New MPs for old
PARLIAMENTARY REFORM JOCK HUGHES-HALLETT
Admiral Hughes-Hallett was a junior minister in the last Conservative administration.
For a great many years the House of Commons has been the political sovereign of Britain, and if its status in the eyes of the nation has begun to decline this is through no diminution of its legal powers. No doubt there are many reasons for the growing lack of con- fidence in Parliament, but I am convinced that chief cause of the underlying malaise is simply that the House of Commons tries to do too much. In consequence, it is now in danger of being left with the shadow rather than the substance of power.
The first and greatest remedy is to delegate. `Delegate or die' is as true of overworked assemblies as it is of overworked men, and there are three ways in which the Commons could delegate. There is no necessity to select so many ministers from the Commons—at present there are over eighty of them. Pro- vided twelve Cabinet ministers, twelve ministers of state and twelve junior ministers sat in the Commons, the Government would be effec- tively answerable to the House. The balance of ministers could be drawn from men of ability summoned to sit as Peers of Parliament for the life of the Parliament.
Secondly, a related delegation of work could be achieved by transferring to public boards much of the administrative work at present undertaken by government departments. This is about to be done in the case of the Post Office, and it could with advantage be extended to the highways, the Health Service, the National Insurance scheme and the school and university building programmes.
A third and more daring act of delegation would be by the appointment of about one hundred parliamentary commissioners, whose task would be to form committees to probe into the expenditure and efficiency of every department of state and every public under- taking of importance. Their reports and recom- mendations would be submitted to the Speaker, and would be debatable. The parliamentary commissioners would thus take over the,work now attempted by the Estimates and Public Accounts Committees, together with that of the various 'specialist' select committees that watch over particular industries. I visualise each commissioner being appointed by resolu- tion of the House, after nomination by a select committee. He would be full-time and serve until a fixed retiring age, being removable only by a Joint Address. Any man with suitable training and experience could apply for appointment, provided he had not been in the employment of the Crown during the past ten years.
What should Members do with the time that might be saved? No doubt some of it should be devoted to `homework'; that is to say, to studying reports prepared for the use of Par- liament. But I believe also that Members should have more time to spend in their con- stituencies, and should be given greater oppor- tunities to associate themselves with the administration of affairs within their con- stituencies. My suggestion would be that a Member of Parliament should automatically become an ex-officio member of his local authority and its committees, the bench of magistrates, the appropriate Health Service board, and comparable bodies, with the right to attend and speak at their meetings, but not to vote. He would use his own discretion on when to attend, but he would receive reports of their proceedings and thus remain in closer touch with what was going on than is often the case at present.
This leads to a further question: should the size of the House of Commons be reduced?
That it would be possible for a Member to represent a larger number of electors than at present cannot be challenged. It follows from improved modern communications, and is proved by the experience of foreign countries. By reducing the size of an assembly it becomes much easier for each individual member to intervene in debates and become known to the public. Such is the national dislike of redundancy, however, that I foresee no pros- pect of achieving this change, save perhaps very gradually. A large reduction, of course, would be achieved if Scotland and Wales were given a degree of self-government such as Northern Ireland possesses. Personally I should favour this, and it would save time in legis- lation.
Another reform which would raise the status of Members would be to allow backbenchers freedom to speak their mind without the em- barrassment of then having to vote against their declared convictions or risk precipitating a premature election. There is no easy solution to this problem, but there is one far-reaching change worthy of consideration. It would be possible by legislation to transfer the power to ask for a dissolution from the Prime Minister to the Speaker. In other words, the Prime Minister would need an affirmative reso- lution before he could go to the country. If he failed to get it he would either have to resign or bow to the will of the House on whatever issue had caused the crisis.
Finally, the House of Lords. The practical advantages of having a second chamber to revise legislation are well understood. Ever since the Parliament Act of 1911, however, two aspects of the second chamber have remained matters of controversy: its composition and its powers. Both these issues are now to be re- opened.
Mr Wilson's declared intention is to end the purely hereditary right of any peer to be summoned. In this he is in accord with the policy of the Plantagenets, and no strong challenge in principle seems likely. Everybody has his pet idea on the composition of an ideal second chamber; the Conservatives took a big step forward when life peers were introduced, and I would now go a stage further and advo- cate also having peers who are summoned for the life of a single Parliament.
Neither need there be irreconcilable conflict over powers, so far as the legislative powers of the Lords are concerned. The Commons, as the political sovereign, must decide what should be done; the Lords, as a more expert body, should be allowed a big say in how it should be done. If the Commons will not listen, then be it upon their heads alone: the delaying powers of the Lords should not be sufficient to prevent the Commons overriding them in a current session.
But the Lords should be more than a revis- ing legislature. The glory of the Revolutionary Settlement lay in its system of checks and balances, and nothing that has happened in modem times leads me to think that it would be any less dangerous to dispense with them in 1968 than in 1688. At the very least, the second chamber should have restored to it a right of absolute veto on any form of legisla- tion which would extend the term of an assembly beyond the period for which it had originally been elected, whether this affects the House of Commons itself or only a local council.
.Despite the failure of our parliamentary system to keep pace with changing times, the House of Commons itself remains a wonderful assembly. Most of its Members are men of integrity who have entered politics to give rather than to take. Humbug and insincerity are quickly recognised, and pomposity is ridi- culed. I know of no place at the same time so tolerant of eccentricity, or so merciless in cutting men down to size.
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