Guaranteeing Korea ?
While British troops were firing red, white and blue smoke shells in Korea, President Syngman Rhee, it seems, was exploding some diplomatic ammunition on the White House in Washington. The slightly more hopeful atmosphere that has surrounded the Communist reception of the latest United Nations proposals, and the chilly reception given by official circles in Washington to South Korean protests, appear to have inspired a new approach from Mr. Rhee. He is reported to have asked President Eisenhower, in exchange for South Korea's participation in a truce, for a military and economic guarantee. If South Korea is again attacked, the United States must, apparently, declare war on her attackers; in the mean- time, American dollars are to rehabilitate the country. There is so far neither confirmation of Mr. Rhee's demands nor news of Washington's reactions. Nor is anyone prepared to gamble on what they may be. From a Democratic Administration, Mr. Rhee would almost certainly have received a sour reply. Under the Truman policy of containment, Korea was not initially regarded as a " situation of strength " and would probably not have qualified for a guarantee. Furthermore. Mr. Truman fought shy of the whole principle involved in guarantees—he gave one to Australia with the greatest re- luctance. Since then, the temper in Washington has changed. In a country where the leader of the responsible party has virtually dismissed the United Nations, the President may be under heavy pressure to extend an American guarantee to South Korea. But before the United States, as opposed to the United Nations, becomes inevitably involved in South Korea's wars, President Eisenhower should be quite clear that South Korea is both strategically essential and strategically defensible In the last resort.
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