5 AUGUST 1854, Page 15

BOOKS.

ductions and frequent discnrsions of Lamartine, with his biogra- the Fide, the sentiments, and the prospects that power was allowed, by a strange series of blunders, he gets it, we think, in a sounder way. Although a powerful closely to the matter of history proper ; yet it is remarkable ho* but upon the ignorance with which itper be has seized upon the more striking and salient points, even to

isha Lamartine relieves and also retards his historical narrative, vemment." part variety as well as information of a very attractive kind, but

will not be found in Mr. Crowe, but he has often contrived to ex- tract their essence. A long residence in France has also given him a living knowledge of the people, which quietly pervades the narrative, and sometimes appears in the form of direct relation,— as in the Revolution of the Barricades.

It is not merely as a literary work, in which accessible facts are

presented in another and a more compact form, that these volumes are to be considered. A different principle, a new idea, runs through the whole, slightly tinging its narrative, and directly affecting its comments and conclusions. Mr. Crowe surveys French story from the downfall of the old regime to the downfall of Napoleon, and through the civil turmoil of the Restoration till Charles the Tenth finally quitted the shores of France, with the eye not of a mere Liberal, but of a Liberal philosopher. He has not the personal and party feelings which animate Lamartine ; who sometimes feels his consistency at stake, and sometimes his party objects, and who has besides his friends and enemies again before him during his retrospect of a contest in which he might truly say, "quorum pars fui.' He has none of the rabid preju- dices of Alison about Jacobins and Democrats ; but he is as little blinded to their crimes and faults as is the historian of Europe. He admits and admires the great military genius of Napoleon ; but he is not dazzled by the glare of his martial merits to overlook his great political blunders and crimes, or his personal insensi- bility and selfishness. He is free from party prejudice, French or English, in his estimate of the men and measures of the Res- toration; and this estimate is in the main original. He denies that constitutional or representative government has failed in France—because it has never been tried. The concoctors of the first Charter or Constitution knew nothing of the matter. The Emperor Alexander had no experience whatever on the subject ; Louis the Eighteenth, through his residence in England, bad from observation and reflection more knowledge of the English consti- tution; but, independently of his Bourbon ideas of legitimacy, he did not sufficiently comprehend the submission and the management essential to its actual working. All the Frenchmen who had to do with it were in a state of greater ignorance. Functionaries them- selves, they looked to the functionary class as superseding the people ; and, instead of a body of electors, however limited, free to choose representatives, the power of choice was partly by practice and partly by law really placed in the agents of Government. So little, indeed, was representative government understood by those whom it most concerned, that on the second Restoration Talley- rand and Fondle, the Liberal Ministers recommended by 'Welling- ton, neglected the elections, even to the extent of allowing the old Royalist party to manage them. ‘;.One would have thought that politicians so experienced, when reduced to he necessity of leaning upon public opinion, and upon a national parlia- the against the treachery of their own Court and the secret hostility of sion te .opinion, and calling a parliament freely elected by and in harmony .onarchs of Europe, would have seen the expediency of giving full expres- with it. But Fouche was incapable of comprehending this. His first act Was to stifle public opinion altogether, by a decree forbidding journals to appear without fresh authorization from the police; whilst over these so BO authorized a Commission of .Censorship was appointed. Fouche's colleagues On perceived the disadvantages of their situation; and they succeeded, not without difficulty, in obtaining an ordonnance setting books and pamphlets free of the censorship, which still fettered the journals. The King himself F!_ractill?ally resisted this for some time : the horrors of the Revolution were in is mind bound up with pamphlets and the press, nor could all the eloquence of unateauhriand persuade him that the monarchy could be safe if the se-large of criticism was freely applied to it. 'The mode in which the election to the Chamber was to take place was considered and discussed in the ame ignorant and narrow spirit. The safety wofiththe,,meo.n.archy, the independence and even the integrity of the country, .L.m. liberal and moderate policy which Ministers chose to fetter, could OOly 1.3ea maintained by the reality of constitutional government and the '7Heasi pplication of its principles : but even the Liberals of the day dreaded Author Ofry"Ittihe Reigns of Louis XVIII and Charles X. By Eyre Evans Crowe, bans. rubli "The Historyof France," "The Greek and the Turk," Re. In two yo-

b by Bentley.

though the style of this book may be sometimes objected to his- eanlewehoifehpolilcay of whichhe was never after able to shake phieal notices, sketches of characters, and descriptive details, im- graphy, the touches of personal idiosyncracy, and the various de- freeitdineeit in well as in re dynasty, and laid the foundation of that worst of from the fall of Napoleon to the expulsion of the elder branch of Emperor whom they selected to be their colleagues. Conciliation to the the Bourbons the English reader had no means of learning any- thing. Notwithstanding the prior appearance of those two works, toehaenyleuesee and for the settlement of the law by which the elections were to best of the three. The reader gets more matter in less space ; and and to Talleyrand,) were so mismrYanagid b their ignorance te eeeinemexepeeerieence, writer, Mr. Crowe has none of the turgid rhetoric of Alison ; and BEFORE the appearance of Lamartine's "History of the Restore- personal friends of his exile to whom in 1814 he had intrusted the Govern. lion," lion," and Alison 's "Europe since the Battle of Waterloo," this work of Mr. Crowe would have filled up, worthily, a pure and arts, theennecthessitie s, or experience of constitutional government. Fouch6 per Mr. Crowe's History of the Reigns of Louis XVIII and Charles h revolutionary of those.elections, though intrusted to chiefs S: may take its place as the most useful and in some senses the of th!national anddmrea party in the Cabinet, (that is, to Fouchi.: torically, it is always close and full of matter. The long intro- off the obloquy, dynasty ytre' irrevocably at variance with attained at the expense of historical continuity, and with the effect th classes, who made allowance for circumstances, of unduly extending his work. Mr. Crowe confines himself more and who Niciiidt the l'ilinene of evils, novteorntetdh.e catstitutional system the traits which mark individual characters. The lifelike bio- essay in constitutional monarchy ; and, consequently, they shook the public

tails that give so much interest to the galleries of portraits with i the mind o a great nation—an indifference to its form of ge- feet vacuum in English literature : for of the history of France and Talleyrand knew as little of it as those aides-de-camp of the Russian

CROWE'S LOUIS XVIII AND CHARLES X.* " But the councillors whom Louis gathered around him, not merely thee national party was recommended in words, whilst far more flagrant acts more odious to the French than absolutism. This might not be altogether the public did not discern this nicety of distinction. The ueltgurwetilch they beheld, and which galled and humiliated them, proceeded from a solemn wfere committed to alienate and affront them. Nor, indeed, was conciliation eth'eereltohnuasztastetors of. the King, the Government, and the Chambers, forced it the rule of a faction, which rendered constitutional government itself far

France, is the simple truth that the representative or the constitutional principle was never applied. * * *

Leenetd, to call those politicians approved for their Liberalism, whom he was in- trated in the hands of the Royalist and reactionary party. This party, emelnio- to apply more than mock representation. The true answer then, as since to the reproach that all attempts at constitutional government failed in ".[he first essay of constitutional monarchy in France was thus to make his abinet in 1815, were utterly ignorant of the ways, the

Improvements during the next fifteen years were made in the mode of elections, but mostly in an unconstitutional way, by the mere ordinance of the King. Still France never attained a real body of electors in fact ; even' under Louis Philippe their num- bers were so small that it was a farce to call the nation repre- sented. Under Charles the Tenth, however, great advances were made in constitutional ideas; insomuch that, till quite towards the close of his reign, the broad constitutional distinction was drawn between the Monarch and his Ministers ; and, amid all the vio- lence of party in and out of the Chambers, the King was spoken of and indeed regarded with respect. How all this was put an end to in the "three days of July," by the narrow minds and con- scientious obstinacy of Charles and Polignac, the bigotry of the D'Angoulemes, and the blind passion of the Ultra-Royalists, is known to everybody. Nor could the catastrophe have been more than postponed. In some cases accident seems to precipitate a re- sult, which had time been allowed might have turned out differ- ently. But, had greater docility or greater prudence permitted Charles Dix to die on the throne, the Duke D'Angouleme and his wife would certainly have overturned it. If we can suppose des- tiny interfering in their favour, the training given to the Duke de Bourdeaux would have insured the fall of the dynasty.

In pointing out the difficulties that representative government has to contend with in France, we do not remember that Mr. Crowe mentions the most difficult of all—the impulsive character of the mass of Frenchmen. Yet as representative government is really a system of checks and compromises, when men often have to subdue their passions and their prejudices, and sometimes even their sense of what is fit and right, to avoid a distant evil, get what is attainable, or make the best of a. bad bargain, a hot- blooded people are apt to fail in the beginning. It cannot be said that Mr. Crowe is blind to the vehement passions and selfish vanity which induce French politicians, in search of vengeance or of success, to combine with their enemies to crush those who are almost their friends ; but, though he marks his perception of the fact in occa- sional comment, it does not sufficiently colour his narrative. In his estimate of persons, he allows less merit to. Louis the Eighteenth than is generally ascribed to him for his temper and prudence. Charles the Tenth, on the other hand, he paints as more personally respectable, and even more publicly conscientious —desirous of doing his duty according to his light—than the world at large have hitherto believed.

Although this work is called, and is in form as well as in fact it history, the reader feels a want of the true historical animus. The plan is narrative, and the writing is narration ; but the mode of the work is to a great extent comment or digression. Although it prevents a continuous completeness, this mode is favourable to the full exhibition of parts. Anything remarkable in war, in poli- tics, or in civil affairs, can be brought out prominently. Such is the case with the Royalist persecution of the Protestants in the South of France ; which our author pronounces to equal the ex- cesses of the Reign of Terror. So, again, with the character and policy of Bonaparte, events are rapidly passed over, or the reader's knowledge of them is assumed ; but the principles of Bonaparte's career are developed at length. In fact, with the exception of the Hundred Days, which falls within the field of history, the career of Napoleon is one of exposition. The following extract furnishes an example. Mr. Crowe has been speaking of the impossibility of a mere military government enduring long, and he goes on to trace the effects upon Europe of French Imperial domination and Napoleon's character.

"But the more perfectly France became organized and disciplined for war and domination, the more unfit did it become to establish its influence peace- ably and permanently over that Europe which it had conquered. For, thanked be Providence and civilization, there are no rights which have been so modified and curtailed as those of conquest. Of old the victor might make of the vanquished his slave, and partition his territory to new holders. But the days of exterminating a people, of enslaving or dispossessing them, are ,past. The race and the soil remain, and the victors must devise some means of -Satisfying the Wants and even the pride of the Vanquished ;,fortlie'rule o broth intimidation is for toreineffectual and costly: ,Ifed the Froneh Re- public achieved wide conquest, however turbulent and irregular its ,rule in .foreign aonntries, it would at least have found friends amongst the classes it emancipated, and by degrees it would have succeeded in the formation of allied states, re ublics like itself. But a military chief and an embryo Ens- :peter, cominnn ing the French soldiers, and through them master of the tilde, saw or would see nothing in other nations hnt'monarcha like himself. With these aloue he would negotiate—these alone conciliate or court. Na- poleon, frera character as well as position, was fitted to enact this part of the .tittere crowned head. His early experience made him acquainted with all that was abhorrent and impuissant in Democracy. Be thus learnt to ignore the existence of a people altogether. His political optics were so formed as exclusively to discern princes and courts and armies. He neither knew• what the word people meant, nor the worth nor the power which it implied. Hence it was, that although he made the Imperial eagle victorious throughout Europe, he made no real effort to implant either French in- fluence or ideas, at least in that popular soil wherein they could alone take root. Whilst despising the people and popular modes of influence, Napo- leon was by no-means either skilled or apt to conciliate princes. Personal af- feetions he had none : he soared far above them. But even of political friondship or sincere alliance be was incapable. His own policy and views were continually changing. They became modified and enlarged as eircum- ntances extended the sphere of his power. And in the new contingencies Miff possibilities which from year to year arose to attract and dazzle him, the ally of one day became the foe of the next ; so trifling seemed the fate of even dynasties and nations, in comparison with what appeared to be the predestined and unlimited grandeur of his own. This utter want of consi- deration for others, this blindness to the necessity of large conciliations, lost 3raPoleon the friendship of every sovereign, as it procured him the mistrust of every people. There was in truth not a sovereign in Europe whom he Might not have converted into a firm friend ; the King of Prussia at one time, the Emperor of Austria at another, the Czar at last. But he was so avaricious of power and dominion, that, like a stupid miser, he knew not bow to part with it even for security and profit. It was impossible for an independent country to have humbled itself more to France than Prussia did, whieb for a bog series of years not only tolerated but aided in French ag- grandizement. Such patience and attachment were of no avail, and counted asmothing with Napoleon, who, when Prussia at the eleventh hour flew to arms, showed himself as merciless to it as he could have been to a power which, like England, had shown him unswerving enmity from the first. "Generosity, as well as policy, would have dictated such large eoncessions to Austria, especially after .Napoleon had espoused one of its princesses, as would hare soothed the pride, satisfied the interests, and secured the alliance bl the Ceurt of Vienna. Butno ; Napoleon could not be generous; and he left the dominions of that first of European princes, into whose family he bad married, just so circumscribed and oppressed, with all the wounds in- flicted by the sword,of conquest still open and unhealed, to ponder and to doubt whether Austria had really gained anything by its gift of an Arch- Anthem to the French Emperor, save an increase of severity, exaction, and contempt. Nothing could be more sensible or more just than the represent- ationa which Metternich frankly and repeatedly made to the French Em- peror, that his concessions should be large and his treatment generous, if he weeld knit a firm 'friendship and alliance.. But, with many high qualities, Napoleon had all the.petty meanness of the dealer, whose first principle is never to be overreached ; and thus he lost every chance of a steady and Sim ally during his rise by want of generosity, as he threw away every chance of treating during the period of his fall by the same higgling spirit, which could never reconcile itself to a fit and large concession in time. -"nein is this, however, to be said for Napoleon, that in the entire course of his power he never enjoyed a moment which he could really call peace, is Whinii he could consider his power fixed and his position determined, and , „in which he could relax from the duty of grasping all the means of war and of offenee within his reach, in order to carry on the struggle with his snor- ts?, Irreconcilable, indomitable antagonist. One greet fact stood prominent -throughout the whole epoch, and threw all others into the distance and the .shaele. This was the great rivalry of France and England. There was in , truth no other effectual antagonism. All the forces which other kings or ttnuntries marshalled against Napoleon, he swept with ease from the battle- ,field ; and if they rose again year after year to occupy rather than resist him, 4 was English inveteracy and English wealth that gave galvanic life to these '-dft-slain monarchs, and enabled them to bring onee more their armies into the field. To reduce, to humble, to subdue England, became necessarily the . ,nrie and only thought of tho conqueror of the Continent; in his treatiea and arrengemente with the powers of which, be was compelled to look rather to array them against England than attach them to France."