AFTER WOLFENDEN
111,—I was not concerned in my letter to justify any extended meaning' of the Street Offences Act; but Merely to argue that the Divisional Court had quite reasonably held the facts in Smith V. Hughes to be Within the ordinary meaning of Section 1, and that Mr. Cline's charge that the Court had come near to making prostitution a crime was extravagant. Following 'he metaphor of Lord Justice Denning (as he then was) in a well-known case, the Divisional Court did not have to consider any 'ruck' in the 'texture' of the Street Offences Act, as Mr. Cline would have us believe. Neither does the Act need 'a normal man of fairly robust disposition' to make it work. It requires three concurrent conditions : (1) a common prostitute (2) who solicits or loiters (merely) and (3) in a street or public place. As for Mr Miller. one cannot equate admissible evidence with judicial discretion—which appears to be Mr. Miller's problem— since the former involves a rule to which the latter is an exception. What facts Judge may consider without requiring strict proof I. a matter for his discretion, and the manner in Which !he discretion is exercised makes it unimpeach- able. What evidence can be legally obtained to prove facts in issuc is a matter not of unimpeachable dis- cretion but of law, and cases can be found in the books showing the errors of trial judges being righted on appeal. I stick to what I said previously. 11 should be noted that in Smith v. Hughes the Court was quite alive to one of the suggested effects of the Act, namely sending prostitution underground. —Yours faithfully.
4 Tilsworth Road, Beaconsfield, Bucks
HARRY THORPE
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