Another Congo?
By A. 1,,,LATHAM-KOENIG THE end of the Belgian trusteeship over the ,1:.twin territories of Ruanda and Burundi on July 1 and the addition of two new African members to the United Nations have not exactly been greeted with jubilation either in New York or in the territories themselves. It was only after nineteen days of acrimonious debate and thanks
the extraordinary conciliation shown by M. Spaak that the resolution granting independence could be passed at all. Although it calls for the withdrawal of all Belgian forces by the begin- ning of August it in fact allows for their con- tinued presence provided this is requested by the tWa governments.
Ruanda, where relations with the Belgians are excellent, has already announced that it would ask the paratroopers to stay, but Burundi insists on their departure on the scheduled date. There is, however, a real threat of chaos in both terri- tories if they leave prematurely.
An explosive situation has existed already for some time on the Mountains of the Moon, as those high plateaus separating the Sudan, East Africa and the Congo Basin were called in antiquity. It has been created by the complete breakdown in Ruanda and the weakening in Burundi of a rigid racial feudalism which had survived almost intact right up to the 1950s.
When the Belgians received a mandate over this ex-German protectorate in 1923 they found two feudal kingdoms in which a minority race of giant Tutsis of Ethiopian origin had under their Mwamis or Kings reduced to serfdom the great bulk of the population consisting of Hutu peasants of Bantu stock. The latter tended the flocks of lyre-horned cattle, the 'Yarnbos,' of their Tutsi overlords and lived from them. The Belgians, like their Gentian predecessors, did not interfere with this established order of society and contented themselves with abolishing some of its harshest features such as the right of life and death over their subject's enjoyed by the Mwamis. The indirect rule practised by them in fact consolidated the sway of the Tutsis over the Hutus, who later complained of the two-storeyed colonialism (colonialisme a deux etages) which had been imposed upon them. The introduction of education widened further the gulf between the two races since the Tutsis alone, at first, could avail themselves of the new opportunities by reason of their greater wealth and higher social status.
But at the same time the Belgians sowed the seeds of the future emancipation of the Hutus. They introduced coffee, which soon became the mainstay of Ruanda-Urundi's economy and its chief export : it turned the Hutu into a coffee- planter and thus gave him the self-confidence and economic basis necessary for breaking his bonds. The other instruments of his liberation were the enormous development of education after the Second World War, when the mandate was transformed into a trusteeship, and the rapid spread of Christianity, and especially Roman Catholicism, throughout the land. More and more Hutus now attended the primary and secondary schools, and the successes they scored, fully comparable with those gained by the. Tutsis, rid them of any inferiority complex vs-ii-vis their erstwhile masters. Catholicism, which is now the religion' of half the population of the two territories, taught the Hutu that his subjection was not part of the divine order of things and that all men were equal before God. The Churches also opened centres of education for women, and the emancipation of Hutu women became an important factor in the Hutus' struggle for equal rights.
Social progress was followed by political ad- vance which, however, assumed a different shape in each territory. In Burundi the monarchy was less absolutist and centralised than in Ruanda: a certain amount of mixed marriages—a thing unknown in Ruanda—had smoothed relations between the two races and a 'debonair Mwami, Mwambutsa IV, played the role of arbiter be- tween Hutus and Tutsis. A peaceful transition to a constitutional monarchy could thus be effected: it was marred only by the assassination after the last September elections of the Prime Minister, Prince Rwagasore, the son of the ruling Mwami and leader of the majority party UPRONA (Union et Progres National du Burundi). This has revived racial animosity, since the Hutus were suspected of the murder.
Ruanda might have followed the same path had not its Mwami, Mutara, who favoured -con- cessions to the Hutus, now organised in PAR ME- HUTU (Parti du Mouvement d'Emancipation Hutu), died suddenly in 1959. The Tutsi 'ultras, who had founded UNAR (Union Nationale Rziandaise) to defend their threatened privileges, immediately elected his younger brother, Kigeri V, as Mwami.
COmpletely inexperienced and a mere tool in the hands of the extremist Tutsi clique, he was unable to avert the impending disaster. Their 'French Revolution,' as the Hutus call it, broke out in 1959: villages were burnt, the most de- tested Tutsi aristocrats murdered, and thousands of Tutsis fled for safety to the neighbouring Tanganyika and Burundi. Some 100,000 of them are still there, looked after by Christian missions and relief organisations, and thirsting for revenge. They have even started raiding their
homeland and are Known biyenzi (cock- roaches) because they operate by night. Kigeri V himself went into exile soon afterwards With his leading advisers and tried to rally support for his cause first with Lumumba • in Leopoldville, then in Cairo and finally with the Trusteeship Council in New York. Mean- while the Belgian administration switched its support to the Hutus and set up a provisional government under Gregoire Kayibanda, the leader of PARMEHUTU. Having tasted power, the Hutus now stole a march on their Belgian tutors: at Gitamara in January, 1961, they pro- claimed the deposition of Mwami Kigeri and the establishment of a Republic. The BelgianS had to bow to the fait accompli, which was later in the year legalised by legislative elections and Gregoire Kayibanda was elected President of the new Republic of Ruanda.
With Ruanda as a democratic Hutu Republic and Urundi still a Tutsi monarchy all efforts by the United Nations Trusteeship Commission to unite the two territories politically were doomed to failure. At Addis Ababa in April of this year they refused to go further than economic union.
This then is the stage on which independence, has burst last week. In both territories there is a desperate shortage of local cadres, although, the Belgians have done their best for the last to years to train ministers and higher officials fora their new responsibilities. if the present exodus, of the white population goes on, very few Belgian administrators w ill be left on August 1 and if Belgian forces are then withdrawn they too will leave. Economically Ruanda and Burundi depend almost exclusively on sales of coffee to support a population of five million which is increasing at an annual rate of 3.3 per cent. thanks to Belgian achievements in the fields of health an,d1 hygiene. It is impossible therefore to foresee when: they will be able to stand on their own feet since they are entirely deficient in raw materials and, export possibilities are drastically limited by the, enormous transport costs inherent in their pecu7 liar, land-locked situation. Unless financial and technical assistance is steadily pumped in by the. West, these two isolated and destitute communi- ties might soon revert to the bush. Belgium obviously cannot provide all the aid needed and the United Nations faces bankruptcy.
The most Urgent problem however is internal security. The local gendarmeries are still embryonic and would be helpless if confronted with internal strife or an armed attempt by Tutsi refugees to regain power in Ruanda--both of which are distinct possibilities. Since the UN , has no troops to spare, there is no reasonable alternative to the continued presence of Belgiatil forces, at least for some time. But even if a; Congo-like outbreak of violence can be avoided, the political future of these two petty States raises grave doubts. M. Julius Nyerere, it is true, has. talked of an East African Federation that would embrace Ruanda and Burundi. But it is difficult to see how a Republic firmly orientated towards the West and a kingdom leaning increasingly towards revolutionary African nationalism, can fit into such a scheme—and yet if the balkanisa- tion of Africa is to be avoided, both States will eventually have to merge into some larger, viable unit.
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