A VOICE FROM THE PUNJAUB.
Two months ago there appeared in Fraser's Maga=ine a very eloquent article entitled "India in Mourning." The writer then limited himself to facts, postponed criticism and inquiry into causes, and by an original style where moderation was coloured
by deep feeling, succeeded in style, somewhat of Indian experiences in the terrible summer of 1857 to English readers. From the impression left by that paper, we readily welcomed a second by the same writer, on the Politics of the mutiny, in the current number of Fraser, and read it through with much in- terest, though we confess also with some disappointment. The writer sets himself to discuss the causes of the mutiny, and to set forth a view of them which, it is assumed, would meet with the concurrence of nearly all the Anglo-Indian authorities. If that be so, then one result is obtained—we know what those causes were for there is little difference between the Anglo- Indian and the British authorities. First of all, there was a Mahometan conspiracy and Hindoo cooperation. But this belongs rather to the category of means than of motives. The true ques- tion is, why was there a conspiracy ? The answer to this is, that the Sepoy felt the "march of intellect," as shown in the appli- cation of scientific discoveries, such as telegraph and railways to Indian requirements—and the march of British power, which involved service beyond the Indus and. even beyond the sea. Then his discipline was in a fatally relaxed state. The Bengal army had been flattered like a vain beauty, until Sepoys began to think that they fought as well as Europeans, and were indis- gnsable. "They began to regard the discharging of duty or not scharging it as an open question." There can be no doubt, now, that the Sepoy was disgusted, with the acquisition of Oude, not from patriotic but personal motives. The Sepoys were not be- loved in Oude. They were janisaries there, a privileged class ; and direct British government in Oude, abolishing their privileges, was almost as fatal to the Sepoy as Mahraoud's famous specific for his Sepoys. The Bengal army had grown dangerous, arro- pnt, insubordinate, unwieldy, and no one dared to touch it. British improvements hurt its pride and alarmed its fears ; British aggrandizgment gave it a more extensive field of duty ; British control oia it for many reasons had been relaxed, and it had become a fact that Bengal officers had behaved splendidly "in almost every capacity except that of commanders, captains, and subalterns of regular regiments" ; so that in 1857 there were thousands of 'inflated Sepoys commanded by incompetent officers, incompetent at least in time of peace. It must be admitted that this was a composition likely to explode at a touch, like the assassin's shell filled with fulminating mercury and studded with caps. Caste was one of the caps of the great Bengal shell, and the greased cartridge affair was the force that fired it. But there was another condition essential to a successful explo- sion of the Mahometa.n conspiracy, which the Oude Pierres and Jailers -assiduously set on foot and expanded. It was that this enormous and combustible Bengal army was too big in proportion to the guropean force. The writer in Fraser regards this as "the great cause of all, the simple cause" ; but he is in error in supposing that he is the first to netice it. Whatever may be its value as a cause, the fact has been often noticed on this side of the world, but can hardly be noticed enough. Fraser's contributor says— "That the European force had become too small, will not now be disputed by any man ; that the fact was fully appreciated by the Natives, was proved by the letters intercepted at every post-office. The one idea in the Native mind, if indeed they had any one idea in common—was this, that black pepper was very common and twd pepper very scarce' ; that ' white wheat was hardly to be had, but all other grain was amply abundant.' In such figurative language they communicated to each other the discovery they had made, that the odds of Natives to Europeans were some thirty thousand to one. There is no one fact the conviction of which was more likely to pro- duce a revolution among the people or a mutiny in the army." This hits the blot. No stronger condemnation of our East In- dian policy, whether Crown's or Company's can be devised than the simple statement of fact that we permitted our Asian procon- suls to add kingdoms to our sway without at the same time support- ing conquest by the presence of British legions ; and that we could, only give a White garrison to the Punjaub by confiding the great highway from Calcutta to the Sutkj almost exclasively to a Black one.
So far as the treatment of this question of the causes of the mutiny, the Anglo-Punjabi seems to be sound and suggestive. It is the treatment of that part of the subject which deals with the suppression of the mutiny that is disappointing. On all that re- lates to the maintenance of the Punjaub, and the truly real go- vernment of Sir John Lawrence—" the saviour of India," as Mr. Mangles called him—this writer is a good authority. In treating of matters East of the Sutlej, he labours under the disadvantage of being cut off from ample supplies of correct information, which renders his position unfavourable for a judge. Lord Canning has enough to answer for based on known facts ; he need not be con- demned on incorrect data. Take away front him the credit of collecting reinforcements from the Colonies and China, and give it, if you please, to Lord Elgin and. the Colonial Governors, (no- tably, the noble-hearted Sir George Grey at the Cape " I) but do not accuse him so roundly of delaying regiments at Calcutta— since we have Mr. Sidney Herbert's testimony to the rapidity with which, by a novel mode, they were hurried up the country ; do not say that his proclamations only "hindered, hampered, perplexed, and insulted the Executive "—since Sir John Lawrence can be quoted in praise of them ; do not accuse him at once of not sending every bayonet to Havelock, and of not "snatching the sword and matchlock from thehand of every Native "—seeing that the two charges are incompatible. Nor is it just to accuse Lord Canning with showing a coldness and indifference towards his un- happy countrymen. It is unfortunate that an eulogy upon the Lawrences should be prefaced by an attack upon Lord Canning, written in the spirit of the Calcutta petition. We cannot think that this is the view which the majority of Indians would take of Lord Canning, or that these are the points on which they would assail his policy. That he underrated the mutiny, not only in March but in May, seems certain ; but, when once convinced of its magnitude, evidence is wanting to show that he lacked energy, or that he did not make a good use of his means. Then as to the late Home Government. Bitter is the complaint that they sent troops "round the Cape" ; that they could reinforce "imperilled officers in India after no other fashion than that by which their predecessors reinforced Lord Clive"; that they did. not use the overland route. Not to dwell on the feet that there is a vast difference between the ships of the nineteenth and those of the eighteenth century, and show that the Lord Clive parallel does not hold good, it may be remarked that political rea- sons, as well as physical reasons—the difficulty of securing ships at Suez, and the unhealthy character of the journey in summer— must have influenced. the Minister. Of course Indians think of nothing but the salvation of India, and in so thinking lose sight of the fact that Egypt is not .yet British territory, and that to use it as a highway for troops is introducing a precedent by no means pleasant either to Turkey or to other European Governments. Indians speak of Egypt too much as if it were a strip of their own country. But it may be admitted that had Ministers been as well aware at the end. of June of the gravity of the crisis in In- dia as the gentlemen in the Punjaub, they would probably have risked the political perils, and also the health of the troops, in order to place a few hundred soldiers at the orders of the Gover- nor-General before the summer expired; at all events, they would not have sent out the earliest regiments round the Cape in ships almost as slow as the ships of Clive.
At the close of his letter the writer makes some inevitable errors, because he wrote without information. Thus he says, writing in the middle of December, that "we have been obliged to evacuate Oude, "—whereas Sir James Outram remained at the Alum- bagh ; and that of the army sent from England not a single com- pany had reached Allahabad,—whereas two or three regiments, which did. not sail from England until June, were engaged in the actions at Lucknow and Cawnpore under Sir Colin Campbell. "Christmas arrived " and did not find us "on the defensive,"—but found Luoknow relieved, the Alumbagh retained, and the Gwa- lior Contingent dispersed. But the source of these errors is ex- plained in a few words : "The Punjaub is still oat off completely from all India below Delhi." It is not so now.
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