Even the citizens of Teheran themselves must have found it hard at times in the past week to make out who was on which side of the barricades and what all the fuss was about. But the pattern which finally emerged from the confusion was one which has been seen on more than one occasion in recent years—Moussadek versus the rest. The Court, the Army, displaced officers and officials, the Mullah Kashani and the Tudeh Party, all have their own reasons for disliking Dr. Moussadek. As an opposition, however, they suffer from the fatal weakness of having no common programme and no mutual trust. It is not enough for the mob to shout " Down with Moussadek I " unless it can agree on an alternative Prime Minister. This the opposition could not do. There is no doubt that the Mullah Kashani, who has the highest opinion of his own talents, would like to regain more active control over Persian politics. There is no doubt that the Shah is . unhappy at Dr. Moussadek's recent tendency to arrogate more and more powers to himself for the purpose, apparently, of doing less and less. But this does not make an alliance between Kashani and the Court a workable arrangement. Still less is it possible for the common dislike of Dr. Moussadek, shared both by the Army and the Tudeh Party, to overcome their instinctive antipathy to each other. Thus it seems that Dr. Moussadek is destined once again to triumph, and his opponents to suffer a further decline in reputation. All this; of course, has nothing to do.with a solution of the oil problem or of Persia's other problems. The fact that all these acute difficulties are left exactly where they were a week ago is a warning that a repetition of the recent crisis, in some form or another, cannot be long delayed.