Do we need the F 111 ?
DEFENCE LAURENCE MARTIN
The F 111 is a complex and controversial air- craft in its own right. It would be difficult enough to assess its place in British defence policy if we knew what that policy was. It has been its curious fate to become an acute politi- cal issue intimately associated with the role and reputation of the defence ministers in both America and Britain.
In the United States Mr McNamara made the plane a test case of his policy of forcing 'com- monality' of equipment on the services, and pushed the F 111 down the reluctant throat of the us Navy to the great cost of Boeing and the fury of many a West Coast congressman. In this country the decision to buy the F 111K is linked to the cancellation of both the TSR 2 and the new aircraft carrier. As a result the un- doubted faults and bad luck that have dogged the project have been eagerly seized upon and magnified in both countries by those who de- plored the original choice.
As an aircraft the F 111 is in the forefront of many technological trends. It is, of course, the first important operational swing wing air- craft, with consequent combination of high speed—at best about Mach 2.5—with a capacity for slow flying, short landing and fairly short take-off. Its 'avionics' are outstand- ing and in particular its terrain-following radar permits long range, high subsonic, very low level flight—at fifty feet if needed—to avoid interception. It is so accurate in navigation that its performance is appreciably marred by in- accuracies in the bombs and missiles available for it to carry.
There can be no doubt that Britain bought the F 111K for the Far Eastern role. Justifying the purchase, the 1966 Defence White gaper singled out the F 111 for range and for 'low-level con- ventional strike in tropical climates.' In the same year's defence debate Mr Healey said 'most of these aircraft will be based in Singa- pore' and, failing that, Australia. There were to be a few in Britain only for training and to rotate the crews. Elsewhere in the debate the purchase was directly linked to the phasing out of the carriers.
If, for the argument, we concede the wisdom of the original purchase, we are still not much further forward in assessing whether we should still take delivery. In the first place we do not yet know what the Government intends to do in the Far East. Rumour has it we are to be out even faster than expected. But last July's special White Paper distinguished between two modes of British presence: the one on fixed bases, like Singapore, which was to end in the early 'seventies, and an open-ended readiness to inter- vene, supported by naval and amphibious forces. If our savings are to be made by accelerating the end of the fixed presence, the Far Eastern case for the F 111K might remain valid or even be reinforced. But if we are about to wash our hands of the Far East entirely, and honestly for once, as the current controversy about the F I 1 1K suggests, then the aircraft will have to find its justification, if at all, in our NATO role.
As early as 1966 unofficial references were being made to the need for tactical striking and reconnaissance power in Europe, though the official solution was chiefly found in joint pro- jects with the French, including the now defunct AFVG. To assess the case for the F 111K in Europe we would have to ask whether we need its range, short take-off and other characteristics in this theatre, or whether we could make do with other existing aircraft like the F 4 Phan- tom, or alternatively should aim, even at the price of delay, at cooperatively built European aircraft now that our requirements no longer diverge from our fellow Europeans by reason of our overseas commitments? If there is a need for an aircraft with precisely the charac- teristics of the F 111, we would have to ask whether the Americans could not do the job for us. For some time to come we are un- likely to be carrying out reconnaissance and bombing in NATO without American coopera- tion, and no one seems eager to bring the Middle East into the argument.
If it is felt that a policy of 'let America do it' would be a step toward accepting the role of more primitive cannon-fodder within the alliance, the reply could be first, that this is an extreme attitude to take over a single, special- ised military task, and, second, that if it is in- dependence we want, this might be best approached by debating what would do most for the future of the European air forces and aircraft industries in the long run. These are the long-term questions with which we are only belatedly grappling in a systematic way. The same is true of attempts to suggest that now is the time to get out of the nuclear business. Cancelling the F 111K, or an attempt to slough off nuclear weapons—just as hopes of non- proliferation are generally waning—would save relatively little money, and might actually be costly in the short run, particularly in foreign exchange.
We should probably not underestimate the intrinsic value of the offset sales agreement, one part of the F 111 affair that has worked well. British officers in Washington handling the sales to the United States say that the gains are genuine and by no means merely a devious method of accounting for exports that would have been made anyway. Quite apart from the specific removal of protective barriers, the agreement has led American services to survey what Britain can offer in a way in which they would otherwise never have done. Many of the sales may con- sequently have follow-on potential well beycind the limits of the strict trade-off against the F III, and the purchases set up inter-company and service-to-company relations that may lead to further business. It would be naive to become too optimistic about cutting deep into the ferocious American arms market, but even a small share would be of immense value to any emergent cooperative European efforts in this field, both financially and in fostering a for- ward-looking technological and commercial outlook.
The history of the F 111 and its British sister makes one doubt whether even those with the fullest inside information can be very sure of making a wise decision. In any case, it is prob- ably too much to hope that the decision will be taken on its merit as an issue in national strategy. One doubts whether Britain would be advised to buy the F 111K if it faced the initial problem today. But being where we are, the arguments for seeing the deal through are not negligible. Cancellation, if it comes, could give the particularly unfortunate impression of fore- closing, in an atmosphere of panic, broader matters of policy that deserve to be approached judiciously. To buy fewer than fifty, merely to save faces and paper over a political quarrel, would be the worst course of all. '
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