TOPICS OF THE DAY.
A FOOD-TAX REFERENDUM.
T9Ilkeston election and the growing want of con- dence between the Liberals and the Labour Party are indications that it is quite within the region of pos- sibility that a General Election may take place within a very few months. When we say this we do not ignore the fact that the weaker Governments and parties become, the more they cling to office and attempt to put off the day of reckoning on the ground that the occasion for going to the country could not be worse and might become better owing to some piece of luck on the part of the Ministry, or some false step on the part of the Opposition. In spite, however, of the cement supplied by the terror of a dissolution, an accident may happen any night. Again, in addition to the difficulties we have mentioned, there is the deep rift in the Cabinet on the question of woman's suffrage. We are therefore justified in saying that a dissolution may be very near. But that being so, it is the duty of the Unionist leaders to make up their minds how they mean to meet the situation, and when they have made up their minds to let the country know. The essential point for them to consider and decide is the problem of food taxes. Mr. Balfour's pledge—a pledge, remember, endorsed by Mr. Boner Law—in effect declared that though Tariff Reform was the first plank in the Unionist programme, and though food taxes, as necessary to Colonial preference, must continue part of the Unionist fiscal policy, food taxes should not be imposed before the whole of the voters had had an opportunity at a referendum to decide for or against their imposition. The object of such a pledge is, of course, not to please the Unionist Free Traders, but to secure extra electoral help for the Unionists, and so to enable them (1) to get rid of the present " incapable and guilty Administration "; (2) to prevent the destruction of the Legislative Union, and with it the stirring-up of civil war in Ulster; and (3) to place our naval supremacy beyond all doubt and question. Unionist Free Traders, like ourselves, have these objects quite as much at heart as Tariff Reform Unionists, and therefore we could not and do not say that we will not co-operate in securing them unless we, though in a minority in the Unionist Party, obtain our wishes in regard to the food taxes. What we do say is something very different, namely : " Though you can and will have our votes without giving up food taxes, because we think getting rid of the present Government and securing the Union and maintaining our naval supremacy more important even than Free Trade, that is not enough. To win you must secure the votes of a large number of neutral or balancing electors who either voted for the Liberals last time or abstained from voting. But the votes of these men you cannot obtain unless you give the Referendum pledge in regard to taxes on food." It might be argued perhaps that the Referendum pledge has never been withdrawn, that it holds the field, and that therefore there is no necessity to ask for its renewal. We have not the slightest wish to rely upon such a piece of political pedantry. We admit that the Unionist leaders have a perfect right to withdraw from that pledge, even if it technically holds the field, and that in effect the Referendum pledge must be renewed to make it effective. In other words, the whole problem must be considered entirely afresh and solely on its merits. Now we say frankly that we cannot and do not expect the Unionist leaders to give such a pledge if they can do without it. They believe sincerely, though wrongly, as we think, that food taxes are an essential part of their programme, and therefore they cannot be expected to postpone them, or rather to put them into a category which will need a special popular endorsement, if they think they can win without doing so. Provided that they can obtain a victory even if they go to the country with, as we should say, food taxes round their necks, then, of course, they will not give the Referendum pledge. To give it would be an example of political Don Quixotry which it would be ridiculous to ask from them. Let it be clearly understood, then, that no one has a right to ask for the Referendum pledge in regard to food taxes except on the hypothesis that the Unionists cannot make sure of victory without such a pledge. That is the point which has to be considered. Can we be certain of safeguarding the tremendous interests at stake without that pledge ? We venture to say that there are very few Unionists who will assert that they are certain we can win without such a pledge. Some of them will say no doubt that they have got a fair chance of winning without making the Referendum pledge, but they will not say more. If that is the case, what a tremendous responsibility would be incurred by the Tariff Reformers in running the risk of defeat, not in order to secure their whole programme, because that is not the issue, but in order that there shall not be any delay in a part of that programme. What would be the feelings of Tariff Reformers, who, though they care much for food taxes, care still more for the Union and for getting rid of the present Government, if after refusing to give the Referendum pledge they are again beaten at the elections ? In the first place they will have ruined the cause of Tariff Reform altogether. It is clear that after a fourth beating it would be impossible to continue the struggle. No party can endure more than four defeats on one issue. Tariff Reform for good and all, and not merely food taxes for a time, would have to be dropped. That being so it will be seen that the Tariff Reform Unionists, by refusing to give the Referendum pledge, would be risking not only the Union but also that part of Tariff Reform which does not depend on food taxes, and which is regarded by many Tariff Reformers as the essential part of their policy.
We have now reached a point where no doubt many Tariff Reformers will be inclined to urge that there is a fallacy in our argument. They will say, " There are risks involved in any course of action. We must not forget, however, that it is quite possible that, if we were to post3 pone food taxes until they had been endorsed by the popular vote, we should alienate a large portion of our own party. Even though we gained. many votes from the. Liberals or from the neutral electors we might in the process lose still more Tariff Reform votes, and so in the end. be worse off." They will argue, in fact, that it is more important to them to keep the votes they have got than to reach out for hypothetical votes which might or might not be secured by the Referendum pledge. Here, then, we come to a question of fact. Would the Referendum pledge have or not have the depressing' effect upon the Tariff Reformers just suggested? We do not believe it would. In the first place it will, we think, be admitted. that when Mr. Balfour gave his Tariff Reform pledge, in spite of the fact that it was given far too late and without any proper preparation, it was not badly received by the Unionist Party, but very much the reverse. To the astonishment of many Tariff Reformers, the party as a whole accepted it gladly and did not lose thereby. The pledge may not have won over many Liberal votes: or many neutral votes, but at any rate it did not depress or antagonize the Tariff Reformers. But if that is admitted, then we venture to say that a renewal of the pledge is from the electoral point of view well worth while. It would be far better understood now by the moderate men and by the neutral voters. After nearly two years and the great amount of popular education that has gone on in regard to the Referendum, they would fully understand what the pledge meant, and they would. be influenced thereby in quite a, different way from that in which they were influenced by Mr. Balfour's statement at the Albert Hall. That pledge, coming literally on the eve of the election, hardly did more than startle and surprise the neutral voter. If renewed we believe it would. have much more effect, while at the same time it would not, as we have said, depress the Tariff Reform voter any more than it depressed him before. In fact the pledge would do what it was intended to do, but did not do, in November 1910.
Let us consider the matter still further, and this time from the standpoint of the rank-and-file Tariff Reformer. He would say, and we think rightly : " By giving the Referendum pledge we do not really stand to lose anything. If, as we believe, the majority of the people are really in favour of food taxes in order to secure Colonial preference . we shall win at a poll of the people. Indeed, we are more likely to win the whole of our programme if we present it in sections than if we present it as a whole. And for this reason. Directly we come into office we shall construct and pass our tariff without food taxes. But when we have applied it for six months the public will realize that it is not half such a dangerous and dreadful thing as was supposed. It will be found that it does not raise prices in the way expected, and that it does produce revenue. Thus, having secured a solid foundation, we shall be in a better position to build up preference. After seeing half our policy at work people will realize that there is no danger. We shall be able to argue from the effect of the tariff on manufactured articles that our very moderate preference to Colonial food. products will do nobody any harm.. In fact, we shall be far more likely to get our whole programme accepted by cutting it into two than by trying to make the electors swallow it in one gulp." In other words, the ordinary Tariff Reformer will recognize that the Referendum pledge does not involve the abandonment of preference, but merely its delay, and that such delay may very likely prove highly beneficial to the cause of preference.
We feel so strongly that this is likely to be the prac- tical effect of the Referendum pledge that as Free Traders we are distinctly alarmed at the prospect. Indeed, were we not so strongly convinced of the danger to the Union and of the general evil results of the continuance of this Government in power, nothing would induce us to use the arguments we have used. The only thing that reconciles us to using them is the knowledge that the Government and the Liberal Party have already so completely betrayed the cause of free exchange, owing to their labour policy, the encouragement of Protection in the guise of militant trade unionism, and, worst of all, by their profligate finance and their ominous land policy, that the choice between true Free Trade and Protection no longer exists as practical politics. Free Trade has been bled to death by the Liberals. One side is asking for a vicious fiscal system in the form of a tariff and the other side is asking for an even more vicious fiscal system in the form of confiscatory land taxation. The supporter of true free exchange has really nothing but a choice of evils before him. In any case we are prepared to run the risks, though we admit they are very grave risks, involved in the Referendum pledge. Great sacrifices, we recognize, must be made to save the sinking ship. If we cannot save Free Trade we are, at any rate, not going to assist in destroying the Union, enthroning Socialism, establishing the futile, nay ruinous, policy of destroying free exchange in land, and handing over the free labourer to trade-union tyranny. In other words, we feel we must be content to run the risks involved in helping the Tariff Reformers to win in spite of themselves.
We would ask Tariff Reformers to note that if we were blind to everything else but Free Trade and were willing to risk the ruin of the other causes we care for in order to defeat Tariff Reform, nothing would suit us better than to let the Unionist Tariff Reformers go to their fate. In our opinion what will happen if the Referendum pledge is not given and the Unionists go to the country once more with the food taxes round their necks, and so make it impossible for the neutral voters to vote for them, is that they will be beaten once more. They will win a few seats, but not enough to do more than halve the Liberal majority. But, as we have said, one more defeat for Tariff Reform must be a final defeat and must mean its abandonment. That, of course, if we isolated the question of Free Trade and did not trouble about the other consequences, would suit us admirably. We know, however, that if Tariff Reform were to be destroyed there would be destroyed with it what we care for more than even Free Trade. Therefore we find ourselves in the position of in effect trying to teach the Tariff Reformers how to save their cause from destruc- tion. We are not trying to entrap them or to cajole them into making a sacrifice. To be quite frank, we are trying to teach them how to win in order that incidentally we may save the Union and prevent the triumph of Socialism and Jacobinical tyranny. That is the point to which the so-called Radical defenders of Free Trade have brought us. Politicians who are gifted with enough imagination to realize the situation may understand what it costs us to write as we have written.
One more point must be considered. It will be said in some quarters that it is impossible to put any portion of a tariff to a popular vote, and so give the people a right of vetoing a series of proposed taxes. That is a mistake. It is not impossible, and we can prove it is not impossible by pointing to the fact that the thing was done in Switzer- land only nine years ago. As a distinguished Swiss publicist, Professor Roget, shows in our issue of to- day, a tariff was submitted to the Swiss electorate in March 1903, and the Swiss democracy approved and passed that tariff. And remember that the tariff in question involved a complicated. series of schedules and not merely one section of a tariff, such as the food taxes. The Swiss put the whole of their tariff to the people. We only suggest that the preferential tax on breadstuffs, meat, and dairy produce should be submitted to the voters for their veto or endorsement. What the Swiss have done we can do, and only those who are afraid to trust the people need fear the result. If the Tariff Reformers believe that they have the majority of the people on their aide, as we are sure most of them do, they certainly need not be afraid. Remember they will get a clean vote on a clear issue. All votes also will have the same value, and not the varying values of the present system under which the dwellers in Irish constituencies often have ten times the voting power of voters in London and the South of England, that is, in the strongholds of Tariff Reform.
To conclude. The time has come when in our opinion the Unionist leaders ought to tell the country frankly whether the Referendum pledge is or is not in existence. If they postpone their decision and renew that pledge, as in all probability circumstances will force them to do, on the eve of an election it will most likely be given too late to produce the result which they most desire—the result of saving the Union, turning out the present Government. and securing assent for what is, after all, the major part of their fiscal policy.
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