THE PANIC.

[commurriceasp.]

THE recent outcry on the subject of the Navy and the defences of the Empire has done undoubted good. It ie only right that we should clearly understand that the future of England depends entirely upon whether the first great war in which she engages leaves her with unquestioned naval supremacy. This great issue cannot be too widely made known, and there is the more reason for plain speaking, since we in England have not that realisation of the possibilities of war which is ever present to the minds of all the great European Powers. To France and Germany the necessity for defences is sufficiently apparent, and millions sunk in fortifica- tions justify themselves without the need of rhetoric. With us it is otherwise. For eighty years the Navy of England has swept the seas with might unquestioned. It is only too easy, therefore, to ignore the dangers of the future, to fail to realise a time when our ocean communications might be cut, our trade paralysed, and our very food-supply insecure. That these dangers, in a greater or less degree, threaten us, in the event of a war with a great Naval Power, cannot be denied ; and having this fear before their eyes, there is small wonder that the numerous writers who have dashed into unaccustomed periods should not have paused to measure language or facts. There are times when it is natural and excusable to shout.

Granting all this to the fullest possible extent, the time has now come for a calmer and more scientific tone. The white- heat of panic which it has been sought to create, cannot in any case be maintained. Fortunately for the taxpayers, great measures of defence are not to be undertaken with the precipitance which the Pall Mall Gazette appears to desire. It is so easy to dispose of imaginary millions, which must, after all, be first obtained at the cost of the toilers. Panic legislation is, however, rarely wise ; and when it is applied to measures of defence, the inevitable results are ill- considered schemes, and reckless waste. The defences of England should be sufficient, and no more.

Of all the many modes in which the resources of a country may be wasted, excessive or ill-judged military

expenditure is the worst. By building a fort in the wrong place, or creating a fortress where none is needed, not only is a greater or less sum absolutely sunk, but a permanent addition to the national expenditure is en- tailed, to maintain such fort or fortress for an indefinite number of years, and to tinker it at intervals, so as to attain some compromise with military science. Even when you have done this, you will at regular periods find distinguished people proclaiming loudly that you have neglected sufficiently to perpetuate your original blunder, and that on this mis- taken fort or fortress the safety of the Empire depends. Only thirty-seven years ago, it was somehow or other proved in the clearest manner that the conversion of Alderney into a great naval harbour and fortress was a national necessity. There were certainly a few eminent authorities who objected to the scheme, but they were regarded as optimists, or possibly economists of an unpatriotic type. Hundreds of

thousands were flung into the sea, in the futile attempt to create a breakwater. Other thousands were squandered in elaborate fortifications and barracks, surmounting every trifling indenta- tion of the iron coast. The breakwater has been practically abandoned, and has partly disappeared. It used to figure periodically in Parliamentary debates, but it is now forgotten.

The fortifications are monuments of human error. If any

eminent doctor would take them and convert them into private asylums or water-care establishments, the War Depart- ment would probably be only too glad. In 1859, Lord Palmer- ston, taking practical advantage of a hot fit, committed the country to the extent of many millions. Fortifications were everywhere commenced in haste. Granting that the original designs were superior to criticism, it will be generally admitted that soma of the works were half-obsolete before they were finished. Some are not even finished yet, others are not armed. The estimates ran out before completion and arma- ment could be provided for. The cold fit had supervened. In 1861, there was a cry for Dockyards for the Navy, and vast works were begun under the Duke of Somerset's Admiralty Administration. The succeeding Government,-on coming into office, at once proceeded to dock the expenditure instead of the ships. The cry had begun to die out. Surely there are here sufficient grounds to justify a plea for mature considera- tion. Let us be sure as to the exact measure And nature of what we really require. The needs of the Empire are admitted on all hands. The Navy is unquestionably too weak for present and future

security. Unless the distant coaling stations are protected, the motive-power of our ships cannot be counted upon, and their sphere of certain action is limited to the narrow seas. The great commercial ports of the country, with the vast tonnage they harbour, and the wealth of national resources they con- tain, must be defended. So much is granted ; and on these texts it is right and proper to preach. It is somewhat different in the case of the discussion of the detailed measures which should be adopted. Take the Navy. Clearly, with the far greater and more scattered interests we have to guard, our

Navy must be maintained at a peace strength considerably beyond what is implied by a dubious and gradually vanishing supremacy over that of France. But where are we to stop ?

Some writers appear to consider that we should accept cheer- fully the heavy burden of a peace establishment out- numbering the Navies of three or four European Powers combined. The prospects of a war alliance between France and Germany against England are hardly imminent. There are no signs of any growing community of interest or sentiment between France and Italy. Where the fate of the Empire is involved, it would be folly to ignore future possibilities, how- ever apparently remote ; but the line must be drawn some- where, and it is for the statesman to draw it. Even when the standard has been laid down, the measures necessary to attain it are not to be settled off-hand. Sir E. Reed and the Admirals are not yet fully agreed among themselves. There is a general consensus in favour of fast cruisers and torpedo- boats. But are the former to be Esmeraldas,' or modified and improved ' Warspites ' ; if both, then in what proportion ? And bow many first-class ironclads, and of what type, are to

be laid down At least, let these matters be calmly dis- cussed before the money of the people is lavishly expended. A mistake in shipbuilding policy means culpable waste.

Measures of fortification are specially ill-suited for mere newspaper discussion, and a leading article in the Times

of the 29th ult. supplies a typical example of the unreason of which there have been other manifestations. " The official scheme for the defence of our coaling stations is

ludicrously inadequate," states the leading journal. This " official scheme "—the Times appears to think that there is a

veiled sarcasm in the mere term "official "—has obtained the approval of the ablest minds in the country. Although "official," it has received an amount of careful thought which

has been bestowed on no other scheme. And the Times knows

of no other scheme, except that of which the Royal Commission accepted the parentage. This nurseling was more costly

and therefore, in the view of the Times, necessarily far more

powerful. Defensive strength does not, however, lend itself readily to measurement in pounds sterling ; otherwise, what a pillar of strength Alderney must have been to the Empire !

" A number of stations are put out of sight altogether, on the ground that they are of minor importance,"—as a minor matter of fact, this is not the case ;— " it would be interesting to learn what, in the official view, is an im- portant station." The relative importance of the stations was settled by the Royal Commission, and has been adhered to

almost without exception. Provided only that this Commis- sion recommends a larger expenditure, the Times is willing to

follow blindly. When it comes to the fixing of the relative importance of stations, the opinion of this authoritative body is dismissed with a sneer as the" official view." Proceeding on the

gratuitous assumption, unsupported by reason or fact, that the measures of defence proposed by her Majesty's Government for the first-class coaling stations, and actually in progress at Aden and Hong Kong, are " ludicrously inadequate," the Times finds the rest of its case easy enough. " Suppose a distant one [station] is attacked by one of the strong expeditions with which it is not able to cope, and that we have to send a counter-expedition,"- what then, asks the Times, triumphantly " Our ironclads carry coal only for four or five days' steaming at high speed." The French ironclads apparently carry coal enough to take them from Toulon to Saigon without replenishing their bunkers. By the simple process of emancipating the ironclads of our enemies from all the restrictions which hamper our own, a sufficient case for the expenditure of any number of millions can readily be made out. With Malta (the greatest fortress in the world), Aden, Trincomalee, Singapore, and Hong Kong all defended, as they will be, an English ironclad cannot steam to the China Seas. With Obok, a barren, undefended, and uninhabited bay ; Mala6 and Pondicherry,open unprotected roadsteads, well off the line ; and nothing else on the Red Sea route between Toulon

and Saigon, a French ironclad can steam full-speed to the attack of Hong Kong. It is all clear, and admits of no manner of doubt

in the minds of those whose main object is to commit the country to unlimited expenditure. But the Times has more questions to ask. " What is a comparatively weak squadron ?" The reply is obvious. A comparatively weak squadron, in this sense, is the balance of an enemy's Navy, which, not being held in check by our own Navy, nor required for the defence of that enemy's home ports, nor for operations in home waters, becomes available for distant expeditions, and can be so employed, provided that it is able to make its own arrangements for an assured coal- supply along the line selected. The non-official view appears to be that France, for example, will have ships to meet the British Navy in the Channel and Mediterranean ; to guard her own undefended or slightly defended ports, and at the same time to carry on an attack or blockade of Portsmouth, Plymouth, or Malta ; to convoy an invading force to the shores of England, and to carry out distant expeditions in great strength,—say, against Hong Kong, the Cape, or Bermuda. But such operations cut both ways. If France devotes a " strong expedition " to the reduction of the Cape, some British ships may apparently be relieved from duty in the Channel and Mediterranean. Even an enemy's ships—not being birds— cannot be in two places at once. Descending from questions of policy to those of gunnery, the Times is hardly more fortunate. "A single ship, armed with guns of longer range than our coaling stations are pro- vided with (sic), is strong enough to destroy their fortifications with impunity." Women and children invariably measure the power of a big gun by its range. " How far will it carry ?" is the usual question they ask. It may surprise the Times to learn that, for practical purposes, all new-type heavy guns range alike. Even so small a gun as the 6-inch ranges over 10,000 yards,—about 5 miles. At long bowls, the "single ship " which terrifies the imagination of the Times would simply expend her ammunition uselessly, thereby incapacitating herself for an engagement with an English vessel—after all, there must be one or two English vessels somewhere about!—and would further run considerable risk of receiving injury which, even if not of a disabling nature, might be incapable of repair without a 10,000- mile run to her nearest port. The main feature in the " official scheme," and one which might have secured for it a partial approval, is the provision of a large number of new- type guns. If this thoroughly mischievous article means anything at all, it means that we are to make all our first-class coaling stations (as well as any others the Times may subse- quently indicate) into first-class fortresses. This the country will certainly refuse to do at such bidding.

To deprecate panic measures is in no sense to underrate our present dangers. The questions of the Navy and the coast defences are undoubtedly urgent, and the country has rightly decided that the present insecurity must cease for ever. The necessary sacrifices will be cheerfully accepted, and the nation will grant whatever sum her Majesty's Govern- ment consider to be necessary ; but, remembering the lessons of the past, it will not be led blindly into reckless expenditure at the bidding of unreason. Grave questions of national defence are subjects for calm scientific discussion, not for mere assertion ; and it is only by rational processes that a compre- hensive and well-balanced scheme, capable alike of securing the Imperial interests and giving force to the Imperial policy, can be developed.