Commonwealth and Foreign BRITAIN AND SWISS MISCONCEPTIONS
A SPECIAL CORRESPONDENT By
Switzerland, March 28th, 1940.
HE affair of Finland's surrender to Russia has been so I successfully exploited by the Germans that, rather than forget it as quickly as possible, it is unfortunately worth while to consider its disagreeable consequences. For some time, owing to German and Italian insinuations, but also owing to the almost abandoned self-criticism of many English people themselves, foreign opinion has been becom- ing increasingly hostile towards the British Empire as such.
Just at the time when the Empire had become decentralised and altogether a more liberal and enlightened institution than ever before, the small countries were stirred up into resent- ment that the British should " have so much "; a reactionary social system, it was further asserted, underlined the un- desirable qualities of imperialism—in short, the pluto- democratic story. On the whole Switzerland reflects the reactions of neutral and small-power Europe very accurately, and condemnation of British Imperialism is fairly pre- valent, for example, among Swiss University students, whether those of German-speaking Zurich and Basle, of French-speaking Lausanne and Geneva, or of Italian- speaking Swiss students who have no specific university of their own.
Nazi sympathies, of course, virtually disappeared from Switzerland a year or so ago, and, while it was appreciated that Great Britain was unaggressive, it was hoped that she would afford some protection to the small States against the more and more frankly predatory German Reich. The Munich Agreement, therefore, did incalculable harm to Britain's reputation, and the fact that no Allied help ever reached Poland during the German Blitzkrieg against her darkened the impression which had already been made. When Finland's turn came, small countries with strong anti- Russian inclinations him Switzerland, while eager to see Britain at last—as they felt—justify her claim to stand for the rights of small nations, were overtaken by a wave of intense pro-Finnish emotion. They hoped so much from Finland's successful resistance that they became blind to awkward geographical facts, and, neutrals though they were, they would for the moment hear nothing of Scandinavian neutrality.
When, therefore, the news came on March t3th that Finland had accepted Soviet Russia's terms, the emotional reaction in Switzerland was tremendous. Though one can- not say exactly how, it was obvious that the whole thing was stage-managed by unseen German influences. The .outcry was all against Britain, not against the Allies—against Britain's hypocrisy, vacillation and senile incompetence. It was largely irrational, a great emotional outburst, and con- sequently the best possible fuel for the fires of Nazi propaganda ; thus Russia's maladroit attack upon Finland, which should have been a lucky windfall for the Allies, was snatched up by the Germans as the occasion for another of the Fiihrer's magically bloodless victories. Within Germany this success, coming at the end of the exception- ally hard winter, steadied the regime at a particularly diffi- cult moment, and safeguarded the critical supply of Swedish ore. Among neutrals perhaps the most disquieting result was the effect, not upon pro-German opinion, which in Switzerland it has been seen is negligibly small, but upon anti-German,.even pro-Ally, people ; the people with strong pro-Ally sympathies felt most disillusioned of all.
It has been clear for some years that German propa- gandistic successes are simultaneously exploited in the economic sphere. The importance, therefore, from the British point of view, of popularity and respect in neutral countries is not simply a matter of whether four million Swiss or 54 million Yugoslays are Anglophile ; it is a ques- tion of whether we are able to wage the economic war suc- cessfully or not. German economic pressure is more readily accepted after it has been possible to discredit the Allies, however inconsequent the discrediting has been. This was immediately the case in the Balkans after the surrender of Finland. In Switzerland the question of Germany's economic needs was, at that very moment, a burning one, on account of the coal which she wished to convey to Italy ; this could no longer travel by the cheap sea route, yet the Brenner and Tarvisio railway lines were totally inadequate for its transport.
In February the attitude of the Swiss Government had been a little equivocal in the matter of Dr. Rauschning's book, but the Swiss Press had answered the German Press attacks with no uncertain voice. Towards the middle of March German demands of various kinds were multiplied in Berne, and, while the Swiss public was bound to feel less enthusiastic with regard to any kind of resistance to Germany, it was kept without information about the traffic congestion which now became noticeable on the Lotschberg- Simplon and St. Gotthard routes. People who had occasion to go to Brigue or Bellinzona found that the Federal Railways had increased their personnel, especially at Brigue, in order to deal with expanded traffic. Most of the coal trucks were Italian, though some German ones were to be seen. Italian foodstuffs and fodder, apparently on an increased scale, were being sent to Germany. It is true that the Swiss are paid exceedingly well for each ton of coal which crosses their country from Germany to Italy, and not only hypothetically, but, as is always the way when the Reich really wants some- thing, promptly and in free exchange ; in other words, not only intimidation is at work. It is true, also, that to have to send the coal in this way, even in Italian trucks, constitutes an additional strain upon Germany's over-strained system of railway transport. Yet Germany compensates herself by having again created the impression that, since she gets what she wants, it is better not to resist her.
In spite of the blackguarded Empire and diplomatic defeats it would be possible to go far towards regaining the support of world opinion and the economic advantages which that support brings. Readable and well-translated presenta- tions of the admirable case for the British Empire of today would be welcomed in a country like Switzerland, where at present it is mainly left to the German travel agencies (sic) to display maps of the Empire—got up to look as if the French Empire belonged to it too—with ironical comments upon the number of square miles involved. A historical account of Kitchener's concentration camps would provide a valuable reply to Nazi legends with regard to South Africa. Although inland countries like Switzerland underrate the importance of sea-power, Swiss delight (flavoured with a feeling of enjoyable guilt on account of Norwegian neutrality) over the Altmark ' incident was really astonishing ; it was, of course, hoped that the affair heralded more vigorous and large-scale British action in the north. In Switzerland, too, and perhaps in many other countries, there is a strain of sweetly sentimental affection for the oddity of England. I have been told time after time that the only thoroughly suc- cessful piece of British publicity in Switzerland since this war began has been—of all things—the showing of the film, Goodbye, Mr. Chips! When one hears this piece of news, it is usually with the added implication of how much else might be done.
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