled by his own Army com- manders (pp. 332-3), and as it seems unwisely. On the other hand, he had better luck with Joilre, to whom he stood up, and who, he says, was no tactician and could not read a map (pp. 312, 326, 334). He liked and helped Foch and Clemen- beau, the latter still a free lance, but thought Briand shifty. On the whole, the impression produced is that Haig deserves immense credit for the battle of the Somme. Wellington never commanded more than 50,000 British troops in France, Haig commanded 1,369,100, and the vastness of the responsibility he incurred in shifting the date of his carefully planned offensive from July 1st to June 25th, is shown by the mere enumeration of the figures, which indicates the intricacy of the organisation and the complexity of the problem. It also shows his loyalty to his Allies. The Somme was Haig's, and the shock and the surprise to the Germans of beholding a British army taking the offensive on a Continental scale, was the greatest blow they had in the War until the day that Haig drove through the Hindenburg line.

The volume ends a little ominously. Haig likes Asquith, he suspects Lloyd George, whose visit was a "huge joy-ride" . . I have no great opinion of L.-G. as a man or leader " (p. 357). Lloyd George had written him a friendly letter on September 21st. But on the 17th lie had put questions to Foch regarding Haig's subordinates, a proceeding abhorrent to Haig. Foch told Haig that he, as British commander-in- chief, had not been criticised. .But, according to .Henry Wilson, Foch reported Lloyd George as Ns monte 'against Haig and " he did not think Haig's seat was very secure." AU of which explains much in the War Memoirs of David Lloyd George.