Peace by Land and Sea
Peace in Our Time. By Sir Austen Chamberlain. (Philip
- 12e. 6d.)
National Policy and Naval Strength. By Vice-Admiral Sir W. H. Richmond. (Longmans. 16s.) The Mastery of the Pacific. By Sir Frank Fox. (The Bodley Head. 8s. 6d.)
IN a modest preface, Sir Austen Chamberlain says that he blushes to find his speeches served up as literature ; they were intended to be nothing more than speeches, and between the covers of a book they necessarily lack what aid they received from the personality of the speaker. But Sir Austen need not be alarmed ; we might say, without wishing to be in the least disparaging, that the subtraction of personality does not injure his speeches when they are put into printed form. He has not that oratorical talent which enabled his father by means of the hushed dramatic whisper to turn an ordinary statement into something of thrilling significance. What he does here is to impress Ili with his sincerity and his clearness of head, and these things are enough.
Most of the speeches deal with the League, Locarno, and the Protocol. We are glad to see here that speech of remark- able candour in which Sir Austen declared decisively against the Protocol and praised the safe British method of making details secure before putting all one's money on an ambition. He bravely risked much when he made the speech, but he was rewarded, for he cleared the air and the work of the League was afterwards simplified.
Vice-Admiral Sir Herbert Richmond is among the most thoughtful and well-read of our Naval officers. He has long since framed certain general principles on the effect and uses of sea power, And he applies them as consistently as did that brilliant American, Admiral Mahan. A Ministry of Defence, which will co-ordinate the ideas of seamen and of soldiers and airmen, is an ideal that will take many years to reach, but in the meantime it is to men like Sir Herbert Richmond that we owe concentration of thought at the centre. When the Great War came the Admiralty was without a War Staff, properly so called ; the War Office had a General Staff, eight years old, but dissipated it. To-day the growing importance of the Air Force makes co-ordination more necessary than ever. Last year an Imperial Defence College was established with Sir Herbert Richmond as its Chief. Most of the chapters in his new book were delivered as addresies. A specially interesting one discusses the changes introduced into the organization of the Admiralty by Sir James Graham. Sir Herbert sums up strongly against those "reforms " on the ground that they failed to produce either efficiency or economy.
Sir Frank Fox has no doubt that the problem of the Pacific holds grave dangers. He is afraid that Britain and America may go on prophesying smooth things until they suddenly find themselves at the breaking-point, because both have shrunk from seeming to be so uncivil to each other as to face the facts. He is himself quite candid ; he blames America as much as he blames his own country. He thinks that
America, In the grip of biological law, is bound to be an Imperialistic nation. But she has a considerable, power of self-deception and never traces effects in her foreign policy to their real causes. He regards China as the crux. He
suggests that Britain and America, not forgetting Japan, should discuss frankly together all the various problems " on the margin of the Pacific Ocean with the motive of serving not their own particular interests but the interests of the world at large." That is to say, America has only to describe her manifest destiny in new words in order to see that it is good and humane.
Mr. J. M. Kenworthy and Mr. George Young have colla- borated in a valuable book. However much we may disagree with incidental arguments, it is sound and most helpful on
the main point that an understanding with the United States about the-law of the sea is indispensable. This main argument does not always corm out so clearly as it might because it is overlaid with a good deal of historical infOrmation that is scarcely relevant. Perhaps -that had to be in such a cOilif-' boration ; the-- searnari-vantstO haVe his Airy from the naval'
point of view, and the diplomat will not omit what he has learned in the Chanceries. They believe that events have gradually made a blockade of the old-fashioned kind impos- sible. Blockades defeated Napoleon and the last German Emperor, but the price of the blockade against Napoleon was a war with America, and the blockade against the Kaiser was largely conditioned by the interests and wishes of America till America herself came into the War and made the blockade complete. A future blockade, except with American help or sanction, will be impossible.
That is a much more promising approach to a settlement of naval rivalry than is provided by proposals for merely abandoning the rights of search and capture in the misleading name of " Freedom of the Seas." If the truth were known it would probably be found that the American Government themselves do not want to abandon these rights. They may have need of them within the four corners of the Monroe Doctrine. Britain might well strike a bargain which would prevent America from complaining in future that she carried on her trade only by permission of the British Fleet. If there should ever be war again on the large scale there would really be no such thing as neutrality. The so-called Neutral who insisted on trading in all circumstances would be, - in practice, a nation willing to give " aid and comfort " to an aggressor, and to prolong a war to the injury of the whole world. With an agreement between Britain and America to neutralize the narrow seas and to respect each other's blockades the Navies could be cut down to a mere police force. Such blockades as were necessary would be conducted with the assent of the civilized world.
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