THE FRENCH YELLOW BOOK. T HE French Yellow Book is the
latest official publication to tell the story of the negotiations which preceded the war. The nucleus of facts is, of course, the same as in the other Books (always excepting the German Book, which omits vital steps in the negotiations), yet the Book adds some new information of extraordinary interest. It shows—what we all knew before—that Britain was ready to go to almost any lengths to avoid war ; that Austria had virtually decided to withdraw the most preposterous demands in her ultimatum to Serbia ; that conver- sations were actually going on at St. Petersburg which promised a settlement ; that, in Sir Edward Grey's words, " only a little respite in time " was needed to secure peace ; and that just when it seemed that the black cloud was lifting Germany deliberately brought on the storm by declaring war on Russia and France. But in examining the Book we shall leave all that aside, and summarize only the revelations which it gives of the determination of Germany to force on a war as soon as she had com- pleted a wonderfully cynical programme of preparations. It is for its peculiar information—the information which appears in no other official publication—that the French Yellow Book is enormously valuable. The Secret Report, which M. Etienne somehow acquired in April, 1913, as to German national ?policy, and the use to be made of t he Army in prosecuting that policy, is like a flash of white light in a dark room. Hardly less informing and important are the document in which M. Jules Cambon reports the brutal sentiments of General von Moltke, and the report of a conversation between the German Emperor and the King of the Belgians which M. Jules Cambon derived from an "absolutely sure source." Altogether, the French Yellow Book is not only the most readable official Book that has been published, but the most crushing exposure of German methods.
The Secret Report which came into the possession of M. Etienne, then French Minister for War, in April of last year is called "A Note regarding the strengthening of the German Army," and is dated " Berlin, March 19th, 1913." It points out (we quote throughout from the Times translation) that the improvement of the French Army has made " an attack against the French less easy than in the previous period." It will be noticed that the idea of " an attack " on France, without any other warning of course than some trumped-up political grievance, is implicit in the German military mind. The German militarist does not ask himself, " How can peace be pre- served ?" but " What is the most favourable conjunction of circumstances for us to deliver an attack so that we shall not only find our enemy weak, but shall be able to put him in the wrong diplomatically ? " Early in the Note there is, indeed, a mention of peace, but peace is conceived of as dependent on Germany getting her way. And when we remember what that way is we can measure the value of talk about peace, and are prepared for the extraordinary character of the rest of the Note, in which preparation for war.is treated as a right excuse for every sort of chicanery by unfriendly action in other people's countries. We must quote the sentence about peace with the sentences which follow it ; for the fact that peace is mentioned at all is just the kind of point the German mind is apt to seize upon to prove the innocence of its intentions :— " Opinion is being prepared for a further strengthening of the active Army, which will ensure an honourable peace to Germany, and the possibility of suitably guaranteeing her influence in the affairs of the world. The new Army Law and the complementary measures which must follow, will almost allow the complete attainment of this aim. Neither the ridiculous clamours for revenge of the French jingoes, nor the English gnashing of teeth, nor the wild gestures of the Slays, will turn us from our end, which is to strengthen and to extend Deutsehtum (Germanism) throughout the entire world."
How Bismarckian is that touch about preparing opinion.
All thought of peace in any shape or form is soon left even further behind than in the few words we have quoted. It is remarked that the new Army Law is " an extension of the military education of the German people." It is a sacred duty to sharpen the sword and hold it " ready for our defence as well as to strike the enemy." Meanwhile " the idea that our armaments are a reply to the armaments and policy of the French must be instilled into the people" (Bismarck again !). The next sentences are worse. " The people must be accustomed to think that an offensive war on our part is a necessity if we are to combat the adversary's provocations. We must act with prudence in order to arouse no suspicion." But the day is past when German prudence can get the better of even the Daily News. The upshot of the whole scheme of preparing the people is to be that " the outbreak of war shall be considered as a deliverance." If the German militarists have not succeeded in imposing on us, they have at least had up to date a great success in their own country. It is also pointed out that, while " the war must be pre-
pared for from a financial point of view," the suspicion of the financiers must not be aroused. We seem to remember some charmingly sincere pacific assurances
communicated to an English newspaper by a German financier whose suspicious had not been aroused. The Note then goes on to set forth plans for securing " secret allies " in other countries. We must here quote a passage which would be ruined by paraphrase :— " Disturl antes must be stirred up in Northern Africa and in Russia. This will be a means of absorbing the forces of the adversary. It is, therefore, vitally necessary that through well- choeen agents we should get into contact with influential people in Egypt, Tunis, Algiers, and Morocco, in order to prepare the necessary measures in case of European war. These secret allies would, of course, he recognized openly in time of war, and on the conclusion of peace they would be guaranteed the preservation of the advantages they had won. These desiderata can be realized. A first attempt made a few years ago gave us the necessary contact. Unfortunately, the relations established then have not been sufficiently consolidated. Whether we like it or not, we shall have to resort to preparations of this sort in order rapidly to bring the campaign to an end. Risings in time of war created by political agents require careful preparation by material means. They must break out simultaneously with the destruction of the means of communication. They should have a guiding head, who might be found among influential religious or political chiefs. The Egyptian school is specially suited for this. More and more it gathers together the intellectuals of the Mustalman world. By every means in our power we must be strong, so that by a powerful effort we may destroy our enemies in the east and in the west. But in the next European war the small States must be forced to follow us or must be cowed."
There is surely nothing so masterly as that in any of the other official Books for all their exposures of cynicism. After dealing with the probable action of small States in the North, the Note refers in particular to Belgium :— " If, on the other hand, that country's defensive organization were turned against us, which would give obvious advantages to our Western adversary, we could not in any way offer Belgium any guarantee of the security of her neutrality. A vast field is therefore open for our diplomacy to work in our interests in that country. The plans made in this direction allow of the hope that the offensive might be taken immediately the concentration of the Army of the Lower Rhine is completed An ultimatum with brief delay, followed immediately by invasion, would enable us to justify our action sufficiently from the point of view of Inter- national Law."
Again we see the nauseous insistence on the importance of doing wrong and pretending that it is right. We should have more respect for the German militarists if they frankly argued that might is right, and reintro- duced into the world a kind of majestic barbarism. Our stomachs turn at this Pecksniffianism, unworthy of a people who are certainly strong and brave.
The mention of the vast field for diplomacy in Belgium causes us to look on for an example of its working. And, sure enough, there is a capital example in the interview between the German Emperor and King Albert. M. Jules Cambon reported on November 22nd, 1913, that the interview took place in the presence of General von Moltke. He states that a deep impression was made on the King by the words of the Emperor, and continues :— "I am in no way surprised by the impression created, which corresponds with that made on me some time ago. Hostility against us is becoming more marked, and the Emperor has ceased to be a partisan of peace. The German Emperor's interlocutor thought up to the present, as did everybody, that William the Second, whose personal influence has been exerted in many critical circumstances in favour of the maintenance of peace, was still in the same state of mind. This time, it appears, he found him completely changed. The German Emperor is no longer in his eyes the champion of peace against the bellicose tendencies of certain German parties. William IL has been brought to think that war with France is inevitable, and that it will have to come one day or the other. The Emperor, it need hardly be said, believes in the crushing superiority of the German Army and in its assured success. General von Moltke spoke in exactly the same sense as his Sovereign. He also declared that war was necessary and inevitable, but he showed himself still more certain of success. 'For,' said be to the King, 'this time we must put an end to it' (setts lois tit Taut on finir), and your Majesty can hardly doubt the irresistible enthusiasm which on that day will carry away the whole German people.' The King of the Belgians pro- tested that to interpret the intentions of the French Government in this manner was to travesty them, and to allow oneself to be misled as to the feelings of the French nation by the manifestations of a few hotheads, or of conscienceless intriguers."
In an earlier despatch (May 6th, 1913) M. Jules Cambon had reported some other opinions of General von
Moltke :—
" The idea of the General Staff is to act by surprise. The commonplaces as to the responsibility of the aggressor,' said General von Moltke, 'must be disregarded. When war has become necessary it must be waged by ranging all the chances on one's own side. Success alone justifies it. Germany cannot and must not give Russia time to mobilize, or she will be obliged to main- tain on the eastern frontier a force which would leave her in a position of equality, if not of inferiority, in front of France. There- fore, we must forestall our principal adversary immediately there are nine chances in ten that we are going to have war, and we must begin war without waiting, in order brutally to crush all resistance.'" If that is terrible enough, it at least avoids the fashionable Pecksniffianism. There is much else in the Book which we should like to mention—in particular, the extremely strong evidence that the German Government knew all about the ultimatum to Serbia in spite of the official denial —but we must content ourselves with having pointed out the wealth of the Book in what newspapers call " exclusive "
information.
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