TOPICS OF THE DAY.
THE SITUATION IN CHINA.
WHEN a few marauding binds break into Cape Colony and play hide-and-seek there with our troops, the British public grows anxious and restless and begins to talk about the terrible gravity of the situation. Yet all the tiwe an infinitely graver situation is developing in China to which no one seems to pay any attention whatever. We are not pessimists even about China, and we do not want to encourage even there any sensational ideas of coming evils. Still, if people want to indulge in gloomy forebodings, they have far more reason to do so in regard to the position in the Far East than in regard to South Africa. The state of things in Pekin and the provinces held by the Allies is, in truth, unsatisfactory in the extreme, and as far as we can see no real progress is being made towards a solution. Consider for a moment what the object of Great Britain, and, indeed, of all the Allies, is, and then ask how far we have got in the direction of realising it. What we want is, in fact, to go back to the status quo of this time last year, only with better guaran- tees for its permanence. We want to see the Chinese Government restored, and China once again open to the trade of the world. The Chinese Government must be strong enough to maintain itself and to keep order, and willing and able to protect the foreigners who do business in China, and strong enough also to give no excuse for any of the European Powers helping themselves to portions of Chinese territory. If we could obtain that, plus a certain amount of punishment for past misdeeds, including an indemnity, we should be able to feel that we had finished with the crisis in the Far East. Nominally, no doubt, it may be said that we are just on the point of achieving this result. The Chinese have agreed in principle to the Joint Note, and if this agreement could be believed to be genuine we might feel hopeful. It is, however, almost certain that what the Chinese really mean to do is not to agree, but to negotiate. They have accepted in form—what else could they do when the Note was de- scribed as irrevocable ?—but in fact they mean to discuss every point in detail, from the precise wording of the inscriptions and the proclamations to the amount of the indemnity and the way in which it is to be raised. But such negotiations may last for years. No doubt the Chinese Government would agree quickly enough if they wanted to be back in Pekin as ardently as we want to go out of it. But, unfortunately, though they admit that they want to come back to Pekin some day, they are in no pressing hurry. They realise that time is in their favour, and mean to take every advantage of the fact. If the Powers occupying the capital and the neigh- bouring provinces were a single Power with a clear and definite policy, this might not be so great an evil. A single Power might grimly resolve to wait on and to beat the Chinese at their own game. But, the Allies cannot do that. In face of an active opposi- tion a force like that of the Allies may bold together, but it is extremely difficult, if not actually impossible, for theta to face successfully a long period of dawdling negotiation. Without anything like the angry quarrelling with which the tamps of the Crusaders were cursed—that is the only analogy of the present situation in
divergence of aim and method is sure to grow up and render the Allied Governments restless and distrustful. Even though there is nothing in the nature of bad faith, some Power or group of Powers will grow more anxious than the others and begin to think of making special terms, and so getting out of the imbroglio. But directly
this begins to be suspected the danger of serious trouble among the Allies must become very great. An outbreak of suspicion, too, is all the more likely to happen owing to the fact that all the Allies do not now want the same thing. They all wanted to get to Pekin, and they all want a settlement in the abstract ; but can it be said that they are all squally willing to wait for that settle- ment? Russia., for example, has practically got what she wants, and is now only anxious to stop spending money on war and to begin spending it on her railway. At the same time, she would be extremely glad to give China the impressien that in spite of the virtual .lopping off of Manchuria she is really China's best friend. America, again, has not obtained, and does not want, any Chinese territory, and is specially impatient to get done with China, and so free from an association with Europe to which she is not accustomed. She is the last Power to play the game of waiting patiently. Then comes the Japanese difficulty. Japan has hitherto behaved with great loyalty to her Allies, but Japan never forgets, and We must never forget, that she is a yellow Power, and has no notion, as is pointed out elsewhere, of joining in anything which approaches to a crusade against a portion of the yellow race. There is always a party in Japan which dreams of a world-Empire through and by Japanese leadership for China, and Japan will not spend indefinitely and wait indefinitely to make this dream impossible of accomplishment. Japan no doubt for the present wants the status quo before the massacres; but if, owing to a jelly-fish resistance on the part of China, she were to see no prospect of that status quo being restored, it is impossible to say what steps she might take to pro- tect her vital interests. However, we do not wish to speculate in detail upon possible causes of dispute among the Allies, bit merely to point ont how greatly the danger of diff.-rences is increased by a long period of negotiation. Add to this that the conduct of the Allied armies in China has been of a kind to give rise to grave anxiety, even from the military point of view. Even making every allowance for exaggeration, it seems clear that the troops have not merely looted to an extent which is gravely injurious to discipline, but have treated the conquered districts with a recklessness and indifference to the future which show that the leaders have little or no understanding of the problem before them. Not only have they made the Chinese inhabitants fear and hate the foreigner more than ever, but they seem even to have allowed the coolies to be misused, and so have largely deprived themselves of local help which was of the utmost importance. In fact, they would appear to have wasted a country which they may have to occupy for many months to some. If we bad behaved so in India we should never have built up our Indian Empire.
But perhaps it will be said that the Allies will be able to force the Chinese Government to give a genuine and quick agreement to the Joint Note by threatening if they do not that they will take further hostile steps. We wish we could think that they possessed any such power to present an ultimatum to China. It appears to us that they have nothing left with which to threaten. They cannot seriously propose to follow the Court to Sian, for it is admitted that the Empress would only move another eight hundred miles deeper into the heart of China. Such an expedition might be undertaken by a single Power which had resolved really to conquer China, and was prepared to spend £400,000,000 in doing so. The Powers cer- tainly will not do so in combination, and will not allow any one of their number to do so alone,—as the Chinese very well know. The notion of a great punitive expedition up the Yangtse is equally impossible for similar reasons. No Power would be trusted to do the work alone, and the Powers could not or would not do it together. Seizing the chief ports, again, is an impossible threat, as to do so would mean destroying vast quantities of European property, and so completing the ruin of the China trade. In truth, the Powers have shot their bolt in taking Pekin, and though the Chinese would like to get them out of it, the threat of remaining cannot be seriously used as an ultimatum.
What, then, is to be done ? We confess we have little to suggest. Possibly if we knew as much as Lord Salisbury knows, and had access to the secret negotia- tions, we should be able to feel more confidence in the future, and should see a clear policy in front of us and the Allies. All we can say is that the facts that are visible all tell in the opposite direction, and tend to produce a sense of hopelessness as to anything definite coming of the policy of joint action. But if that breaks down then we must fall back on the "spheres of influence," and this is almost certain to mean an
ugly rush for territorial plunder. We should not perhaps
dread that result so much if we could feel sure that our Government would keep cool and would refuse to be forced into a big grab by public opinion. But unfortu- nately we cannot feel any confidence that they would not be carried off their feet by a panic outcry that we wen
being ousted of our rights in Ohina. Meantime we can only wait, and if pessintietie ahem* the iaintedints outlook in tfhina, comfort ssayselvss with the firm belief—and it is a belief which we hold most unhesitatingly—that even if we waste lives and money in China, owing to the condition of stalemate that has arisen there, we shall come through in the end without any serious injury. But though we and others may in our hearts hold this com- fortable doctrine, it must not be made an excuse for sleepy indifference to what is going on in China. That is the way to make such a belief prove untrue and to stultify our optimism. We must face the difficulties of the China problem, and not imagine that it can be dawdled out of because all Europe is in the same boat. That makes dawdling not less but more dangerous.
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