TOPICS OF THE DAY.

A POSITION OF PERIL.

OUR naval position to-day is such that if we received from Germany, or any Power equal to her in strength at sea, a sudden declaration of .war, followed by immediate action, the situation would be one of grave peril.

We make this statement only after the most serious con- sideration, and after ascertaining the views of persons not merely fully competent to express an opinion on the facts, but unlikely to take an exaggerated or alarmist view through party prejudice. There is nothing which we more strongly deprecate than newspaper scares in regard either to the Army or the Navy ; but in view of the opinion which we feel bound to entertain, we should be guilty of a breach of duty if we did not speak out.

If the peril—and we cannot use any weaker word—of which we write were caused by a real lack of naval strength, either as regards ships or men, and so was, for the time at any rate, irremediable, we should consider it incumbent upon all good citizens to hold their peace. The present danger is not due to any such cause. We have enough ships and enough men to make our position not merely safe, but to place us as far beyond risk of naval disaster as it is humanly possible for us to be placed. We are in a position of peril, not from material weakness, but solely (1) because of the faulty distribution of our naval force ; (2) because of the lack of concentration of power ; and (3) because of the fact that for a considerable portion of our ships in home waters we have substituted the ideal of a "practically ready" fleet—that is, an unready fleet—for that of a fleet instantly ready for war. Many men have been ruined in business because, though they possessed enormously large reserves of wealth, those reserves were not ready to meet an instant call. Just in the same way may we as a nation be ruined, not because we are weak at sea in essentials, but because our immense strength is not instantly available. It is, unfortunately, by no means a difficult task to point out the nature of our present weakness. The current number of the Navy League Journal gives a list of the tests by which one may discover whether a fleet is or is not instantly ready for war. We propose to state those tests, adding one of our own, and then to apply them first to the only British naval force available to resist a really sudden attack. Next we shall apply them to the foreign fleet that under existing conditions is most likely to challenge our supremacy. Here are the conditions laid down by the writer in the Navy League Journal:— " (1) Force amply sufficient in the judgment of the commander- in-chief to enable the blow of the enemy to be parried and defeated, allowing for the fact that the enemy will almost cer- tainly have the initiative.

(2) That force to be composed of ships under the personal command and control of the commander prior to hostilities, so that their training can be carried on under his eyes. (3) The ships of the force to be in good condition for war, and kept, as far as circumstances permit, fully provided with coal, ammunition and stores, and in such a condition that they can move out and fight on the shortest notice. (4) The ships to be kept concentrated, or so far Concentrated that they can be assembled before the enemy can arrive and obtain contact with them, thus avoiding any risk of defeat in detail.

(5) The training of the force to be carried out in such a manner that the tactics and shooting will be equal to the demand placed upon them in battle. The officers to be penetrated with the ideas and plans of the commander-in-chief, so that they can display initiative, which is out of the question when captains are not familiar with the intentions of their admiral.

(6) The force never to be allowed to fall below the minimum which, in the opinion of the fighting officer, is needed for instant action, and when ships are withdrawn for refit or docking those units to be replaced."

To these we will add—

(7) The fleet instantly ready for war to which is entrusted the work of resisting an attack levied against our supremacy at sea should be a fleet of all arms. That is, its commander, besides having the requisite strength in battleships and cruisers, should also have under his immediate command, and attached to his fleet as an integral portion of it, such a force of torpedo craft as will give him a truo superiority over the enemy in that as in other respects. By an integral part is meant that the torpedo craft shall be exercised in peacetime with the fleet, and that the commanders of such craft shall know the commander-in-chief of the fleet thoroughly, and shall be thoroughly known by him.

We venture to say without fear of contradiction that the fleet, or rather we must call it the body of ships, upon which the naval security of these islands now depends—that is, the Channel and *Home Fleets combined—does not in the true sense fulfil these conditions. The Channel Fleet is too weak, and the Home Fleet is only "practically ready." If the Cabinet will make an independent inquiry into the matter, they will find that the conditions just named do not prevail. (1) The force at the command of the Commander- in-Chief of the Channel Fleet is not amply sufficient, in his judgment, "to enable the blow of an enemy to be parried and defeated." (2) The naval force upon which we are relying for our safety in home waters is not, as a whole, composed of ships, which have been "under the personal command and control of one commander prior to hostili- ties," aud their training is not being "carried on under his eyes." (3) The ships of the force as a whole are not "in good condition for war," and are not "fully provided with coal, ammunition, and stores," and therefore could not move out and fight on the instant. (4) The ships are not kept concentrated in such a way that they could assemble before the enemy could arrive and obtain contact with them, thus eliminating any risk of defeat in detail. (5) The training of the force has not been carried out, and is not being carried out, in such a way that there is the necessary mutual trust between the Commander-in- Chief and the Captains. (6) That part of the force which is ready for instant action has fallen below the minimum which in the opinion of those on whom the shock would fall ig needed for instant action. (7) Finally, the fleet which must receive the first shock—that is, the Channel Fleet—is not a fleet of all arms in the true sense. The torpedo craft on which it would rely do not fulfil the conditions stated above.

When we make an appeal to the Cabinet as a whole to consider this momentous question, let us assure our countrymen that we make it in no party sense. We repudiate with indignation the monstrous sugges- tions that have been occasionally made that Ministers are either individually or collectively indifferent to our naval security. They are, of course, as anxious to main- tain the safety of the nation as their political rivals. Further, we are fully aware that the present situation is in no sense due to any economies in naval expenditure that have been ordered by the Government. Those economies are not the source of our naval weakness, and we are convinced that no member .of the present Government would run the slightest risk in order to show a saving upon the Fleet. The question of a lesser or a greater expenditure has nothing whatever to do with the matter which we are now dis- cussing, and with regard to which we make our appeal to the Cabinet.

If, after applying the tests given above to our naval forces in home waters, the Cabinet apply similar test,s to the German High Sea Fleet, it will, we believe, be found that though the Germans have, in truth, very much smaller 'naval resources than we have, their High Sea Fleet is in a position of immediate superiority, (1) because it is instantly ready for action ; (2) because it is concentrated ; (3) because it is constantly moving in company ; (4) because it is under one supreme command ; and (5) because it is a fleet of all arms of which the torpedo craft are an integral and most important part,—because, in a word, it is not a "practically ready" but an instantly ready fleet. For these reasons it is a fleet which at the moment is in a position to overcome the naval force which we could bring against it in case of a sudden declaration of hostilities followed by immediate action,—action like that taken by Japan at the outbreak of the war with Russia. To argue that Germany does not mean to attack us is idle. We do not want a security which rests upon the good intentions of Germany, even though we may be convinced of those good intentions, but upon something much firmer and more absolute. We want to be secure, not because of the peaceful aspirations of our neighbours, but because of our own intrinsic power.

Before leaving the subject we will quote a note added to the article in the Navy League Journal giving the exact figures in regard to the Channel Fleet, and ask our readers to mark them carefully :— "Nom—The main British Fleet, tho Channel Fleet, consists of the following units, which are all that are permanently under the orders of its Admiral, and has at the present moment the following nominal strength: Battleships, 14; armoured cruisers, 4; protected cruisers, 3. The First Cruiser Squadron, usually attached to the Channel Fleet, is now in American waters. Its place is temporarily taken by the Fifth Cruiser Squadron. No destroyers are permanently attached to the Admiral's command, but 24 are temporarily placed at his disposal."

At the same time, the German High Sea Fleet consists of sixteen battleships, four armoured cruisers, eight small cruisers, and forty to fifty destroyers. It will of course be urged that we have not counted our Home Fleet, and that therefore our whole argument is vitiated. Our answer is that the Home Fleet is not an instantly ready fleet, but only a "practically ready" fleet, (1) because it is not under the immediate and direct command of the com- mander of the Channel Fleet ; (2) because it is not con- centrated; (3) because a large portion of its vessels have only nucleus crews on board; (4) because it has not been trained to act as a fleet either by itself or with the Channel Fleet. It is, in fact, not a true fleet, but a more or less fortuitous concourse of naval atoms.

It will be asked how a state of things so strange can have arisen, and how, while we have overwhelming naval capital, we seem to be in the position of a man who is in deep anxiety as to whether he will be able to meet his obligations from day to day. The complete answer is too long to give here, but in essence it is to be found in a fact for which the late Government are quite as responsible as the present. Both Governments, but chiefly the late Government—for they began it—are guilty of spoiling a good permanent official, expert, or naval servant of the State—whatever we may like to call him—by endowing him with virtually unlimited power. The present condition of things has arisen because Sir John Fisher is, and has been during the last two or three years, the possessor of uncontrolled authority over our Navy. Until a proper control is exercised over him, as over other servants of the State, by our rulers, and until common-sense and prudence are made to prevail even over expert opinion, the perils which we are pointing out will continue. To be quite plain, Sir John Fisher is one of those men whom predominant influence and absolute power render reckless. Power has gone to his head. But after all, he is not to blame for that so much as those who, contrary to all the traditions of the Service and of our political system, showered power and responsibility upon him.

We shall, of course, be accused of sensationalism and of a newspaper's desire to attract attention to itself by what we have written. Such accusations we are perfectly willing to endure if we can only induce the present Cabinet to face the naval situation and to realise its peril. Let them remember that to put the matter right is, happily, by no means a, difficult task. Only a few months ago we had under Admiral Wilson a fleet which in most particulars satisfied the conditions laid down above, and was, at any rate, fully equal to the tasks imposed on it. There is nothing to prevent such a fleet being called into existence again, either under the present Commander-in-Chief of the Channel Fleet or another. And here let us say that, though we have no reason to doubt Lord Charles Beresford's ability as a naval officer, we hold no brief for him, do not write in his interests, and have not the slightest wish to pit him against Sir John Fisher. It is, of course, notorious that Lord Charles Beresford is alleged to be anxious, nay, alarmed, and convinced that he is not in a position to do what he would be called upon to do if we were subjected to a sudden attack. We do not, however, want to make the rumoured opinion of Lord Charles Beresford, even if the whispers as to his opinion should prove to be true, or of the Admirals and Captains under his command, or even the general opinion of sailors afloat, the ground for our reiterated declaration that the present position is one of peril. Our appeal is not to rumour, but to common-sense and to facts, which can be judged by the members of the present Government as well as by any naval officer. We ask the Cabinet to look at matters for them- selves, and not to be put off by the opinion of this or that expert. Finally, we ask them as patriotic men not to yield to the temptation to harden their hearts in this matter, and to say : "The attack that is being made upon the Navy is part of the party game, part of the Opposition's desire to pretend that we are all Little Englanders and indifferent to the needs of the Empire and the nation. Such attacks we can only treat with the contempt they deserve." For such attacks we, too, have nothing but contempt ; but we can assure the Ministry that this is not a case in point, and that among those who are most anxious at the present moment are to be found men who wish the Government well, and have quite as much confidence in their sense of patriotic duty as in that of their opponents. Another proof, and a conclusive proof, that this is no party attack is to be found in the fact that it has received no encourage- ment from the Leader of the Opposition, and that the opinions expressed in the Press have not followed the line of party cleavage. The non-party character of the view we have expressed is further illustrated by what took place in the House of Lords on Thursday. The matter is thus not complicated by party feeling, but may be judged on its merits.