WAR, OR PEACE ?
Prussian Consols Russian Fives French Routes Italian fiestas Austrian Fours Hungarian Fours Spank'. Et Fears • • • • . • •
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Jan. 1.8.1887. Feb. 3rd. 1837.
... 104 102 ... 951 92
82 76
... 991 91 ... 901 83 ... 83* 73 ... 65f At the same time, while the German Emperor significantly tells his Prussian Parliament that his conflict with the Deputies before 1866 ended only with the outbreak of war, the Berlin Post,which is often inspired by the Chancellor himself, publishes a weighty article, the pith of which is this. General Boulanger has suddenly risen to supreme popularity in France, because he gratifies the aspiration of the French people for the revanche. The Government of Paris cannot remove him, though it would gladly do it ; but though the General is all-powerful for war, he is powerless to lead France to peace. His ascendency depends on his ministering to warlike feeling, and is therefore a standing danger for Germany. This article has been universally accepted in Europe as an informal demand for General Boulanger's dis- missal ; but it is much more probable that it is merely a state- ment of the German official conviction that General Boulanger, if he retains power, must sooner or later fight. In either view, the article, if inspired, is a most ominous one ; for if the conviction in Berlin is so deep, the German Staff will insist on choosing a good time for war, and, as we showed last week, the good time from their point of view must be while they are completely ready, and the French are not. They are not likely to forget what the needle-gun did for them in the war of 1866, the shortest war on record, and yet com- pletely successful. It is, of course, an object with the German Generals, whose troops camp out in the open without tents, to wait till the severest weather is overpast ; but it takes four- teen days to mobilise even a German Army ; and if war is resolved on by either side, the final steps which must precede it cannot be much longer delayed. What form those steps will take, or from what quarter they will proceed, is still un- known ; but according to regular European precedent, one Power or another should request explanations of an adver- sary's armaments, and refuse to be content with mere words of denial. That is more honest than the invention of pretexts, and at least as effective.
The pressure of the Army Staffs of Europe towards war is an element in the situation of which too little account is taken in this country. The civil power is here so completely supreme, that the opinion of the Army counts for little, even in foreign politics, and in home politics does not count at all. Upon the Continent, however, the Governments, even when, as in France, they are nominally civil, rest ultimately upon vast armies, whose chiefs are as potent in affairs, and especially in foreign affairs, as leading statesmen. The Russian and Austrian Emperors look to the Army as the mainstay of their power— there are men who say there is no true Austria except the Imperial Army—and would regard any widespread discontent among their officers, or any contempt for their action felt within the barracks, as grave calamities. Even when not soldiers themselves—and they are both soldiers—those two Sovereigns listen to their Generals with deep attention ; and when told that great military opportunities are passing away, or that grave military dangers may arise from delay, are as much influenced as an English Minister is when he perceives that his party is eager for a special course of action. They court, in fact, their most effective supporters. In France, the Government is at times actually afraid of the Army, which, if irritated, can overset it ; and though that fear is not felt in Germany, where loyalty is a military passion, any " loss of heart" among officers is sincerely dreaded. That is a loss of the impulse which makes a cruel discipline toler- able, induces all classes to serve, and helps in the hour of danger to ensure the sacrifices which can alone produce victory. An Army which believes in its chiefs' capacities is a different instrument from an Army which doubts them, and an indefinitely stronger one. If, therefore, the great group of picked and scientific soldiers who form the Army Staff of Germany report as their deliberate judgment that " the retention of Metz will in the next war save 100,000 men," or that the delay of a year will add 5 per cent, to the mobility of the French Army, the German Court, including Prince Bismarck, are compelled to listen with grave attention. If they do not, they may be regarded by the whole Army as men who do not appreciate military necessities. Whether, under present circumstances, the Staffs in European States desire war, few men have any means of deciding, the Generals main- taining a secrecy more perfect than that of politicians ; but general arguments to the contrary are not of much value. Sixteen years ago, it was said everywhere that armed nations would be peaceful, because the horrors of war would come home to every household ; but the experience of those years shows that now, as of old, for political purposes the officers, and not the soldiers, constitute " the Army." In the event of defeat, the opinion of the men is of infinite importance ; but until defeated, a good Army lies in its officers' hands, and their opinion is less likely to be peaceful. They risk much in a campaign, but they may gain all. Not only do they profit by war, which holds out vast and sudden prizes in the way of promotion, but they have a strong professional interest in war, and a professional desire that it should be waged with every advantage obtainable. If this view is correct, the Russian Staff can hardly be otherwise than anxious for war with Austria, the Power which permanently bars their move- ment in the only direction where great prizes are obtainable ; and the German Staff must be restless under the idea that the enemy whom they must fight soon—we assume that Prince Bismarck uttered his real belief on that point —is monthly growing stronger. It is useless to accuse the German Staff of callousness for entertaining such a sentiment. They think of themselves as humane for feeling it, as trustees for the lives and reputations of the trained youth of Germany, which will be sacrificed in vain if they are defeated. When war can be avoided, a scientific General thinks like another man ; but when it cannot—and that is the assumption—he is under terrible pressure to select the time which, in his judgment and not the enemy's, is the fittest to ensure a quick, a non-sanguinary, and a successful campaign. Military Staffs are duellists from one point of view ; but ordinary duellists are not trustees for others' limbs and lives. That argument,' You will save 50,000 men," is a natural one in a Von Moltke's mouth, and will completely blind any Staff officer to the immorality of shooting a burglar only because he is convinced that the man has plotted burglary.
There is still, of course, a chance of peace, owing to the terrible nature of the risk which each Power may run. France, if war begins, may have Italy as well as Russia on her hands —for the war with Abyssinia can wait—and we question if the German Chancellor is quite so confident in Russian assurances as he gave himself out to be. Either Power may hesitate ; but hesitation will not solve the dilemma, or even reduce it. It is the retreat of one side or the other from their condition of visible readiness which is required ; and what hope is there of such a retreat? The German Emperor has staked his Throne upon a renewal of the Septennate with an increased force, and is certain not to retire, while the Government which withdrew the French Army from its Eastern border would be condemned for cowardice. Nothing, be it remembered, must be done, or can be done, which the Armies—that is, the officers, now as numerous as an Army— consider dishonourable ; and their feeling is that with- drawal before menace constitutes dishonour. We can see as yet no way out of the position, and understand some- thing of the French and German anger with England for idly looking on. It is not soothing when you are preparing for a duel to the death, to see a distinguished acquaintance take out his opera-glass, and prepare to be exceedingly interested in the effect of every thrust. That attitude, however, offensive as it necessarily is, is forced on England by circumstances, and does not diminish her capacity to form a clear judgment as to the total drift of events.
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