PROPAGANDA PROSPECTS
By DAVID THOMSON
THE material advantages of the new Pact between Germany, 1 Italy and Japan are so intangible and dubious that it may best be regarded as the measure of Nazi need for some new " diplomatic triumph " to sustain the confidence of the German people. If this interpretation is correct, are there not oppor- tunities of propaganda in enemy countries that we may be neglecting? There is considerable anxiety lest our Ministry of Information, so busy reorganising itself, may neglect the opportunities of which the new Pact is a symptom. Last autumn our airmen strewed Germans towns with millions of leaflets. Some were too long and prosy, and struck a self- righteous note. Others, which gave details of the fortunes hoarded abroad by the Nazi leaders, made good propaganda. We must act with surer touch this autumn.
British propaganda starts with immense advantages, which are not sufficiently appreciated. It is the one offensive in which the Nazis cannot effectively retaliate. Democracies do not fear criticism, or even abuse. Dictators are morbidly sensitive to unpalatable facts and ideas, and dread the power of public opinion. Our leaflets have to be carefully collected and destroyed ; Hitler's leaflets can be sold to buy Spitfires. British propaganda can afford to be consistent, for our case is a good one. Goebbels is led from a campaign to prove demo- cracies decadent to the inconsistent arguments that poor little Germany was encircled and forced into war by warlike democracies. Commander King-Hall had only to present Goebbels's own arguments in the London Daily Telegraph, three weeks before war began, to turn them into a perfect boomerang. Again, Nazi propaganda, both internally and externally, began with a crescendo, and everything since has necessarily savoured of anticlimax. To have used up already all the words of hatred and anger in one's vocabulary is a weakness rather than an advantage. It leads to incredulity abroad and disillusionment at home.
Finally, Nazi propaganda is often peculiarly inept. This is not only due to a certain lack of finesse and a humourlessness in German national character, which some observers have noted, but also to sheer lack of experience in coping with criticism. The politicians and publicists of a democratic State have constant experience of countering criticism and under- standing an opponent's point of view. The organisers of a dictatorship have none. They believe that all criticism is dis- posed of by shouting loudly and often enough, and leaving it to the Gestapo to do the rest. The British, however, are natural masters of under-statement.
Yet, it may be objected, Nazi propaganda has been remark- ably effective, and all this is only one side of the coin. This must be admitted, and the reasons for Nazi success explained, if our own propaganda is to find the vulnerable chinks in the armour of the enemy. The Nazi technique of propaganda can be likened to the Nazi strategy of low dive-bombing. Just as dive-bombing was effective in France, where it could be imme diately accompanied by the advance of mobile ground for so German propaganda has been effective where it could accompanied by rigid _censorship, espionage, and terrorism that is, inside Germany itself, and in the territories adjacent her. It succeeds very little overseas.
The word " propaganda " dates from the Counter-Reform tion of the sixteenth century: so do the Index of prohibi books and the Spanish Inquisition in their most complete forms This is more than coincidence. Propaganda is absorbed M readily when it can be pumped into a vacuum heimetieall sealed against all uncongenial facts and opinions. That is wh Nazi propaganda succeeded amongst Germans. It told Ger what they wanted to hear, and refused to let them hear any thing else. Inside the Reich there was the censorship, an amongst German minorities abroad there were various method- of intimidation and espionage. But just as that very, concen tram upon the technique of dive-bombing, to the neglect o long-distance night-bombing, explains the present inferiority of the Luftwaffe to the R.A.F., so the very reason for the suc cess of Nazi propaganda at home is the chief cause of its in effectiveness abroad. And there lies our chief advantage.
The penalty of censorship is rumour. And rumour is th solvent of confidence. Our broadcasts and leaflets should, therefore, confirm rumours which have any basis in fact. The stories of the Nazi leaders' fortunes were effective in this way, and the true facts given by Mr. Knickerbocker doubtlessly 1 nothing when they became rumours. The news of the dockers' strike at Hamburg should have been immediately spread by leaflet to other bombed German ports—possibly accompanied by aerial photographs of the demolished docks, because all leaflets for Germany must be such that " he who runs ma read." The suspicion that Nazi air losses over Britain are vastly heavier than they admit, which Goering himself encour- ages amongst his airmen by forbidding them to return to their own bases, should be endorsed by accompanying all bombs on German aerodromes with bundles of leaflets showing a few of our Heinkel-dumps, and "perhaps groups of captured German airmen.
But we must equally remember the inherent limitations of propaganda itself. Broadcasting may be effective in the German-occupied countries of Europe where listening is more difficult to ban. But our radio-audience in Germany is neces- sarily a selected one, consisting mostly of the definite anti- Nazis. Few but the converted—or the specially immune— will be ready to incur the penalties of listening to illegal bulle- tins. The leaflet remains probably our best method. It is more spectacular, arouses the curiosity even of the lukewarm, and even when it is not accompanied by bombs, carries the impli- cation that " it might always have been a bomb." It can be used to make a definite appeal to a locality, or to a particular section of the community. I believe this is its special value to us at present as a method of disseminating propaganda. for successful propaganda demands a definite audience, which Is receptive in one particular way. For example, a specific griev- ance should be made use of wherever possible. It might soon be opportune to remind Berliners of Goering's boasts of German immunity from bombardment. There must already be au un- easy feeling that the treasured weapon of air-power is already turning in Hitler's hands. Finally, the importance of careful timing must never be forgotten. Most of the current suggestions for a " general message " to the German people are probably premature. Tb fact that the promised Blitzkrieg has become a war of ex- haustion in which even the victor will suffer terribly, as even, " triumphant" Germany is rapidly learning from the s7reau of destruction and the menace of hunger, is a fact wh1c;i our propaganda must certainly bring home to the German 1,00: in due course. But they are still too proud of the overthrow of France, too hopeful of ultimate victory, to be receptive of such arguments. The dread of the Gestapo is still too Im- mediate and intimate, the chance of British victory still -eculs too remote, for our unconfessed allies to take any 2,-ticna. our own thu:.cler. And that thunder is the greatest of our resources. Premature propaganda would be giving away
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