DE BAZANCOURT'S CRIMEAN EXPEDITION. * iT is easy to conceive the

desire of the Emperor of the French that the people he rules should possess a fuller account of the toils and enterprise of their army in the war now ended than could be gathered from the formal documents published in the Moniteur. The services of the soldiers, the just amour propre of the nation, required it. The amplitude of the English unofficial accounts could not but contrast remarkably with the barrenness or reserve of the French press, suggesting other thoughts than of the Turkish war. The error of this "chronicle" lies in the choice of the chronicler. Beyond servile devotion to his Imperial employer, and a certain semi-poetical power, which when exercised on fitting subjects and restrained within the bounds of good taste produces a vivid picture, but more fre- quently loses itself in vague flourishes, Baron De Bazancourt's qualifications are not above those of a 'third-rate French litte- rateur with all his vices of vague theatrical claptrap. Neither does a knowledge of his subject make up for his literary defi- ciency: when sent out he knew nothing of war, or even of soldier- ing. Speaking of the kindness with which he was received in the camp, he rather ludicrously says, "That which was still more valuable to me was the opportunity of familiarizing my-, self by daily contact with that military life to me unknown. Neither had he the opportunities of personal observation, supplying so far as it can that trained. experience which in all complicate

d matters, but especially in war, is necessary not only to ju.e but even to see. He did not leave France till the beginning ofJanu- ary 1855; so that the most important events of the campaign—the sufferings of Varna, the transport of the armies, the battles of Alma, Balaklava, and Inkerman—had passed before his arrival. The severest privations of the British Army, too, were over; of those of the French he says little or nothing. In fact, except the daily work of a gigantic siege, the Baron could only have been present at the assaults of the 7th and 18th June and the 8th September ; which he could. not observe better, nor judge of better, than any newspaper-correspondent, possibly not so well as those who had longer experience.

In all that regards the author' the disparaging criticism generally pronounced upon the book has been true enough : it is of no more value than the comments of any other third-rate writer upon military facts. Neither do we attribute any great importance to the personal information given to the Baron De Bazancourt by in- dividual officers. They could only see what was immediately around them, and speak of particular acts of courage and de- votion ; which mostly, by the by, suffer from the Baron's

inflated style; while the anecdotes are so dramatized in charac- ter—so obviously the Baron's improvements upon nature—that the truth becomes doubtful. But the extracts from official documents, and the information based upon them, are of im- portance. It is true they are fragmentary, and are often widely separated. by the chronicler's own narrative ; so that we get at them piecemeal; and if brought together, they would not give an entire picture of the subject even from the French point of view. But they open up some curious glimpses, let the reader behind the scenes, and are full of suggestions, that the success of the war, much as it has been undervalued, was very great, and far beyond the expectations at the outset. St. Arnaud is rapidly impulsive in forming opinions impatient of obstacles and delays, and quick in modifying his Plan to meet difficulties as they arise : and. his letters are not only striking from their opinions but in- teresting from their character, though the writer was too hasty to be always sound in conclusion or just in his censure. St. Arnaud seems to have thrown his soul upon paper; and we see how limited in the first instance were the ideas even of the sanguine man—how the plan grew from saving Constantinople from the victorious Russians passing the Balkan and advan- cing upon the city, to the invasion of the Crimea and the capture of Sebastopol. First the object was the lines to de- fend the capital; then the army proceeded to Varna in order, when the Russians had crossed the Danube and captured Silis- tria, (whose fall was always assumed,) that the Allies might ad- vance, effect a junction with Omar Pasha, and give battle to the Russians in advance of Shumla. When Paskiewitch retreated, then came the question of what next; and it appears to have been the English Government and Lord Raglan that first resolved on the Crimean expedition ; which St. Arnaud only accepted, though afterwards he was more forward than any one. It was this rapid extension of ideas, from the defence of Constantinople conjointly with the Turks in the spring, to the capture of Sebastopol by the Allies in the summer, that was a great cause of the subsequent

* The Crimean Expedition, to the Capture of Sebastopol. Chronicles of the War in the East, from its Commencement to the Signing of the Treaty of Peace. By the Baran De Bazancourt, charged with a Mission to the Crimea by his Excellency the Minister of Public Instruction. Translated from the French, by Robert Howe Gould, M.A. In two volumes. Published by Low and Son.

difficulties ; hopes and. plans springing up faster than soldiers and materials of war. Other acts of the great drama contain informa- tion equally curious, but fall more properly under another head—the alleged depreciatory character of the book towards the English.

Of this we must confess we find but slender traces ; and the idea seems to have originated in imperfect reading, or too hasty a judgment. The failure at the Redan is briefly told, but in terms that do full justice to the gallantry of the troops: the explana- tion is conveyed in the words of General Simpson's despatch. More prominence, or at least more fulness in particulars, is given to the French exploits, especially at Inkerman, than the English reader has been accustomed to: but the work is intended to pre- sent a narrative of the actions of the French army., and of it alone. A passing remark or two is made on the administration of the English army during the winter; but it is the merest milk-and- water compared with the language of the English press and Par-

liament or of our own witnesses. The style in which the com- ments are made is not always the best; but that, we believe, is merely the writer's "way." Sometimes the criticism is conveyed with all a Frenchman's politeness; as in these remarks on Alma.

"The distinctive genius of the French and English nations, and the in- dividual character of each people, were strikingly manifested on this occa- sion. While our soldiers and our artillery dashed forward, borne on by an irresistible impulse,—surmounting all obstacles, and climbing with desperate activity the steepest precipices,—our allies, in admirable line of battle, marched with their usual step, extinguishing the fire of the formidable positions which they had to carry, without slackening or accelerating their march, and facing every difficulty in front, rather than seeking to attack it in flank. An heroic error, which inscribes glorious names upon the page of history, but inscribes them upon the records of the dead."

The most important statements affecting the English relate to delays, and to differences between Lord Raglan and Canrobert, which ended in the resignation of the latter. What degree of truth there may be in the frequent complaints of the English not beino.b ready—whether, if the complaints were true the facts on which they are grounded might be innoxious as to final results, and merely the expression of a nervously impatient temperament —we cannot tell. They began early, even at Varna ; on landing in the Crimea they are of frequent occurrence as long as St. Ar- naud lived. As regards the fact, there seems a dramatic truth about them, bringing out not apathy but a sort of calm in- souciance on the parr of the British commander, who would not allow himself to be ruffled or excited, even on occasions where earnestness, if it effected nothing, -would have looked well. Nearly half a dozen complaints in little more than as many days seem to have been entered by St. Arnaud in his journal or written in letters.

"On the 17th, the English are not ready to begin the march ; an enormous quantity of impedimenta retard their operations indefinitely. The departure is therefore postponed, perforce, until the following ' day. The i two armies are to put themselves n motion at eleven o'clock the next morn- ing. • • "On the 18th, fresh delay caused by the English. Come what may, the Marshal is resolved to march on the following day. * * •

"Letter from the Marshal.—The Crimea September 18, 1854. "'I have just written to Lord Raglan that f could wait no longer ; and that I have given my orders for departure, for tomorrow morning, at seven o'clock. Nothing shall delay me longer.'"

The delay after the victory has often been commented on and explained. Here is Bazancourt's text, with some extracts from St. Arnaud.

"On the morrow our allies were not ready, and compelled us to remain upon the field of battle. We placed at their disposition mules and caeolets for the transport of their wounded. "The English, intrepid and indefatigable in action, appear not to under- stand the vast importance of a day, or an hour of delay, in a warlike opera- tion. They either know not how to hurry themselves, or will not do it. I have lost fewer men than they,' writes the Marshal, because I have been more rapid. My soldiers run ; theirs march.'

"Letter from the Marshal to his Brotlger.-22d September.

" ' The English are not yet ready; and I am detained here, as at Balt- chick, and as at Old-Fort. It is true, however, that they have more wounded than I, and that they are further from the sea.'

Journal of the Marshal.

"'What tardiness in our movements ! War cannot be well made in this way.' "

And again, on the flank march.

"The order of departure had been given for six o'clock in the morning ; but it was necessary to wait till the English (taking with them an immense quantity of baggage, and arabas loaded beyond measure and drawn by oxen or buffaloes) had ceased to defile. Our army, therefore, could not move until twelve o'clock."

Part of this delay no doubt originated in difference of national character, each peculiarity having its advantages according to the circumstances of the case. Nor does it follow that be cause the English were late in moving less ground was passed over in the course of the day. The fact in this story of a delay of four hours at Alma was (if true) attended with graver consequences. It removed the element of surprise from the plan of the battle, and probably caused considerable loss of life. To some extent it will be seen that there is an English witness, Sir Be Lacy Evans, who should be called into court.

"At half-past five, the Second Division quitted its bivouac, and began its march, at about one kilometre from the coast, and parallel with it, advancing towards the heights of the Alma. At half-past six, it was already to be seen forming in the .plain ; but still no movement whatever was made on the side of the English army. General Canrobert, astonished at this immobility of the English troops, so contrary to the in- structions communicated the evening before, hastened to Prince Napoleon, and both proceeded rapidly towards the Division of Sir Le Lacy Evans.

"They found the English General in his tent. When Prince Napoleon and General Canrobert explained to him their astonishment at a delay which might gravely compromise the success of the day. " ' I have received no orders,' replied Sir De Lacy Evans. • is • • * "General Canrobert proceeded without losing an instant to the Marshal. The latter was already on horseback, and had quitted his bivouac, placed behind the lines. Directly he was informed of what was passing, he sent an officer of the Staff, Commandlint Reason, to tell General Bosquet to halt, and to wait for the English troops, who were retarded.

"During this time, Colonel Trochu started, at the utmost speed of his horse, for the English head-quarters. It was then seven o'clock. But go rapidly as he inig,ht,—the Colonel having nearly two leagues to traverse, over uneven ground, occupied by the bivouacs of the troops,—his ride occupied half an hour. The English troops, through whose lines the Aide-de-camp of the Marshal passed, were still in their tents, and in no respect prepared for the march agreed upon.

"Lord Raglan, however, was on horseback when Colonel Trochu reached the head-quarters.

" ' My Lord,' said the latter, 'the Marshal thought, after what you did me the honour of saying, last night, that your troops, forming the left wing of the line of battle, were to have marched forward at six o'clock.'

"lam I am now giving my orders,' replied Lord Raglan. ' We are preparing and are about to march : a part of my troops did not reach the camp until very late in the night.' " 'For Heaven's sake, my Lord,' added the Colonel, 'be speedy ; every minute of delay takes from us a chance of success.' " ' Go and say to the Marshal,' answered Lord Raglan, 'that at this mo- ment orders are despatched along the whole line.' "It was half-past ten when Colonel Trochu announced that the English were ready to march."

In December and in January, according to Caturobert, the French were ready to resume their fire against Sebastopol, but had to suspend it owing to the English batteries not being ready. This, however, arose from the sickness of the troops, the consequent want of hands, and the deficiency of transport. A similar complaint of tardiness was made in the following March. The account of the alleged difference between Lord Raglan and General Canrobert has been the subject of much remark directed against M. Be Bazancourt. It seems to us that the persons most entitled to complain are Canrobert, and the Emperor himself, if he cares about such matters. The Imperial determination to go to the Crimea and command in person, assisted by the negotiations

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at Vienna, mischievously checked operations in the s ring of 1855. The Emperor's scheme also delayed the first ex 'tion to Kertch, and was the cause of its recall. To exhibit these topics in a satisfactory manner, as well as General Canrobert's offer to serve under Lord Raglan, his resignation of the chief command, and his final removal from the Crimea, much against his own consent, and evidently the victim of something or somebody, would require more space than we can spare.

The official character of the work has been denied, and the denial is no doubt true so far as not involving official responsi- bility or directly expressing official opinion. It is, however, under official patronage. The author was selected by the Minister of Public Instruction to write the book; he was accredited to the Commander-in-chief by the Minister of War; and he had access to documents which only official authority could have procured. A hostile feeling towards England we believe to be out of the question; though it might have been better to have chosen a man of greater discretion and delicacy, and more competent to the task. The public use of the most delicate documents by a most indiscreet person removes all delicacy from us. There is nothing now to prevent the publication of secret or private letters which would give the English version of doubtful points. It is de- sirable to know whether the facts of habitual delay, so continu- ally charged upon us not by M. Be Bazancourt, but by St. Arnaud and Canrobert, are really true ; and if so, whether the inference of neglect which they contain is true also, or admits of explanation, as we believe it does.