GERMANY AND FRANCE.
WE do not believe that this country is in serious danger from a European coalition,—firstly, because of the difficulty of forming one ; secondly, because of the difficulty of paying one for so enormous a risk and effort ; and thirdly, .because we think it more than probable that Great Britain, even without the active assistance of America, could defeat such a coalition at sea, and so reduce it to the condition of partial paralysis in which Napoleon lay after Trafalgar. If the Continent could not go to sea, the Continent could neither subjugate nor plunder Great Britain. We do believe, however, that statesmen of great importance in the world have thought over combinations which, if they succeeded, would at least seem to be directed against this country, and would, in any event, give its people a most anxious quarter of an hour. The most attractive, and on the whole the least impossible, of these combinations is an alliance of France and Germany ; and we do not wonder, therefore, that even a rumour of such a contingency reuses writers like "Ignotus," in the National Review for August, to utter a Cassandra-like note of warning. He believes that the German Emperor would like to form a combination between Germany—with Austria and Italy behind her— end France, and to direct that combination against Great Britain, and subsequently against the United States. We can quite believe he would, and for a reason which is too often forgotten. Everybody recognises the intense desire felt both in Germany and France for colonial dependencies, which, as their statesmen fancy, may intro- duce new wealth, and so avert the uprising from below which is the permanent cloud in their horizon ; but a great many overlook, as " Ignotus" has done, the bitter- ness caused by another aspect of the situation. The immense sacrifices endured by the peoples of both Germany and France for a generation, sacrifices which they are now asked to increase by the creation of great fleets, have been almost entirely sterile. The two countries neutralise one another France and Germany are both forbidden to expand in Europe, the former by terror of provoking superior forces, the latter by alli- ances which bind her not to disturb the peace for her own advantage alone. France cannot acquire Belgium, or Luxemburg, or Piedmont, or Catalonia ; Germany cannot acquire Holland, or Denmark, or the German provinces of Austria. Each must rest content, though crushed by the weight of new armour. The ambitions of both, are limited, as it were forcibly, to transmarine expan- sion, and neither while they are enemies to each other dare risk-a transmarine war. France cannot dream of Egypt or Burmah ; Germany cannot hope for the Con go, or the Eastern Archipelago, or Brazil. Each is compelled to watch the other, and neither can stir abroad. It is natural that under such circumstances grave and ambitious men should ask whether it is not possible to lay enmity aside, for a time at all events, and, either by an alliance or by a secret agreement ad hoc, recover full liberty of action. The two Powers together might be able to bribe Russia by gifts in China or Turkey, and to compel Great Britain not to interfere with them, and then the world would be before them where to choose their prey.
" Ignotus" is persuaded that the German Emperor is eager for such an agreement, and accumulates a number of small facts in proof of his argument. We shall not discuss them, for we think he is thus far right, that William- II.. would like an agreement with France exceedingly, and if he could get one by flattering France, would pour out smooth speeches and pleasant courtesies without stint. Nor shall we deny his other proposition, that although France longs at heart for military prestige, she would like to inflict a great humiliation upon her secular rival, England, and might with adequate provocation' be willing for that end to post- pone; though she will never wholly abandon, the revanche. We - will admit all that, and still we remain un- convinced. In the first place, the new coalition would instantly dissolve the old one. It is very easy to talk, as Count Yorck von Wartenburg does, of " Central Europe under the hegemony of Germany," but what have Austria and Italy to get by aggrandising Germany and France ? They could only lose. Austria seeks no colonies, and Italy, though she would like to possess a section of North Africa, would find in that colony no compensation for unfettering her most deadly enemy, who once free to act would reduce Italy once more to a cluster of small States with the Papacy for pivot. There is no prize which Central Europe could offer Russia which England could not more easily secure to her, or which she is incurably unwilling to secure. Who cares about Constantinople while we have Cairo, or seeks in China anything but trade? The moment their designs were fully revealed France and Germany would be left alone to face England and America, the latter knowing perfectly that the day England was beaten she would have to defend the one prize left that is worth a great war, namely, South America. Brazil would be worth the bones of many Pomeranian Grenadiers. We cannot doubt the result of such a contest, which, moreover, will not come, for the statesmen of the Continent are able men, and would not risk all they now possess upon a struggle the chances of which would be so incalcul- able. It is true, dangerously true, that if the two Powers limited themselves to the seizure of Belgium and Holland, they could bring to bear the full weight of their armies, with which neither England nor America is competent to contend. That is said to have been Gambetta's idea, and Gambetta's ideas still weigh in France ; while every German thinks of Holland as naturally by the laws of geography an appendage of the German Empire. But is either Belgium or Holland worth having as a subjugated, and therefore costly, province unless its colonies go with it ?—and until Great Britain had been defeated neither the Congo Free State nor the glorious Eastern Archipelago could be approached without British consent. We should simply do what Canning did when it seemed that Napoleon would conquer Spain,—that is, we should tear from the subjugated State the possessions which rendered it worth subjugating. That was what he meant when he said that he had " called a new world into existence to redress the balance of the old." The conscript armies of to-day may be irresistible on land except by other con- script armies, but the conscript army stops, as our superstitious fathers thought the Devil did, wherever there is running water. To realise the apprehensions of "Ignotus," the British Fleet must first be deprived of its position on the seas. That may happen after twenty years of Continental effort and sacrifice, or it may happen through some unexpected development of science which shall render all sea Powers equal—there are dreams among electricians of contrivances which would effect that—but taking things as they are there is not much reason for fear.
It is, nevertheless, worth remembering that English- men are exempt from a feeling which weighs heavily on the Continent, especially among statesmen,—the sense of being throttled. Since the Tudor days Englishmen have given up even the wish to expand in Europe, and when Hanover was lost to the dynasty scarcely noticed the fact, or noticed it with pleasure. It is not so with either France or Germany, and more especially with the latter. France would greatly prefer to be surrounded with a ring of small States which could be annexed or threatened or ordered about, but she has no pressure of population on her resources to make the question vital. Germany has. Year by year a new crowd of her people demand food and cultivation and comfort, with the understood menace that if these things are not provided they will swell the great army, "the two millions of ballots," who even now are athirst for a " redistribution " of liberty, power, and materials of comfort. A population so situated will look round for means of expansion, will hunger for new and larger markets, and will feel from time to time that, as a Spanish friend of the writer once summed up the case, "you English are too darn happy." There is danger in Continental envy of British prosperity, though the danger is not near enough to affect Consols.
Previous page
