RECONSTRUCTION OF THE MILITARY ADMINISTRATION.
THE objections to the resolution carried by Captain Vivian in the House of Commons, for consolidating the whole military authority under a responsible Minister of the Crown, are administrative and political, the answer to those objections is political and constitu- tional. Captain Vivian's resolution recognizes the improvement arising from the union of the Ordnance, Commissariat, and War Office under the present Department of War, and argues that greater efficiency would be obtained if the Horse Guards and War Department were placed under the control of one man. There is at present double government, with divided responsibility, and divided function. It is uncertain under what particular office some of the duties are to be performed. Though General Peel is no doubt correct in saying that the broad distinctions between the Horse Guards and the War Department are easy to be observed, the distinction is not so clear in detail, and it is entirely lost when we come to the question of responsibility. Who is answerable for a bad distribution of promotion or appoint- ments ? The Commander-in-chief; but the Commander-in- chief is answerable only to the Crown, not to Parliament. Lord Palmerston replies that the whole Ministry is responsible to Parliament; but the reply suggests a serious inconvenience in the enforcement of the responsibility. Lately, when an absurd despatch was launched at the Governor-General of India, the re- sponsibility was avowed by Lord Ellenborough, admitted to be his by his colleagues, and enforced by the acceptance of his re- tirement. There is, therefore, an individual as well as collective responsibility in the members of the Cabinet. According to Lord Palnierston's construction, however, the only method of getting at the Commander-in-chief is by calling the entire Cabinet to ac- count; and for an indiscretion on his part the whole Government would have to resign, to be replaced by another Cabinet. For a military fault abroad, a Cabinet suited to the political views and immediate objects of the country at home would have to retire. To say the least of it this would be an exceedingly inconvenient mode of carrying out the doctrine of Ministerial responsibility against a Commander-in-chief; but in fact the principal func- tionary at the Horse Guards is considered to be less responsible to the Ministers, than to the Crown, which " can do no wrong " ; and it is only by attacking the Crown through the Ministers that we can exercise any kind of control over the Horse Guards.
The two principal administrative and political replies are both derived from the partial and empirical argument ab inconvenienti. Captain Vivian's idea of consolidated authority is theoretically Tad, say the champions of the Horse Guards, because it is noto- rious that in all affairs divided authority is weak, distracted, and liable to produce conflicting results ; but in practice, they tell ns, so sweet is the temper of the present Commander-in-chief, so ju- dicious are his principal subordinates, so charming is the relation between the Horse Guards and the War Department, that all in- convenience is neutralized ; while the intricacies of the arrange- ment a so very considerable, that any alteration would intro- duce more confusion, more obstruction, delay, hindrance, en-
tanglement, calamity, and disaster, than any perseverance with the present system. This is only to confess that the existing ad- ministrators are incapable of carrying out Captain Vivian's reso- lution ; a declaration which we are bound to admit on their au- thority. The political argument is more imposing. Give to the Secre- tary-at-War, it is said, the patronage exercised by the Com- mander-in-chief, and he will be unable to resist the temptations of favouritism ; corruptions will be introduced in the exercise of his functions, politics will creep into the Army, and Heaven knows what visions of peculation and high treason are conjured up ! But there is no reason why a military Minister should be more corrupt than an ecclesiastical Minister, a legal, or civil ser- vice Minister ; and there is no reason to suppose that a gentle- man holding a military commission is more impervious to in- sidious influences than one holding a civil commission. We believe that a Secretary-at-War is quite as virtuous as a Com- mander-in-chief.
But there are solid reasons against the complete union of the two functions. If the Commander-in-chief were present in Par- liament, and responsible to the representative chamber, it would be impossible for him to keep the Army so separate as it is from the great body of the nation or to retain it as a preserve of patron- age for the well-born and wealthy classes. Placed under a Min- ister politically responsible to Parliament, the purchase system must fall within a couple of years. Now your true military con- servative, or your departmental conservative, can as little imagine the abandonment of the purchase system, as he can the removal of the sentinel on each side of the Horse Guards gate ; and thus the objections to Captain Vivian's motion appear to him to be un- answerable.
But the motion has been carried. The majority is not great, but it is quite large enough to include the most active Liberals in the House of Commons against the united Tories and Depart- mentalists. In the majority, we find united with Captain Vivian, Mr. John Bright, Mr. Horsman, Mr. Roebuck, Mr. Thornely, Sir John Trelawny, Mr. Milner Gibson, and Lord John Russell ; in fact a complete representation of the several sections of the Liberal party, as distinct from pure official con- nexion. We may infer therefore, although the division was not large, that the House of Commons intends to carry out the measure indicated by the motion, and if so, we can only say that the House will be supported by the country. It is one of those measures, not likely to originate with the public, which would yet be accepted by the public as a satisfactory test of sterling Liberal opinions.
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