THE WAR SURVEYED: THE ENEMY PLAN
By STRATEGICUS
IF Hitler is to retain the time table to which he has so far adhered it may be that before these words are read the invasion will be upon us. It has been reported that prepara- tions are being made for the celebration of the peace in Berlin on August t5th, and that does not leave too much time. But apparently Hitler has grown confident ; and, judging from a Rumanian communique, there is already "a new European order." Has Germany forgotten that in 1918 a "new European order" embraced a huge stretch of the continent up to the Bosphorus on the south, up to the Black Sea and Pripet Marshes on the east, and included the Baltic provinces on the north and Belgium and France to the Marne in the south-west?
A few words from Marshal Foch and the bulk of that new order all that was left of it after the battles of the last three months— withered. We shall do well to take the immediate foreground seriously, but regard the distant vista through the eyes of com- paratively recent experience. When we have dealt with the former the latter will attend to itself.
It is all to the good that the enemy is viewing his prospects so confidently; and there is little we can do now, presumably, that will be of immediate help when the battle is joined. We must hope that the tangle of rival jurisdictions in the fighting area and its hinterland has been cleared up. That is probably the most important condition for a rapid and clear-cut decision. It is something of an impertinence to suggest the tactics the soldiers should employ. They either know them already or they will never observe them. To speak of "defensive in depth" may be well in its way ; but it has a bad sound. If the enemy invades us we shall and must do our best to fling him into the sea as quickly as possible. When we begin seriously to consider alternative lines, and to think we could stand better on some back line, chosen hurriedly, than upon the line we selected deliberately, we begin to weaken our power of stand- ing on any line.
Clearly every attempt will be made to secure surprise. There may be numerous feints, clever enough to deserve to distract attention from the main blow ; smoke-screens will be used and every advantage taken of *mist. The problem set the navy is not easy but at least we have to admit that it is not so difficult as that which the enemy has to solve. The transports will be covered by the strongest force of bombers and fighters we have yet seen, and all the operations of embarking and dis- embarking have been practised thoroughly. But the main attack will be upon our fears. All the technical devices devoted to thc operation will be designed to have, a double effect: their own direct, military effect, and the blow at our morale. The former will matter little if we keep our nerve. The low-flying plane, the parachutist, the troops landed from aeroplanes—per- haps in greater numbers than we have yet heard of—can all be dealt with by means ready to hand if we obstinately refuse to allow ourselves to be bustled.
Never before has it been possible to attack human self- possession from so many directions at once. The mere noise deliberately induced is a trial ; but, beyond this, there is all the novel use of the aeroplane to produce the maximum pressure on our fears. Much of this will be directed against the civilian, too, so that his fears may react upon the stead- fastness of father' husband or son at the front. We have to realise that these things may cause us to suffer. They are de- signed to prey upon us. If they could break us, we should fail with the weapons in our hands that might have saved us. I have written in this vein more than once and if I do so again it is because the air has been filled with so many clever pre- scriptions that include everything but the one thing essential. It is in the sphere of morale that the decisive strain will come ; and we must simply steel ourselves against deliberately con- trived shocks. If we do, we shall certainly win.
There is one other reason why I write in this way now. We have so far heard very little of Italy; and many people are inclined to think we shall never hear very much. This may be an unpleasantly mistaken notion. When he was addressing the troops on the eve of the declaration of war, Signor Ansaldo spoke of "the second phase in the German plan, an attack on England " •' and he went on to state that "it is during this second phase that you will see Italy at her peak. It is then she will be fighting her strongest and best, so that Germany .and Italy together will liberate Europe and free the world from the tyranny of the British." The suggestion contained in Ansaldo's words is sufficiently clear ; and moreover it would be simple common sense as well as characteristic German tactics to. create a diversion to cover what is conceived to be the most difficult operation in the campaign. It must have been noticed that Marshal de Bono was, on June 7th, created commander of the group of armies of the south; and Ansel& remarked, a propos of this appointment, "the men included in these forces and the men waiting in the ports to embark are part of those who will strike at one of the nerve-centres of the Mediterranean." - When we begin to inquire which of the " nerve-centres " is to be the object' of attack; we find ourselves confronted with a choice of places ; but with one in particular. Within recent months Italian eyes have been described as resting longingly on a number of places in or off the Mediterranean—Tunis, Cor- sica, Jibuti, Biserta and the Suez Canal. Now, all of these places may be said to be within reach since the Franco-Italian armistice, all but one—the Suez Canal. Recently, Signor Mussolini has been talking about encirclement • and this is another pointer to the Suez Canal. Gayda, the other day, went so far as to connect dealing with the British Fleet and with the Canal. In fact, it is clear that the two objectives are vitally connected. Any attack on the Suez Canal must involve dealing with our Navy first ; and it is known that the Italians have an unconcealed pride in their Navy and Air Force.
At first sight there appear to be too many variables in this proposition for us to say anything useful about it. The "new European order" is a little too new for anyone to know how far its writ runs. What, for instance, is to be the attitude of Syria and Lebanon, now that the local commander has appar- ently laid aside his arms after his first defiance? It miiht be a considerable nuisance to have an enemy force operating there. As to this we may be reassured, since such a force could only arrive there after crossing the Mediterranean. But even the possibility of raids in that quarter of the world is disturbing, if there is any danger of a serious threat to Egypt ; and it must be borne in mind that the Italians have been announcing, day by day, the development of their operations in Cyrenaica—on the west of the Egyptian frontier.
The real hope of the Germans is by synchronising attacks to compel us to split the naval forces upon which we rely so much to defeat the attempted invasion. It is possible they think that in this way they may be able to attack with real chance of success. They imagine we shall be like the monkey and the bottle, and in trying to save all lose that upon which all depends. It is impossible to say what proportion of the French navy is still fighting with us. If there is any consider- able proportion we shall have ample force to cope with the sea threat in both areas. The Scharnhorst ' has been in trouble again. At Kid the bombers unkindly made the damage worse. The Italian Navy has lost about 10 per cent. of the submarines upon which it relied to cause our superior force injury. The Italian Air Force has not as yet been tried out ; but in the first tentative exchanges it has not fared well. It is a perilous thing to attempt to transfer a large army across the seas which are kept by a superior fleet. The problem is difficult enough to engross the minds of the Germans; but they at least have a genius for organisation and even the Fascist regime which has done so much for Italy, has not changed the nature of the people.
At the moment it is impossible to do more than expound the nature of the problem. We have to be prepared for the double challenge on our own shores and in the Mediterranean at any moment now. They may not be actually launched together; but, if they are not, one will be designed to take us when we have become thoroughly embroiled- with the other. It is for this we must be on our guard. We have said that We mean to defend our vital interests in Syria ; and it goes without saying that the Suez Canal will prove much more inhospitable to Signor Mussolini in war than ever it was in peace. We have a body of resolute commanders ; and the troops are not only eager, but of such fine quality that they have won golden opinions everywhere. When everything appeared to be dis- solving in France they stood like a rock. They have only to continue as they have begun, and all will be well.
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