COMMUNISM
Looking eastwards
MICHAEL STEWART
Three major facts dominate world politics today: First, the existence of two enormous power blocs, the chief of one being the United States, of the other the Soviet Union. Second, these are not mere power rivalries: each bloc speaks for a philosophy and a faith. One speaks for dictatorial, Commu- nism, the other—less clearly—for freedom of thought and speech, though its members vary greatly in their degrees of freedom, and its economic and social spectrum stret- ches from unrestricted capitalism to ad- vanced welfare state. Third, each bloc is now armed with weapons so dreadful that their use might destroy mankind, or, more probably, leave a remnant to cope with ao world scarred as it has not been since the last Ice Age.
Any number of qualifications can be made to these three major propositions. There is the timid flush of freedom in some parts of the Communist bloc. There are parts of the 'free world' whose forms of_ government disgrace and discredit the con- cept of freedom. There is the enigma of China, to be set in the margin at present,- solely because her nuclear power is not yet fully developed. There are the many coun- tries of Asia, Africa and South America who look sceptically at both blocs, won- dering whether material aid or political counsel can best be sought from one or the other or from neither. Yet when all these qualifications•have been made, it remains true that the three major facts determine, at present, the choices of policy open to Britain and the other countries of the Wes- tern Alliance.
Let us imagine ourselves to be humane 'and civilised citizens of one of the countries in this Western Alliance, anxious to preserve peace, ;defend freedom and remove or Miti- gate the disgraces to our own cause. What policy, in this situation, should we pursue? We can reject at once the policy, formqrly advocated- by Bertrand Russell and a few irresponsible American voices, of preventive war against Communism—a policy always wicked and foolish, and now patently im- possible. Likewise we can reject the policy (also, subsequently, advocated by Bertrand Russell) of unilateral nucjgar disarmament which would leave this country defenceless, unallied and hoping for the best. The voices raised in support of this policy have been muted by the fate of Czechoslovakia. We may accept and sympathise with her decision not to resist overwhelming power, but we do not wish to be placed in her position.
This leaves us with the necessity to choose some form of the doctrine of co-existence; for, as'Clement Attlee remarked, the alter- native to, co-existence is presumably co- death. But what does co-existence mean? It can mean a situation in which the two- huge blocs stay at peace while the. Soviet Union tries to bring the whole world under its control and the West, according to its meats, replies in kind. Alternativsiy, it can mean a situation in which the peace is kept and both blocs seek to develop more nor- *The Future of Communist Power (Eyre and Spottiswoode 40i) mal relations with each other.
Mr Brian Crozier, in his recent book*, argues for the former and gloomier of these two views, and it must be said at once that he is not lightly to be dismissed. He writes in a most persuasive style and is armed with an impressive, detailed knowledge of world events and of Communist policies, expressed or implied, over the last two decades. He presents four main theses.
First, that the only real power-base of Communism is the Soviet Union, and that the Soviet Union will use all the means in its power—choosing, at each turn of events, whichever means is most appropriate,to extend Communism throughout the World. This, subject to one vital qualification which wilrbe exaniined later, it is not easy to dis- pute in view of the repeated statements of Soviet spokesmen and the record of history.
Second. that the Sino-Soviet quarrel is unlikely to be permanent. This is well ar- gued and extremely relevant to our present problems. A policy for China which pre- sents her with enemies both to landward and seaward, and a policy for Russia which presents her with anxieties both to East and West—these are such manifest absurdities that we cannot expect them to survive, once time has erased certain bitter memories and personal conflicts. The Western Alliance will be well advised to eschew silly-clever policies designed to widen the rift, or to woo China as a possible counterweight to the Soviet Union.
Third, Mr Crozier argues that the West could be betrayed from within by writers and intellectuals who denigrate freedom of thought and justify violence and intole- rance. This part of. his book is stimulating• but superficial. He does not sec that the writers of whom he complains would have no effect were it not for certain ugly facts which give colour to what they say. The potential betrayal of the West is not to be personified by Marcuse and Sartre, but by Rachman and Little Rock, by the' Greek Colonels and the racialists on both sides of the Atlantic.
Fourth, he argues, only too truly, that Communism no longer offers its subjects
great economic and social progress. At one time it was possible to arguei• as Leonard Woolf did, th4the West stood for legal and political freedoms, and the East for economic and social_ justice, and that one day the two might meet: we now have to recognise the dreary economic failure of the
East. His con elusion is that we in the West must stand firm and challenge Communist arguments. This is not enough, and against
this view I set forward the belief which animated the policy of the late Labour government, and which might influence the policy of its successor. The crucial question is whether Mr Crozier's first thesis, con. cerning the, implacable determination of the Soviet Union to extend Communism throughout the world, will always be valid. In its support he quotes an intransigent passage from lzvestia: 'The struggle between two opposing world forces, capitalism and socialism, permeates- the course of history in the last third of the century; revolution. ary currents, whose guiding force is found in the socialist countries, recl by Marxist. Leninist parties, comprise the mighty power that will' bring all countries- into the orbit of socialism: On this, Mr Crozier comments, `Whether all the Soviet leaders believe such statements to be literally true, and such aims attainable, is not of dominant rele- vance.' But surely this is the supremely relevant. _question. It is possible for the democracies to demonstrate, continuously, the falsity of Izvestia's thesis. They can do this partly by maintaining their defences, so that they_cannot be swept into any orbit by brute force, and partly by using demo- cratic procedures to solve economic prob- lems and reinedy, social injustices so that they are invulnerable to subversion. If they are prepared to do this they can then. with. ollt danger, examine the possibilities of de- tente with the Soviet Union.
These possibilities are now greater than they have been for some time, and greater than they are likely to be again, if the present opportunity is lost. Herr Brandt's Ostpolitik has not yet succeeded, but it makes good progress, and we are within reach of a situation in which West Berlin will be free from harassment and the two Germanies will be able -to live together without dangerous friction, neither abandon- ing nor forcing the issue of ultimate re- unification. A conference on European security is beginning to look .like practical politics. The countries of the Warsaw Pact originally proposed a once-and-for-all con• ference confined to European countries; they now accept the participation of the United States and Canada,- and, folloWing a British- proposal, the need for a perman- ent organ for East-West consultation. It would be idle to suppose that these pro- cedures could immediately dissolve the power blocs and usher in an dra of last' ing. gobdwill. What they 'could do is to establish that form of co-existence which is acceptable to the West, with the dr of Communist world-domination not openly renounced but tacitly abandoned. In such an atmosphere it might be possible to get mutual and balanced reduction of armed forces and so mitigate the appalling cost of armaments which is now terrifying both blocs. If it is foolish optimism to assume that such a policy is bound toaucceed, is equally unrealistic gloom ter Tssert th it is bound to fail. What the West ne is policies which are socially progressive home, resolute in defence and imaginat in diplomacy.
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