A WARNING. A ntR the recent debates in Parliament about the

relations of the Government and the Press, Parliament believed, and the nation hoped, that there would be an end to the series of coincidences. Every one knows what those coincidences were, and every one felt that there had been far too many of them. A certain number of papers, which may be generally described as the Northcliffe Press, agitated violently in favour of particular policies, or against particular persons, and shortly afterwards it was discovered that the adoption of those policies, or the removal of those persons, was the will of the Government. The process came to a head in the singularly scandalous attacks upon Sir William Robertson, who was subsequently removed from his high post, at which, however—it is not too much to say—he had saved the Empire before his fall by his splendid tenacity. Parliament and the nation both thought that things would go much better after the debates, because the lesson seemed much too serious for the Prime Minister to disregard it. Mr. Lloyd George's denial that he had ever in any sense inspired the Press campaigns was unreservedly accepted. Of course it was impossible to dispose of the alternative supposition that in many respects the Northcliffe Press was master of the Government. Either one thing or the other must be true. Now the way of safety and honour for the Government is to avoid in future all causes of suspicion, and even the appearance of evil. The recent debates made it plain enough that Mr. Chamberlain and Mr. Asquith, even while they expressed the distrust and anxiety of the nation, had no idea of trying to displace Mr. Lloyd George. They wanted only to warn him, and to encourage him in better methods. Since Mr. Lloyd George handles the reins of government with consent, all we desire is that he should drive as skilfully as possible. Any more coincidences would do untold harm to the authority of the War Cabinet at a time when the preservation of its prestige is of the utmost importance. For our part, we can sincerely say that we are so conscious of the reality of this source of weakness to the Government that we hope that they will scrupulously remove every conceivable cause of misunderstanding.

All who share our feelings about the relations of the Government and the Press will agree that in all vital matters of policy the Government would do well themselves to make announcements to the nation, through one of the several channels which are used for communicating with the nation even when Parliament is not sitting, instead of waiting on the initiative of the Press. In the announcements of the appointment of General Pooh as co-ordinator of Allied strategy on the Western Front this precaution was unfortunately disregarded. This very significant appointment was heralded and discussed in the Press days before the Government confirmed the rumours. And yet the appointment of General Pooh as co-ordinator, or Generalissimo—the title of " Generalissimo" is officially deprecated, though in effect General Foch holds that position—is the culminating event which was aimed at by the chief agitation of the Northcliffe Press. It was said by those who condemned that agitation that the real purpose in creating the Versailles Council was to get rid of Sir William Robertson and Sir Douglas Haig and to appoint a French Generalissimo. Let it be said at once that no one who has followed the exceptionally brilliant career of General Foch can have anything but high hopes for the strategy that comes from his brain. We know no single officer whom we could more implicitly trust. Moreover, for the purpose of the present battle, which is of a compact nature, the dominance of a single brain is of considerable advantage. Objections to the principle of a Generalissimo rest on other grounds, and extend far beyond the present. It should be remembered that nothing is more dangerous to an Alliance than friction between members of that Alliance, and that the single authority of a Generalissimo involves many opportunities for such friction. Suppose, for instance, that we suffered from some calamity, and that the British people felt themselves powerless to demand an inquiry, or even to express their thoughts as freely as they would have done if one of their own countrymen had been in supreme command. The inevitable questions which would be asked would be : "But, after ell, are our troops in a real sense under this French General ? Is he ultimately the man responsible ? Is not every French General finally subject to the will of the French Executive ? Whom, then, are our troops under ? Are they under a French statesman, and is the judgment of French statesmen, over which we can have no control whatever, preferable t-1 the judgment of British states- men ? " Such questions might be very unfair, and might be quite beside the mark ; but they would certainly be asked in the circum- stances we are supposing, and one hesitates to think whither they

might lead. But we are concerned here, not with the desirability of having a Generalissimo, or even a co-ordinator, but with the manner in which the announcement of General Foch's appointment was made. In the Birmingham Daily Post of last Saturday we read the following paragraph :—

" When such London organs as in the immediate past have heralded by rumour serious administrative change declare one day for a unified command on the Western Front, and the Paris journal owned by M. Clemenceau the next day not merely echoes the idea, but indicates that it is virtually accomplished, it will generally be taken for granted that official inspiration oncemore has been at work, and in the now accustomed way. There continue to be serious publicists, however, who intensely dislike such a method of breaking to the peoples concerned the news of a very grave alteration in the military position. They feel that this is a question for the decision alone of the Allies' Governments concerned, on whom will rest the sole responsibility for the change which cannot be evaded when once assumed, and to them it should have been left without officious—or even official—advice and aid from outside."

In the Daily Chronicle of March 28th (though of course the Daily

Chronicle is not a limb of the Northcliffe Press) we read the following words :—

"The grim logic of events may bring about on the Western Front &unity of command such as the Allied Armies have not known since the outbreak of the war. It is well known that Mr. Lloyd George and M. Clemenceau have long been in favour of this unity."

It cannot be supposed that the Daily Chronicle would have pub- lished such a statement without very good authority. At the same

time some of the French newspapers began to write again vehe- mently in favour of placing the supreme military command in the hands of a single person. Such are examples of what we mean.

The Press mobilization preceded the Government announcement. Every one would take an announcement, however surprising or revolutionary it might be, quite well if it came first of all from the Prime Minister himself. It would be regarded as a token of courage, promptitude, and a full sense of responsibility.

Those who have followed closely the Press " stunts " are familiar with the order of battle. The manceuvre begins in a Sunday news-

paper, and is taken up in succession by other papers if there seems a promising prospect of success. The Sunday paper carries out a re- connaissance. If a good opening is found, the heavy guns and the infantry are brought up and the attack is launched in grim earnest.

In these circumstances we cannot help wondering whether some words in the Weekly Dispatch of last Sunday, which were published under the title "Secret History of the Week," were in the nature of a reconnaissance. With regard to the present battle the writer said :—

"At the right time the full acts of the battle upon which the destiny of Europe hangs will be revealed in their proper light, and then and then only will it be possible to estimate the worth of our dispositions when the struggle began. . . . We may leave criticism to lees anxious momenta and simply register the hope that the staunchness of the men of our race in the battle line will before long have cancelled the considerable advantage that the enemy had secured to himself as the reward of his gigantic sacrifices."

In this connexion it is worth while to bear in mind that the principal

attack of the Northcliffe Press was made against both Sir William Robertson and Sir Douglas Haig, and that later the attack directed itself solely against Sir William Robertson. Is the attack upon Sir Douglas Haig to be resumed ? Does the promised estimate of " the worth of our dispositions" mean that this fresh attack is already

contemplated ? It is to be feared that this may be the meaning, because Sir Douglas Haig was obviously in the last resort responsible for those dispositions. It may be said that as the Germans had

their chief success against the Fifth Army, which was commanded by General Gough, the reference is to General Cough's dispositions.

But it is not to be supposed that a great weight of criticism would seriously be directed against an officer who, as the Government have

announced, is now unemployed, even if his long and valuable services should be entirely forgotten. Whom, then, would the

attack be made upon if not upon Sir Douglas Haig ? It would be argued that Sir Douglas Haig Was responsible for what happened in the Fifth Army, since he chose the commander of that army. The argument would then run on that Sir Douglas Haig was not com- petent in his choice of leaders. If other arguments were needed against him, they might concern themselves with the use of the reserves, as that is a matter about which there has notoriously been

much discussion. What was " the worth of our dispositions" with regard to reserves? It might be argued that if Sir William Robertson and Sir Douglas Haig had not resisted many of the valuable pro- posals of brains more imaginative than their own, the strategic

reserves would have been in a very different position, and that we should not have lost any of the ground which is now held by the Germans. In answer to such an argument it is enough to say that Sir Douglas Haig and General Petain are known to have worked in perfect and oonstant harmony, and that whatever the disposition of the reserves may have been—on this subject we profess to know nothing—it was the result of their absolute agreement. Further, it is not too much to suppose that General Petain's judgment, which is the result of almost unrivalled experience, had the approval of his French superiors.

We are of course only imagining this fresh onslaught on Sir Douglas Haig, but unfortunately close observers of events have found themselves obliged to watch very small straws to see which way the current flows. We have headed this article "A Warning," and our meaning is simply this : that if there should be any fresh assaults upon the Higher Command, the nation will expect that critioism and judgment should come in the first place from the Government and not from the Press. If Mr. Lloyd George should tell us that, alter a full examination of the evidence and on the best expert advice, he had come to the conclusion that Sir Douglas Haig was responsible for faulty dispositions and was not a good judge of men, the nation would undoubtedly be greatly surprised and dis- tressed, but the last thing it would do would be to condemn Mr. Lloyd George. People would say : "There is one consolation. This is an excellent sign. The Government know their own mind, and they are not afraid of telling the truth." What the nation will not tolerate, after all the previous warnings, is that another Press campaign should go through all its courses, and that at the end it should be discovered that the Government are willing to adopt its results and declare that the policy is their own.