LORD KITCHENER.
(To rim EDITOR or TES "Erscreras."1 Sns,—Your observations on Mr. Dixon's letter in the last issue of the Spectator recall to my mind the Spectator's article which was written during the most difficult part of the guerilla war in South Africa, suggesting that Lord Kitchener should be recalled to the work of organisation at home, for which he was eminently fitted, and that Lord Roberts should be sent out to finish the war, and the feeling of exasperation which it
caused, at least among some of those who knew pretty well the then state of affairs in South Africa.
About that time the position of things was very uncomfort- able. Trains were being wrecked, derailed, and burnt freely ; the question of our ability to get up supplies enough to keep the army going was becoming serious. Lord Kitchener very soon solved that part of his problem by- the adoption and very vigorous prosecution of the plan of blockhousing the railways. When one considers the comparatively exiguous forces by which that result was achieved with eminent success, and the further fact that ne other plan has ever been suggested by which the- same force (infantry) could have been used with anything like the same effect, it becomes necessary to admit that Lord Kitchener solved the first problem with promptitude, vigour, and complete success,—and, I may add, success which could by no means have been predicted or attained by any "gallant commander lumbering bravely on."
As regards the guerilla war, Lord Kitchener's general plan of operations still holds the field ; not much military support can be obtained for other plans which might have been adopted,—i.e., if due regard is had to the available resources of men, horses, and supplies. The plan of using the containing power of the modern rifle by holding the very thin red lines of the cross-country blockhouses with his comparatively immobile infantry, so as to enable him to concentrate his mobile columns upon the forces located, and to some extent at least confined, in definite areas of that vast country, was surely well thought out and appropriate and more likely to succeed than any other. It is not always realised how successful too those thin lines were as safe lines of supply for columns operating near them, and how well they denied to the enemy important points of vantage and easy intercommunication.
Surely to say of the man who selected, directed, organised, and carried through with immense energy these great opera- tions, who rejected ineffective half-measures, and allowed none of the great, recurrent, and wearing difficulties he had to meet to prevent him from carrying them to a successful con- clusion through two years of anxious effort, that he "lumbered bravely on, like many a gallant commander before him," is to use the language of undue and undeserved depreciation. And what of India ? Did Lord Kitchener lumber through his task there It is easy for a soldier to say to the Secretary of State : "I have no doubt that such-and-such a measure is required for the military security of the Empire, but you, and not I, are the judge of the political possibilities, and therefore I accept your view of the political situation and am willing to give my adhesion to your modification of my plan as the beet possible." The country, however, wants a soldier who will resign office unless at least his unconditional opinion on the whole military situa- tion is placed before the country (in the event of serious differ- ence). In Lord Kitchener people think they would get this, as well as a very competent military opinion, and an energiser of
the whole military organism.—I am, Sir, &c., E. H. B.
[Our correspondent writes ably in support of Lord Kitchener, but he does not convince us that the gallant General chose the true way of ending the war. He could and should have made his force more mobile than that of the Boers. Our resources were so infinitely greater than those of the Boers in men, supplies, and, above all, in the power to obtain fresh horses, that it is impossible to say that we could not have obtained a greater mobility than they. Instead, however, of mobilising his forces, Lord Kitchener largely demobilised them. By squandering his men throughout the country in block- houses, he ran heavy risks and almost certainly prolonged the war. Even in Lord Kitchener's flying columns the toiling ox _played a great part, while the Boer transport was largely composed of led pack-horses. No doubt Lord Kitchener satirised in his despatches the officers who took up kitchen- ranges and pianos in their chariots, but he should have taught his mounted troops to do without the vehicles into which they packed these luxuries. Lord Kitchener's Indian record, in spite of some excellent work, is in no sense above criticism. In his quarrel with Lord Curzon the merits were with Lord Curzon.—ED. Spectator.]
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