FROM COVENANT TO CHARTER
By GILBERT MURRAY, O.M.
HERE is such a thing as a Logic of Events, and one can see its working in the various changes which have taken place in he present plans for a world-wide organisation of nations. Human vishes have, of course, to yield to the events, if they are real events ; n the other hand the so-called Realists are constantly claiming as eal events facts more like wishes of their own. Events are not intelli- nt ; but when they happen they are inescapable, and they have a ower not only of teaching human beings but of bewildering and nfusing them. The Wilson Covenant was a call to repentance. Mr. Wilso• n's
ourteen Points, and Ten Points and Four Points, are all in different arms insistences on the supremacy of the Moral Law. In place of II the shifts and plots of diplomacy there is to be a " reign of law sed on the consent of the governed and supported by the organised pinion of mankind." Wilson did fundamentally believe that wars ostly arose from the selfishness and dishonesty of States to one nother ; and one can find many obiter dicta of Lord Grey and of riand to the same effect. Wilson, during the negotiations in Paris, as vehemently opposed to permitting nations to resign from the eague ; it seemed to him like giving them permission to return to ishonest practices if they wished. His hope was that if the Covenant ere conscientiously observed, under the leadership of the United tates, war, though not actually forbidden, would become increas- ngly improbable, in token of which faith the nations should proceed t once to an agreed Reduction of Armaments.
The plan failed ; not, so far as I can see, because it had no teeth," but because, contrary to all expectations, the U.S.A. de- rted. The League had all the armies, navies and air forces of its embers ; but it did not dare to use them. It was too weak. With merica and Russia outside, and with Japan, Italy and Germany side but hostile, the League was very far from being an effective orld Organisation. When the problem of a new League arose at he end of the Second European War statesmen were acutely con- ous of this failure, and saw the whole problem differently. It as not a question of higher morality ; it was a question of getting e co-operation of Russia and America—at almost any price. merica pressed for " teeth "; that was easy. She also objected to e Unanimity Rule and insisted on various regulations about votes nd qualified majorities ; that might well create difficulties—as in ct it did.
The first difficulty was with Russia. Russia, as far as one can see n the deep twilight that surrounds her policy, does want a stable eace ; but insists on having her hands perfectly free, particularly
n dealing with her neighbours in eastern and central Europe. If he Unanimity Rule were dropped it followed that a two-thirds ajority (or some other majority) would have the right to coerce ussia. That was not to be thought of. Under the Covenant no ation could be compelled to do what it did not wish to do, as long
• it observed its Covenant. The prudence of this arrangement ecomes clear if you imagine a two-thirds or three-fourths majority t the League deciding that South Africa must modify its colour ar policy or Australia behave differently about immigrants. If ajorities were to have a power of coercion, at any rate they should of coerce Russia. Hence came the Yalta rule, giving, not only ussia but all the five so-called Great Powers, a right of veto over he proceedings of the Council. The injustice of this rule is anifest. It may be the fact that, in any serious international broglio, it may be impossible for the League or the Court or the hurch or any disinterested body to insist that the weaker nation hall in practice have its full justice as against a stronger, but that s very different from laying the injustice down as a law and calling rong right.
That is the point that everyone has noticed ; but I expect that he first trouble occurring under the new rule will not be the ggression of a Great Power, but something quite different. Suppose le necessary majority of the Security Council, including all the
Great Powers, decide that some middle-sized Power, such as Canada or Australia, is to do something which the majority of Australians or Canadians are determined not to do, or not to do something which they are determined to do ; what will the issue be? The old League made no pretension to coercing its members. I doubt if the new Council, its authority already undermined by its lack of true justice, will succeed in doing so.
However, the most striking new quality of Dumbarton Oaks, as contrasted with the Covenant, is its absolute concentration on the prevention of war without any mention of justice or international law. Disputes are to be so " adjusted as to avoid a breach of the peace." There are frequent references to " peace-loving States," as if they formed a recognisable class. This raises a suspicion that if there is a dispute between a Great Power and a small, the Organisa- tion will not be much concerned with rights and wrongs, but will " adjust " things so that the small nation shows itself to be " peace- loving " without further trouble. By these concessions the nego- tiators succeeded in their main task ; they got Russia and the U.S.A. into the organisation. That object attained, they proceeded to develop and improve various of the more normal and disinterested activities of the League. The Assembly's sphere of action was at last separated from that of the Council, which saved much incon- venience. The Social, Economic, Philanthropic and Cultural activities of the Organisation were greatly extended, and better- organised Great Powers who followed autarkic principles of isola- tionist traditions need not mind this ; they could not be compelled to co-operate.
As soon as the Dumbarton Oaks plus Yalta scheme was exhibited to the world there was a certain shock. The amendments proposed by the L.N.U., by New Zealand, by various unofficial British and American bodies, by the Swedish Institute of International Affairs, ran mostly on the same lines, and many of them were accepted at San Francisco. The omission of Justice and International Lau was corrected ; a Preamble was added emphasising both and adding " respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms," a clause which may take the place of the old Minority Treaties. Armed force is not to be used " except in the common interest." The Specialised Agencies, created for mutual help during the war or after, are to be co-ordinated with the Organisation. The old Article on Mandates is happily expanded to a whole chapter in Trusteeship, giving in- creased powers and duties to the international committee.
It would be foolish to divide nations into " good " and " bad " or even into " peace-loving " and warlike. Yet there is a great difference in the degree to which different nations are influenced by two powerful contrary motives, the revulsion against the horrors of war and the lure of ambition and glory. The second motive is always to some extent at work in nations which. feel themselves strong and likely to win their wars ; it makes no appeal to those which know that they can only lose. The latter really want the same sort of League as President Wilson ; and the great improve- ments made in the New League since Yalta could generally count on their support. Indeed, at San Francisco the chief operation was a constant debate between the smaller nations and Russia, in which the first step was to get any answer at all from Moscow, and the second to be content with a negative. The problem of the veto is not even yet quite settled ; a Great Power can forbid action, forbid recommendation, forbid investigation ; it is not yet clear if it cart forbid public discussion—a very vital point.
In sum, San Francisco has produced a surprisingly complete and well-considered treaty of world peace in a situation by no means favourable to such an enterprise. The treaty is good ; but the Powers that have signed it leave the Council Chamber armed to the teeth and making—contrary to all the traditions of most of them—universal military service compulsory in peace-time. Who is it they are expect- ing to fight?
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