4 MAY 1944, Page 5

THE ROLE OF SURPRISE

By STRATEGICUS

HE in- expensive and successful establishment of the Second

In the establishment of the Second Front, however, it is quite inconceivable how, under the existing conditions, such superiority can be achieved otherwise ; and upon that condition the successful creation of a bridgehead almost entirely depends. But, while this is clear, it does not at all follow that surprise alone, an unexpected blow, will achieve the desired success. -This can no longer be doubted after the experience of Anzio. Surprise was achieved. The unexpected was made actual. But, when its nature and de- velopment stood revealed, how Kesselring must have rejoiced! Magnificent as it left the Staff, the plan foundered in execution ; and what was arranged as a dynamic initiative lapsed into a purely static bridgehead. It fulfils a role, of course ; but the role it was designed to play never left the script. Surprise, in fine, is a means to an end ; and in so far as it falls short of fulfilling its purpose it is of little value. In the establishment of the Second Front it is the dynamic effect that forms the essence of the objective. The Allies are at present immobilising a considerable number of divisions ; and their objective in the Second Front must be to engage and destroy them. Otherwise they will be doing no more than they do at present.

Surprise may be achieved by striking at an unexpected place. This, presumably, is the explanation of the invasion of Manipur by the Japanese. In the case of the Second Front it can be recognised that although surprise of this sort seems to be out of the question it remains possible. The enemy is nervous about almost the whole of his long coastline. He has been speculating about dangers in Norway ; he has a historical nervousness about Jutland ; and, from thence south almost up to the Bosphorus, he has been indulging in kite-flying that suggests no very easy mind about many areas which, for one reason or another, do not seem peculiarly practicable. It can be recognised that the tendency to narrow down expectation to a restricted area across the Channel depends largely upon coirlusions formed about the scope of various machines which the Allies are thought to regard as an inevitable accompaniment of a landing. Some of these do not seem as valid on examination as they may superficially. The fighter planes, for instance, have been shown to Possess a greater radius of useful action than was formerly thought ; and, since the first bridgeheads may not necessarily be the main ones, there is a considerable elasticity about the area threatened.

Choice of the time may also furnish the means by which surprise can be achieved. Some of the Continental critics have produced a time-table for the Allied landings founded on tides, moonlight and other conditions. It can hardly be doubted that there is an optimum time for the launching of such an expedition ; and it will depend Upon the choice of place. It is certain that the time-factor must play a great part in determining the success of the landings. The mere fact that we have come to the month of May is significant ; for the best campaigning season in Western Europe only begins about this time, and it tends to be a little later in the _east. But hoe/ the time-factor may influence the development of the operationi may be gathered from the success of the winter offensive. Russia's ability. to launch and sustain a great offensive during the winter achieved surprise of a nature that is rare in warfare, and it played no small Part in securing the very great success. In Manipur it is, again,

a cardinal factor that will probably determine the situation. Th: monsoons are about to begin, and, unless the Japanese have by that time installed themselves in Kohima and Imphal at least, they will have shot their bolt and be destroyed.

There is another sort of surprise which comes from the force used. This may consist of a wholly unexpected magnitude. As we have seen, it is as a means to achieving superiority at the selected point that surprise is valuable. The Russian offensive, which has with but small intermission been continuing since the counter-attack at Stalingrad, owes much of its success to the immense superiority of the force deployed in the field. But intimately connected with this is the nature of the force. Indeed, the amount of the force in the final arialysis is a matter of its quality. In the German attack on Crete it was the nature of the force employed that made it formidable ; and this conclusion is not weakened by the knowledge that at the last stage the Germans had suffered such loss that they were about to abandon the attack.

It is clear that the force as well as the time must be determined by the place selected for attack. It may even be true that if the novel means by which the great fort of Eben Emael was reduced had been delayed for some time, it would not have achieved its devastating success. Surprise which may be founded upon so many factors is, therefore, not restricted to any one of them. It may be a complex of a number of them ; and, as these have been suggested only in general, the selected prescription may be compounded of a very great variety of them. It is for the command to balance the advantages of striking at the nearest place, in spite of its being probably the most alert and highly fortified, against those attached to a more distant blow where the conditions to be encountered in the landing may be more favourable. Greater risks may be countered by the probability of securing a greater surprise, and by the pre- paration of a more powerful force considered in relation to the obstacle and the defence expected. For any given place of attack there exist risks and advantages peculiar to it and every sort of composite of force. It need not be thought that the Allies have yet disclosed every element of their force. They will use expedients not known beyond a small select circle. Even in factors already employed the difference in the amounts used for the establishment of the Second Front may be so great as to constitute a difference in kind.

The point of these considerations is that the element of surprise is not so difficult of attainment as may be thought ; the area on which the landings may be made is not so clearly marked out ; the place, time and nature of the force launched are much more open questions than we tend to think. It has already been demonstrated that the mobility of the defending force may be so gravely interfered with that it is, in effect, reduced to only a fraction of its actual size. The air offensive, even as at present developed, had shown that railway communications may be put out of action for a critical period. But there are other means of using air-power that can cut the communications for a longer period. The enemy is not blind to these elements of the uncertain in the situation that confronts him. He strives as best he may with limited forces to hamstring in advance the resumption of the Russian offensive by striking at Zhukov's left flank that covers the area separating the Manstein from the Kleist group. If he could secure a significant success there he would check both the Galician and the Rumanian campaign.

But the fact that he is using only small forces witnesses not only to his weakness but also to his complete ignorance of where the critical strain of the joint offensive will occur. The great adventure on which the Allies will shortly embark is coloured by these con- ditions. It is fraught with great perils, but it is alight with greater opportunities. It is easy, in examining the preparations for the defence of the approach to "Fortress Europe," to be obsessed by their completeness ; but, when full allowance is made for them, it remains evident that the chance of surprise is greater than is commonly thought.