HOW LONG CAN GERMANY WAIT?
IN this journal it has always been recognised and asserted that the unification of Germany and the re-emergence of a German armed force are -simply a matter of time. Anyone can argue about the desirability or otherwise of these developments. It makes no real difference. These things will just happen. The only significant influence which can be exercised by the rest of the world, and in particular by the Four Powers whose Foreign Ministers are now meeting in Berlin, over these developments is an influence over the manner of their happening. Where German unity and German armed force are concerned, the right question is how they are to come about--not whether or why.
In a formal sense this is the question which is supposed to be under discussion in Berlin. But so far the conditions which Mr. Molotov has imposed upon the holding of all- Germany elections amount either to a demand that unity, if achieved at all, must be unity under Communist domination. or to a denial of unity itself; and the attachment of the Western Powers to the proposal for a European 'Defence Community, the device whereby the German forces would exist but not be independent, amounts to a denial of the kind of armed force which the Germans, in the long run, want to have. So in effect the question, of the way in which unity and an armed force are to be achieved in Germany is not being asked at all. It is completely excluded by the attitudes of the Four Powers. This preliminary analysis may perhaps appear to be rough and cynical. It is quite conceivable that there are Germans who would deny any intention to seek a greater degree of autonomy for their armed forces than that which they would receive within EDC. But would they, or anybody else, confidently maintain that this particular piece of international machinery, which was invented by the French in a moment of desperation, and which most Frenchmen would now probably be glad to forget, is the only military organisation within which Germans would like to play their part ? And if, as is perfectly possible, EDC never works, would the desire of Germans to have an armed force of their own evaporate ? What is the sense of playing about with words in Berlin or playing about with international gadgetry in Paris ? The Germans want unity. They want an army. And one day they will get both. They are accepting the Berlin conference, watching it, praying for it—but they are not trying to put pressure on it. They might be justified in hoping that the Foreign Ministers would he able to envisage a future Germany, united and able to defend itself, which to any serious student of that country. is the only stable future Germany. Dr. Adenauer's desire for such an outcome is explicit and obviously genuine. And who can doubt that, despite the wearisome utterances of their Communist rulers, the vast majority of East Germans also want unity and strength. Yet they are not demanding these things with menaces. For the moment the Germans are quietly waiting to see whether 'the Powers will face reality. Surely this is the moment to do just that—rather than to wait and bicker until they feel sufficiently strong to grab it for themselves.
Yet what arc the chances that realism will prevail in Berlin ? At the moment they are diminishing, mostly because of the steady revelation by Mr. Molotov- that the fundamentals of his government's policy have not changed, but partly because the situation arising from the present policies of all the Four PoWers is a natural deadlock. Fundamentally the aim of Western policy in Europe is to get the Russians first out of Germany and ultimately back inside Russia. The Russians on the other hand, still seem determined to hold the line in Germany, which is the most they can hope to do in view of the undoubted success of the Western policy of firmness and resistance to Communist expansion. Germany is about the last place in the world in which the Russians would want to make a concession. It would, indeed, be far more logical, and far more consistent with Russian past history, if having been blocked in the West, they turned to the East. That may be what they are doing at this moment. But it would not follow from that that the Western Powers should abandon their policy, clearly stated after the Washington meeting of the three Foreign Ministers in July, 1953, of putting Germany first on the agenda for all four Great Powers. On the contrary it would be their duty to go straight on to expose the essential barrenness of Russian policy in Germany. Mr. Molotov is a formidable diplomatist, but even Mr. Molotov can be pushed into a corner. There is little reason to believe that he wanted to discuss Germany with the Western Powers, but this week he has been doing it, and as each day passes it becomes clearer that he is the obstacle to the kind of settlement that the Germans want. Even if we cannot alter that fact for the time being, we can at least expose it.
Such a conclusion to the long awaited, often postponed and always potentially crucial Berlin meeting would, of course, be depressingly negative. But, even if it turned out to be all that could be achieved, it would still be better than nothing. And the meeting is not over yet. There is still a hope that the Russians may admit the force of the central factor, the urge of Germany towards unity and self-defence, and make up their minds to bow to it—if not now, then later; if not for ever, then for the time being. Wildly improbable as this concession to reality is, it is still the only road to a stable peace in Europe and to that other professed object of Russian policy, the reduction of tension throughout the world. That road is as straight as it could be. Once Germany is free and able to defend itself, as it undoubtedly will be sooner or later, then it will be in the interest of both East and West alike to ensure that these achievements are not turned to evil account. It will be in their mutual interest to ensure that Germany does not become a swinging weight in the balance of power. At the . moment Germany is potentially such a weight. The longer their basic urges are frustrated, the more likely it becomes that the Germans will, Positively want to play off East and West against each other. The sensible course would be to act quickly before that wish becomes strong and dangerous. At the moment Germany is not much mare than an anxious shadow at the Berlin conference tables. But it could become once again the solid giant capable, not of conquering the world, but of turning the world once more into a shambles.
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