TOPICS OF THE DAY.
THE FORGOTTEN ELEMENT IN THE IRISH PROBLEM.
WHEN the Home-rulers say so positively and so frequently that there is no alternative at all between Home-rule and what they are pleased to call Coercion, they seem to forget one most important element in the matter,—and, curiously enough, the very same element in relation to Great Britain, on which they lay so enormous a stress in relation to Ireland. They forget the effect of a clear and positive declaration of the popular will. Mr. Gladstone has proposed Home-rule for Ireland without consulting the people of Great Britain at all. It is perfectly true that the people of Ireland were consulted by Mr. Parnell on that very subject, and that they gave no uncer- tain reply, though it be true, as we think it is, that one-third at least of the Irish people are averse to Home-rule in Mr. Gladstone's sense. But no one even pretends that the people of Great Britain have been consulted on the question, or even awakened to its full meaning. They are only slowly awakening to it now. And it seems to us perfectly obvious that if it should prove that their will is definitely opposed to the will of the people of Ireland, the declaration of that will would, sooner or later, have a very great effect even on the people of Ireland, a very great effect and a very different kind of effect from anything which could be expected from the mere unanimity of a Government against them. The Irish people are not so irrational as to underrate the difference between the declaration of a people and the declaration of a Govern- ment. Governments may be intimidated, but a people cannot be intimidated. Let the people of Great Britain once say clearly and strongly that they do not approve of that loose organisation of the United Kingdom which is implied in the phrase Home-rule ; that they would even rather let Ireland cut herself loose from the Kingdom and from the Empire at once, and take herself off into Republican independence, than let her disorganise the United Kingdom by bringing back the days of the Heptarchy, or something worse than the Heptarchy ; that they would rather let the Irish take the full responsibility of their own future, than consent to share it in the hybrid manner which is implied in letting her fashion her own laws as to the boycotting of all who like to be masters of their own actions, and the breaking of contracts which do not please the multitude while we nevertheless undertake to protect her against the rest of the world,—let the British people only say this out with perfect clearness, and we shall be very much mistaken indeed, if that declaration does not make as much impression on the Irish people and the Irish leaders, as the Irish vote of 1885 made on the British people and the British leaders. Of late years, Ireland has been too much petted into the belief of the spoiled child that if she only cries for the moon she may get the moon. Naturally enough, so long as Ireland believes that she can convert the people of England to her own view of the case, she is irreconcileable. But the very thing to be tested is whether she would remain irreconcileable supposing she once saw that the issue is one between a complete severance from Great Britain and a hearty union. It may be,—we do not say it is so,—but it may be true enough, as many assert, that the British democracy will never again sanction the conquest of Ireland for the purpose of renewing the old vicious circle of coercion and rebellion. That we quite admit to be possible enough. But even if it be so, it is probable that the British people will give Ireland a plain choice between hearty union,— a hearty recognition of the supremacy of the central Parlia- ment,—and separation, a separation so complete that the Irish could no longer rely on either protection from the sister-island, or even a free market there for the sale of Irish produce. Were this once plainly put to Ireland by a decisive electoral rejection of this half-and-half plan for letting Ireland do all that Great Britain most disapproves without forfeiting the advantages of the union with Great Britain, we can hardly believe that the effect on the Irish irreconcileables would not be even magical. Why should the Irish declaration of a desire for a sort of union with Great Britain, which is to many of our best statesmen at once unacceptable and impracticable, be supposed to have so much significance, if a declaration in the opposite sense by the people of Great Britain is to have no significance at all ? For our own parts, we do not give the Irish credit for being so dull as to learn nothing from a really im- pressive assertion by the people of Great Britain that their will is not the will of the people of Ireland, that they find the sug- gestion made simply intolerable, and that they would much
rather, if the worst came to the worst, leave the Irish to themselves, than go into this dangerous and irritating kind of partnership with them, in which each partner would in- evitably think,—and think with some justice,—that the kind of union left was worse than no union at all. We say that the Irish people are not credited with the intelligence which they really possess when it is assumed that they would not be influenced, and greatly influenced, by a decisive popular de- claration that the scheme of Home-rule proposed is absolutely unwelcome to the people of this island, and will never be accepted by them. The Irish have not been wont, it is true, to accept a non possuntus from the British Government. But a non volumes from the British people is quite another affair. They will bethink themselves when they hear that, of the necessity of making up their minds seriously whether they would prefer total separation to a sort of union which the British democracy reject. It is possible enough that they might tease and badger that democracy into letting them go rather than reconquering them. But it is hardly possible that they could tease and badger the British democracy into adopting a half-and-half union which they think decidedly worse than no union at all.
It seems to us that this is precisely the forgotten question in the whole controversy,—what would be the effect produced on the people of Ireland by the flat refusal of the people of Great Britain to listen to the counsels even of their great and favourite leader, Mr. Gladstone ? Of course, the reply of the British people may be favourable to Mr. Gladstone's counsels. If so, the question is at an end, and this hybrid union will be at least tried. But if the British people, in spite of that enthusiasm and veneration for Mr. Gladstone in which we ourselves have so heartily shared, say, as we do, that here it is impossible to follow him,—that he is leading us into a retrogressive policy, which will end, sooner or later, either in repentance and a return upon our steps, or in the paralysis of the Kingdom and the dissolution of the Empire,—what will be the effect of that decision on the Irish people V We say that it will probably be this,—that they will come to their right mind ; that they will begin to count the cost, which they never counted so long as they believed that they could worry and tease us into doing precisely what they wished. They would ask themselves whether, after all, it would be well for them to set up for themselves, even if they could get leave to do so ; whether they would be wise in forfeiting the right of access to the only market they have hitherto had ; whether they would be wise in taking upon their poverty full responsibility for all the cares of government and self-defence ; whether, after all, they have not much more to gain by the Union, than to lose by it. Of course, no one knows what the result of a dissolution will be. But we do assert that the British people have, for very different reasons, at least as great an interest in weighing carefully this proposal of Mr. Gladstone's as the Irish people themselves, and that if they reject positively and decisively the counsels of their loved and trusted leader, the result may operate like a shower-bath on a drowsy man, and wake up the Irish people to a full sense of the critical character of their position, and the necessity of at once either sending " an em- bassage to require conditions of peace," or, on the other hand, determining to agitate for absolute and complete separation.
Previous page
