THE GOVERNMENT AND THE NAVY.
THE authors of Naval panics in England,—whom we do not wish needlessly to disparage, for they sometimes perform a useful function,—always seem to us to fall into one grand error. They treat the British Fleet as a purely defen- sive force scattered over the world, and forget that throughout ita history it has habitually assumed the offensive, and has won peace on the ocean by pitched battles fought in the European seas. They assume a war, usually with France, and then describe the French Fleet as swarming out all over the world, obtaining coal at will, sinking or robbing merchantmen, and threatening or destroying port after port with total im- punity. They forget entirely that the British Fleet imme- diately after the declaration of war would be watching Cherbourg and Toulon, and striking at every French ship which emerged from those ports ; that if we can seal-up or defeat the French home squadrons, we can bombard Marseilles just as easily as the French can bombard Mel- bourne ; and that consequently if our ascendancy in first- class heavy ships adapted for serious fighting is clear, we possess a supreme advantage,—that of compelling speedy peace. A modern fleet requires a base, as well as an army ; and if we are superior in the Channel and the Mediterranean, we can cut off all French outlying fleets from their base, and make their ultimate destruction a certainty—a possibility which would weigh heavily with any French Admiralty. Lord North- brook was right, therefore, in laying great stress in his speech of Monday on our superiority in first-class fighting-ships—the equivalent of " big battalions" on land—and he certainly showed that we possessed it. The French Fleet, the only one which approaches our own, or is likely to begin an attack on our own, comprises thirty-one first-rate ironclads of 180,894 tons, modern ships and partly obsolete ships being taken together ; while we have forty-six such ships of 325,950 tons, or 50 per cent. more in number, and nearly 100 per cent. more in size. In the best, that is, the most modern ships, the disparity is even greater. In other words, unless the French Fleet were much better manned, or better manoeuvred, or better fought than our own, it must be either destroyed or forced to keep in port. France may, of course, possess the advantages we have named, and some new Villeneuve may therefore be able to defeat some new Nelson ; but that contingency has' not occurred for centuries, and its occurrence cannot be prevented by human foresight. All that any Admiralty can do in this department of their work is to provide sufficient weapons for our sailors to use in the deciding battles ; and these they have provided, and are still providing. They have just finished three new ships, not counted, and are laying down at once three more, each one equivalent to a Military Division ; an ironclad of 10,000 tons, with 110- ton guns on board. They spend much more money on their first-rates than the French are doing ; they turn them out more quickly ; and they secure at least as good designs. What more in this department of their effort—which, we repeat, is incomparably the most important—is it necessary to do ? The panic-raisers reply that they admit the argument as regards France, but that we ought to occupy as good a posi- tion if coalesced Europe declares war on us ; but is that reasonable ? Why should Europe coalesce against us, or could any Power fight coalesced Europe, except in a war of despair, in which we, or any other Power, would resort to desperate expedients—gigantic political bribes, in fact—to break up or dishearten the alliance ? There is no Power on earth which, if driven to such extremities, could offer such terms for such an object as Great Britain ; but, in truth, such considerations are for dreamers, not for politicians. Europe will not coalesce against us ; and if half Europe did, the other half would spring eagerly at its magnificent opportunity for exe- cuting its own plans. A Naval war cannot be made a short war, nor could any conceivable combination sweep the British Fleet from European seas within six weeks. We must remain in European waters superior to any Pdwer, and equal to any two Powers ; but to attempt more is as little sensible as it would be for a Londoner to pace the Strand in chain-mail and a belt full of loaded revolvers. The only result would bo weariness, heartlessness, and consequent ineffi- ciency. To build a vessel that shall be waterspout-proof is a sign, not of foresight, but of a kind of folly growing far too common among the less responsible politicians, and requiring the healthy check which the taxpayers apply.
So far, the case of the Admiralty is clear ; and as regards the smaller Naval needs of the country, if not so com- plete, it is at least as strong as that of any opponent. The fortification of the whole of the ports we British possess is practically out of our power. The taxpayers would not stand the waste, which, after all, would be nearly useless unless we spent further large sums on more guns, more artillerymen, more soldiers of all kinds. The coaling stations along the great routes to Asia ought, however, to be fortified ; and the Admiralty pledge themselves that this is being done. What more is needed ? They may not ask enough money, or they may select a bad plan ; but the nation has against either chance no remedy whatever. It has selected the most competent men it can get, it has adjured them to take trouble, it has offered any necessary means, and it must rely upon its experts. The stake—the safety of our trade—is, no doubt, great ; but, then, so is a man's life great to him, yet he can do no more than choose the beat doctor, submit to his advice, and bear any necessary opera- tion. Paying the doctor ten guineas a visit when he asks two will not keep off death a single hour, or make his advice one grain the weightier, or his knife one whit the sharper. Looking all round the matter, and aware that the nation is in lavish mood, the Ministry say they are doing' enough in the way of fortifications ; and their opinion can only be accepted. All that laymen can do is to criticise on the broadest grounds, and to enforce the strictest responsibility. So criticised, the scheme looks sensible, the routes which are of vital import- ance being made fairly safe ; and the responsibility is made so great, that Ministers are almost terrified into waste. It is the same with the addition made to our swift cruisers, and to the torpedo-boats. The responsible experts say it will be enough to build five large " belted " cruisers, two rams, of a singularly successful kind favoured by Mr. Ward Hunt—who was a political opponent—ten smaller cruisers of great speed, called " Scouts," and thirty small torpedo-boats. Considering the great value Lord Northbrook placed on these latter for defensive purposes, the extraordinary number and wealth of our cities on the coast, and the readiness of both parties to vote the money, we think the Admiralty might have made the number of this kind of floating battery larger with advantage ; but when that opinion is written, what is it worth ? It is at best that of a publicist, who understands well the danger to which a wealthy port might be subjected even by a small force which came in search of ranson4 or purely to destroy. On the other hand, the most experienced Admirals in the country, who understand the danger better than he does, who will be held severely responsible, and who, if they have a personal interest at all, have an interest in increasing patronage, decide that thirty torpedo-boats is a reasonable number. It is irrational, therefore, to be dissatisfied,—as irrational as it would be for the editor of the Pall Mall Gazette to insist, in spite of the whole establishment, that the stock of paper within the office must and should be doubled. That the officials need stimulus sometimes to keep them from enjoying too much the easy delights of inaction is probable enough, and is the reason why we will not scold at the panic-raisers, great as is the tempta- tion they afford ; but when they have been stimulated, when the Press is raging, and the profession is swearing, and Parlia- ment is alive with the excitement either of alarm or of malice, then the experts, who are put, as it were, on their oath, should be trusted, and, indeed, must be trusted, whether we like it or not. Neither House can build torpedo-boats by volition ; and to vote more money than a Department asks is merely to lay a bag of guineas on the counter, and insist on having their value in pictures which the buyer cannot appraise. In the present instance, the Department is evidently inclined to do its best, thinks well of torpedoes, and only deprecates lavishness ; and the thing to do is to signify consent to its idea of the fitting number. This is what will be done; and it is not the result of a foolish apathy, as so many contend, but of that common-sense and power of proportioning ends to means which the nation never fails to display, except at moments when, in a fit of alarm, it loses its head altogether, and insists that a few millions shall be sunk on turning a rock in the Channel, which no sensible enemy will ever go near, into a first-class fortress. So long as it keeps its head, the country will believe that its Government, Liberal or Tory, intends to spend all that is needful on national defence, and will not insist on compel- ling it, in a department which only professionals understand, to waste national resources in order that the timid may be re- assured, and that a trade which is suffering from temporary over-production, may have State work to do.
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