THE DANGER AT GIBRALTAR.
AGREAT naval battle has been fought with modern guns and modern ships of war. There has been an alarm of war with France. These two facts have suddenly turned the attention of all England to the Fleet, and to naval affairs. At no time in living memory has so much space been given by the newspapers to the discus- sion of sea-power and sea-tactics and strategy. But when Englishmen begin to talk of sea-power and the possibility of war with France, they soon get to the problem of the Mediterranean, and of our being able to hold our own there. But the Mediterranean problem necessarily in- volves Gibraltar. Try what solution of it you will, you must always have Gibraltar as one of the most important factors. If we are to maintain ourselves in full force in the Mediterranean Gibraltar is essential as a base of operations and a dace of arms. If we decide to evacuate the Mediterranean, and to use the Cape route to India, Gibraltar is equally important as a coaling-station, a watch-tower, and as a means of preventing hostile fleets issuing through the Straits and preying on our commerce. Let any man think out the various situations which would arise with a war with France, and he will find that Gibraltar is always turning up as the essential point. In all probability, the great naval battle which would decide a war between France and England, and so the fate of the British Empire, would be fought in or near the Straits of Gibraltar.
Were war unhappily to take • place with France, the first fact which would strike England between the eyes would be the danger of the destruction of our Mediterranean Fleet by a superior French fleet. Depend upon it, when, or if, war comes, France will be stronger than we are in the Mediterranean, and other things being equal—and they are equal in the supposed ease—the stronger fleet will win. Our first object, then, will be to supplement our fleet in the Mediterranean, and to bring its strength up to that of the French. But in order to do that we shall not tell our Mediter- ranean Fleet to stop at Malta till we can send our ships two thousand miles to reinforce it. Instead, we shall order it to meet the reinforcements half- way. That is, the last order sent over the wires will in all probability be one requiring our Mediterranean Fleet to meet the reinforcing fleet at Gibraltar. But the French will know, what we are doing by the very simple process of re- flecting that there is nothing else we can do. Accord- ingly they will order their Mediterranean fleet also to the Gut of Gibraltar. Either they will try to intercept and smash up our Mediterranean Fleet before it reaches Gibraltar, or they will get there first and engage our reinforcing fleet before the Mediterranean Fleet comes up. If the first happens, then our fleet will have to fly as best it can, fighting a running battle, ultimately taking refuge under the guns of Gibraltar, and there repairing the damage done to it. In the second case, a battle between the French and the reinforcing squadron will take place in the Straits. Again, it is possible that all the squadrons might arrive together at Gibraltar. That is, first the main French fleet sent out to prevent the junction of the English reinforcing fleet and the English Mediterranean Fleet ; next, our reinforcing fleet and then our Mediterranean Fleet ; and finally, a, French squadron sent from Brest to fall on the rear of our reinforcing squadron. There are, of course, endless variations of the puzzle, the chief condition of which, as in all war, will be for either side to try to meet a small fleet with a big. But work out these variations as you may, it will always be found that Gibraltar is the " constants" and that the necessity for combining Channel and Mediter- ranean Fleets, in the case both of ourselves and of the French, keeps the Rock, as the point of meeting, a place of the utmost importance. But it is obvious that if we are to have as many advantages as possible in the game (and we shall want them all if we are at war with France), Gibraltar ought not only to be an impregnable fortress, but a naval harbour of refuge and a place where the thousand and one structural repairs required by an ironclad which has been in action can be carried out. If Gibraltar is such a place and is in our hands it is clear that we have gaineda great deal. If a squadron can safely wait at Gibraltar till reinforced, or if injured ships can be repaired there, we have a naval base of immense value. The question is,—" Have we such a place in Gibraltar ? " Unfortunately the answer must be "No." Gibraltar, as it is to-day, is little more than a name or a memory. If war were to be declared to-morrow we could not use Gibraltar for the important purposes just enumerated. The Gib- raltar Committee, which is engaged in the patriotic work of bringing the condition of the Rock home to the public mind, have, in a paper just issued by them, given an accurate description of the present inability of Gibraltaa- to fill the requirements of a naval base. This is what they say on the subject of protection :—" There is no protection of any kind whatever ; the anchorage is open, and, though to a certain extent covered by the guns of the fortress by day, cannot possibly be protected at night. The fact of there being no inclosed water space makes the danger of torpedo attack particularly serious. The French torpedo- boat organisation in the Mediterranean is exceedingly com- plete, and no less than three of the French stations are within easy striking distance of the fortress. The impos- sibility of protecting an open roadstead against torpedo- boat attack at night is now generally admitted." Hence it would be impossible either for a weak squadron or for mer- chantmen to seek temporary shelter at Gibraltar. The con- ditions as to docking and repairing are equally unfavour- able. " There are no appliances at Gibraltar for repairing any ship, large or small, provided the injury to the vessel is below the water-line. There is a small and ill-equipped dockyard, but no dock. Every ship injured in action in the neighbourhood of the Straits must take refuge under the guns of Gibraltar, and must remain there either until the war be at an end, or until she is torpedoed at her moorings." The memorandum of the Gibraltar Com- mittee goes on to point out that, apart from any damage from the enemy, an unsheathed iron vessel must go into dock once in every three or four months, in order to retain her full efficiency and speed. " The despatch of a single injured vessel to Malta or Devonport, a distance of almost a thousand miles in either direction, in the face of a hostile force in the Mediterranean or the Bay of Biscay re- spectively, is not an operation which could be undertaken in war." But France has almost unlimited powers of repairing injured• ships within the limits of the Mediter- ranean. Hence, even in the event of a successful naval action in the Straits, the British fleet might easily be in a more dangerous position after its victory than the enemy's fleet after its defeat. An example of the great danger arising from the total absence of dock accommodation at Gibraltar is supplied. Not long ago, the ' Malabar,' re- turning from India with two thousand invalids and time- expired men, came into collision with a French steamer in the Straits. "Unable to dock at Gibraltar, she was com- pelled to proceed to Cadiz, where she was placed in quarantine by the Spanish authorities, and, as a result, nearly sank before the necessary repairs could be effected in the foreign dockyard." The present arrangements for coaling at Gibraltar are also most defective. We will not, however, go into them on the present occasion. It is enough to point out that by not making Gibraltar into a proper naval base, we are throwing away a very great advantage. Two things are wanted, and are known to be wanted by the Admiralty, and are quite feasible, and yet we make no serious attempt to provide them. These two things are (1) a large enclosed anchorage, (2) , sufficient dock accommodation. Instead of giving this, the Government propose to spend a little every year on continuing the new mole, and also a little every year on a single dock. They propose, that is, to take eight or nine years to do something, which, when it is done, will be totally inadequate. What is required is something immediate, and something that will be adequate. Strangely enough, the Government have had an offer from a private syndicate to do all that is absolutely essential, and to do it for nothing and at once, in exchange for the right to sell coal and charge dock-dues to merchantmen, and for a piece of water space on which to make the docks, and to build coal-stores. i Here are the terms of the offer given in the words of Mr. Arnold-Forster :—" A million is to be spent ; a deep-water protected anchorage is to be provided ; six docks are to be created; a coal-store sufficient for the whole Mediterranean Fleet is to be erected. The Admiralty are to have the first right to uge the docks, and to use them free of cost ; they are to be allowed to buy the whole concern if it succeeds, or to acquire it by effiuxion of time if they prefer to pay a small annual subsidy. In return the country is asked to do what ? In the first place to grant the use of a water space which is at present not only useless but dangerous ; and, in the second place to give to an English company the right to sell coal and to dock ships at Gibraltar." Yet the Admiralty refused this offer on the ground that the docks would not be the best possible form of dock for Gibraltar, and that they did not want any private company interfering on the Rock and bringing work- people there who might be a worry in case of war. In other words, they were afraid that the docks and coal-stores might turn Gibraltar into a great port, that a great port might mean a great population, and that a great population would be a trouble to keep in case of siege. These answers are, in our opinion, utterly futile. Surely imperfect but still usable docks now are better than idealidoclis in twenty years, or more probably never, As for the population objection we have hardly patience to discuss it. Let the Government of Gibraltar force the workmen to live, as most of them do now, at La Linea or Algeciras, and come to their work either on their feet or in steam-tugs. The population difficulty is no difficulty at all, if it is properly met. Still, there may be some hidden objection to the syndicate's offer. But if it is a good one, why not state it ? It need not be stated pub- licly. A really valid objection would only have to be stated confidentially to the Gibraltar Committee to make them give up pressing this offer. Till such a course is taken, we can only believe that the Admiralty objections are those they have stated, and those are totally in- adequate.
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